Technology and regulation as determinants of employment rigidities and wage inequality. by Goos, Maarten
TECHNOLOGY AND REGULATION AS 
DETERMINANTS OF EMPLOYMENT RIGIDITIES AND
WAGE INEQUALITY
Thesis submitted for the degree of Ph.D. in Economics,
Candidate: Maarten Goos
Supervisor: Professor Alan Manning
London School of Economics and Political Sciences 
University of London
October 2005
UMI Number: U61BB64
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U613364
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346

ABSTRACT
Chapter I, “Lousy and lovely jobs: the rising polarization o f work in Britain ”, 
shows that the UK since 1975 has exhibited a pattern of job polarization with rises in 
employment shares in the highest- and lowest-wage occupations. This is not entirely 
consistent with the standard view of skill-biased technical change as a hypothesis 
about the impact of technology on the labor market. However, a more nuanced view 
of skill-biased technological change recently proposed by Autor, Levy and Mumane 
[2003] (ALM) is a better explanation of job polarization. ALM argue persuasively 
that technology can replace human labor in routine tasks, be they manual or cognitive, 
but (as yet) cannot replace human labor in non-routine tasks. Since non-routine tasks 
are concentrated at both ends of the earnings distribution, it is shown that ALM’s 
routinization hypothesis can explain one-third of the rise in the log(50/10) and one- 
half of the rise in the log(90/50) wage differential.
Chapter II, “The impact o f  shop closing hours on labor and product markets ”, 
adds to a small but growing literature related to the idea that product market 
regulation affects employment. More specifically, it is argued that shop closing hours 
can affect the level and composition of employment in retail industries. First, this 
chapter exploits recent changes in US Sunday Closing Laws to find that total 
employment, total revenue and the number of shops increase in deregulating 
industries and possibly decrease in non-deregulating industries. Second, building on 
what we know about retail markets, a model is presented to show how consumer 
behavior and retail competition can explain the observed impact of deregulation on 
retail labor and product markets and therefore ultimately employment.
Chapter III, “The recent expansion o f higher education in Britain, college 
premiums and wage inequality”, examines the impact of changes in the relative 
supply of college workers on college premiums and wage inequality between 1975 
and 2003 in the UK. First, it provides a test for the hypothesis proposed by Card and 
Lemieux [2001] (CL) that the inter-cohort slowdown in college attainment growth 
rates explains the higher college premiums for cohorts bom between 1955 and 1970. 
More precisely, the chapter examines the expansion of Britain’s higher education 
system between 1988 and 1994 to find lower relative earnings for college graduates 
bom between 1970 and 1976, in line with the CL hypothesis. Second, accounting for
a positive time trend in college attainment and a secular increase in the relative 
demand for college workers, it is shown that the slowdown in educational attainment 
for cohorts bom between 1955 and 1970 can explain an important part of the increase 
in the average college premium and a significant part of the increase in wage 
inequality after 1980. Relative to the secular increase in the demand for and supply of 
college workers, the recent expansion of Britain’s higher education system is thus 
expected to significantly reduce the average college premium and therefore wage 
inequality.
Chapter IV, “Cyclicality and fixed effects in gross job flows: a European cross 
country analysis”, uses information on manufacturing establishments during the 
1990s in Belgium, France, Italy and the UK to examine whether time series of 
employment dynamics behave differently across countries and whether persistent 
differences exist in gross job flows that are countiy or industry specific. The results 
suggest job destruction is more cyclically volatile in the UK compared to Continental 
European countries. In the longer-run, a country fixed effect best captures the process 
of job reallocation whereas industiy specific differences are not important. Symmetry 
of job creation and destruction over the business cycle and the existence of country 
specific differences in gross job flows most likely reflect the importance of different 
labor market regulations in Continental European countries.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
A complicated model would be needed to explain every possible labor market 
outcome and only high quality data could support its hypotheses. However, this thesis 
aims to show that testing the relevance of simple labor market models using publicly 
available data, already goes some distance towards a better understanding of recent 
changes in employment shares and wage inequality.
Chapter I, “Lousy and lovely jobs: the rising polarization o f work in Britain ”, 
starts from a simple framework considering the relative demand for skilled workers to 
emphasize the role played by technological change. More precisely, this chapter 
amplifies a recent paper by Autor, Levy and Mumane [2003] (ALM) arguing that 
technology can replace human labor in routine tasks but (as yet) cannot replace human 
labor in non-routine tasks. If the ALM hypothesis is correct then we might expect to 
see evidence for it in other areas.
First consider the employment impact of ALM’s routinization hypothesis. The 
routine tasks in which technology can substitute for human labor include jobs like 
craft manual jobs and book-keeping jobs that require precision and, hence, were never 
the least paid jobs in the labor market. The non-routine tasks which are 
complementary to technology include highly paid professional and managerial jobs 
but also many of the most unskilled jobs that rely on hand-eye coordination that 
virtually all humans find easy but machines find enormously difficult. If this is true, 
the impact of technology will be to lead to rising relative demand in well-paid jobs, 
but also rising relative demand in low-paid jobs and falling relative demand in 
middling jobs -  a process we call job polarization.
Turning to the wage impact of ALM’s routinization hypothesis, it is then shown 
that job polarization in the UK can explain one-third of the rise in the log(50/10) and
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one-half of the rise in the log(90/50) wage differential between 1975 and 1999. 
However, the finding that the wages in the lowest paid jobs are falling relative to 
those in the middling jobs presents something of a puzzle for the ALM hypothesis as 
one might expect the opposite to happen if relative demand is rising in the lowest paid 
jobs relative to the middling jobs.
Chapter II, “The impact o f shop closing hours on labor and product markets ”, 
argues that, besides technological change, also product market deregulation can 
increase the relative demand for low-wage work. More precisely, using deregulation 
of shop opening hours and building on what we know about the structure of retail 
markets, this chapter examines how deregulation affects retail labor and product 
markets and therefore ultimately employment.
First, the chapter shows that after 1977 different US states deregulated their 
Sunday Closing Laws at different points in time. Using a number of specifications and 
estimators, it is shown that deregulation significantly increased employment, revenue 
and the number of shops in deregulating industries. However, it is also shown that 
deregulation most likely decreased employment, revenue and the number of shops in 
industries exempted from Sunday Closing Laws.
The chapter then presents a model building on standard assumptions about 
retail markets to explain the observed impact of deregulation on employment, sales 
and the number of shops in deregulating and non-deregulating industries. For 
deregulating industries, it is argued that longer shop opening hours will increase 
employment because labor partially is a quasi-fixed input factor that only varies with 
opening times (threshold labor effect). In so far the observed increase in revenue due 
to increased product demand reflects an increase in the volume of sales, employment 
will further increase (sales effect). Finally, if the increase in revenue offsets the
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increase in labor costs, retailers will find it profitable to extend their opening hours in 
the short-run. In the long-run, the number of shops will therefore increase, further 
increasing employment (entry effect). However, to the extend that consumers 
substitute income towards deregulating industries, employment will fall in non­
deregulating industries because of a decrease in total spending (sales effect) and a 
decrease in the number of shops (exit effect). In line with the empirical evidence, 
these are the channels through which it is argued that deregulation affects retail labor 
and product markets and therefore ultimately employment.
Chapter III, “The recent expansion o f higher education in Britain, college 
premiums and wage inequality”, turns to the importance of shifts in the relative 
supply of skilled workers. More precisely, following Card and Lemieux [2001] (CL), 
a simple model is presented showing that in a period of accelerating (decelerating) 
educational attainment, age group specific educational premiums are likely to twist so 
that inequality among younger workers compresses (expands) relative to the old. 
Consequently, inter-cohort differences in college attainment growth rates are expected 
to affect the average college premium and therefore wage inequality over time.
This chapter first provides some further evidence in support of the CL hypothesis 
that inter-cohort differences in college attainment growth rates can significantly affect 
college premiums across age groups. Using data for the UK between 1975 and 1996, 
CL have shown that college premiums for cohorts bom between 1955 and 1970 are 
higher due to a slowdown in the growth of educational attainment between 1973 and 
1988. In line with the CL hypothesis, this chapter uses data for the UK up to 2003 to 
find higher relative earnings for cohorts bom between 1955 and 1970 and lower 
relative earnings for cohorts bom between 1970 and 1976 following Britain’s 
expansion in higher education between 1988 and 1994.
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The chapter then turns to the question whether a steady trend in the relative 
demand for or supply of college workers is sufficient to explain the rise in the average 
college premium and therefore wage inequality after 1980. It is shown that a 
significant part of the increase in the average college premium and a significant part 
of the rise in wage inequality can be explained by the slowdown in college attainment 
growth rates for cohorts bom between 1955 and 1970. Relative to the secular increase 
in the demand for and supply of college workers, the recent expansion of Britain’s 
higher education system is thus expected to significantly decrease the average college 
premium and therefore wage inequality.
Chapter IV, “Cyclicality and fixed effects in gross job flows: A European cross 
country analysis”, uses an establishment-panel data set to examine the variation in 
employment flows across four European countries and narrowly defined 
manufacturing industries during the 1990s. The key issues addressed in this chapter 
are whether cyclical variation in employment dynamics behaves differently across 
countries and whether time persistent differences exist that are country or industry 
specific.
Using comparable information on manufacturing establishments for four 
European countries (Belgium, France, Italy and the UK), this chapter shows that job 
destruction is more cyclically volatile than job creation only in the UK. Contrary to 
this, Baldwin, Dunne and Haltiwanger (1998) use harmonised data for manufacturing 
industries in Canada and the US to find that job destruction is more cyclically volatile 
in both countries.
Examining the between-country variation in employment adjustments for the US 
and Canada, Baldwin, Dunne and Haltiwanger (1998) also find that country specific 
differences are not important and that the process of job reallocation in both countries
4
is best explained by an industry fixed effect. However, this chapter shows that a 
country fixed effect best captures the process of job reallocation whereas an industry 
fixed effect is not important. It is therefore argued that different labor market 
institutions in Continental European countries could partially explain the absence of 
higher cyclical volatility in job destruction as well as the existence of persistent 
country specific differences in employment adjustments.
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CHAPTER I 
LOUSY AND LOVELY JOBS: THE RISING POLARIZATION 
OF WORK IN BRITAIN1
1 This chapter is joint work with my supervisor Alan Manning. A statement of co-authorship is attached 
at the end of this chapter.
INTRODUCTION
Economists writing about the impact of technology on the labor market in recent 
years have tended to emphasize the role played by skill-biased technical change 
(SBTC), the idea that technology is biased in favor of skilled workers and against 
unskilled workers. The idea of SBTC has primarily been used to explain rising wage 
inequality (see Katz and Autor [1999] for a survey of a very large literature). But a 
recent paper by Autor, Levy and Mumane (ALM) [2003] has argued for a more 
nuanced way of understanding the impact of technology in general (and computers in 
particular) on the labor market2. They argue persuasively that technology can replace 
human labor in routine tasks, be they manual or cognitive, but (as yet) cannot replace 
human labor in non-routine tasks3. The ALM hypothesis is intuitively plausible and 
they provide evidence that industries in which routine skills were heavily used have 
seen the most adoption of computers, and this has reduced the extent of routine skills 
in those industries (see Spitz [2003] for similar evidence for Germany). But, if the 
ALM hypothesis is correct then we might expect to see evidence for it in other areas: 
this is the aim of this chapter.
The basic idea is the following. The SBTC hypothesis predicts that demand for 
‘skilled’ jobs is rising relative to that in ‘unskilled’ jobs, while the ALM hypothesis 
suggests a more subtle impact of technology on the demand for labor of different 
skills. The routine tasks in which technology can substitute for human labor include
2 See also Card and DiNardo [2002] for the argument that SBTC is not as successful in explaining 
wage inequality as commonly thought
3 The idea of jobs as a set of tasks that differ in how easily machines can displace human labour is not 
new and goes back to at least Herbert Simon [I960]. Unlike more expansive computer scientists of that 
time, Simon had a clear sense of what computers would and would not be able to do and his predictions 
are broadly consistent with both the ALM hypothesis and the ideas advanced in this chapter. Simon 
starts from the prediction that complex information processing programs will supplant labor in routine 
jobs intense in many relatively simple and repetitive eye-brain-hand sequences. Consequently, workers 
will sort into non-routine jobs requiring the flexible use of the brain, eyes, hands and legs.
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jobs like craft manual jobs and book-keeping jobs that require precision and, hence, 
were never the least-skilled jobs in the labor market. The non-routine tasks which are 
complementary to technology include ‘skilled’ professional and managerial jobs that 
tend to be in the upper part of the wage distribution. The non-routine manual tasks 
that make up many of the most ‘unskilled’ jobs such as cleaning are not directly 
affected by technology but the impact of technology in other parts of the economy is 
likely to lead to a rise in employment in these jobs. If this is true then the impact of 
technology will be to lead to rising relative demand in well-paid skilled jobs (that 
typically require non-routine cognitive skills) and in low-paid least skilled jobs (that 
typically require non-routine manual skills) and falling relative demand in the 
‘middling’ jobs that have typically required routine manual and cognitive skills -  a 
process we call job polarization. This chapter documents that the pattern of 
employment changes in Britain over the period 1975-99 is consistent with job 
polarization and the consequences of that.
A literature related to the idea of job polarization has emerged more recently -  the 
‘job quality’ debate in the US. Some of the early papers on the rise in US wage 
inequality (e.g. Bluestone and Harrison [1988]) argued that there was an increasing 
number of low-wage jobs and a shrinking number of ‘middling’ jobs. This was 
controversial even at the time (e.g. see Kosters and Ross [1988]) and most labor 
economists came to the conclusion that the problem for low-skill workers was a 
declining number of jobs for them rather than an increasing number (see Burtless 
[1990]). But, in the 1990s one can still find a number of papers continuing to address 
the major themes of the job quality debate (see, for example, Costrell [1990], Howell 
and Wolff [1991], Levy and Mumane [1992], Juhn, Murphy and Pierce [1993], 
Murphy and Welch [1993], Gittleman and Howell [1995], Ilg [1996], Farber [1997],
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Acemoglu [1999, 2001], Juhn [1999], Ilg and Haugen [2000], Wright and Dwyer 
[2003]). Although these studies do differ slightly in their conclusions, common 
themes do emerge, most notably that, in the last 30 years, there has been a very big 
increase in the number of high-paid jobs and (probably) an increase in the number of 
low-paid service jobs -  this is broadly consistent with the job polarization prediction 
of the ALM hypothesis although few of these papers offer this interpretation of their 
results.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. In the first section, we use the US data from 
Autor, Levy and Mumane [2003] to show that the jobs that require non-routine tasks 
tend to be at the top and bottom of the wage distribution while the jobs that require 
routine tasks tend to be in the middle, thus leading to the job polarization prediction. 
The second section describes the data used for the UK. The third section then 
documents how job polarization can be observed in the UK between 1975 and 1999 
when the quality of jobs is defined by their median wage. There has been a growth in 
lousy jobs (mainly in low-paying service occupations) together with a (much larger) 
growth in lovely jobs (mainly in professional and managerial occupations in finance 
and business services) and a decline in the number of middling jobs (mainly clerical 
jobs and skilled manual jobs in manufacturing). We document that one sees these 
trends using all measures of employment, for men and women together or separately 
and for all definitions of ‘jobs’ that we use. We also show that a method used by 
Juhn, Murphy and Pierce [1993] and Juhn [1999] to predict employment growth at 
each percentile of the wage distribution also supports the hypothesis of job 
polarization. And although the pattern of changes in the occupational structure of 
employment is broadly consistent with the ALM hypothesis, other factors may be 
important and the fourth section considers some of them. We discuss the potential
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importance of changes in the composition of the labor force (e.g. from the rising labor 
market participation of women, the changing age and education structure), the 
structure of consumer demand and trade. It is likely that all of these factors are 
important for employment changes in at least some occupations but none of these 
hypotheses seem able to explain the broad sweep of job polarization.
As an increase in the relative demand for low-wage workers (relative to middling 
workers) is not in line with the predictions of the SBTC hypothesis, sections five and 
six consider the evidence most commonly cited in favor of that hypothesis. Section 
five considers the rise in the employment of non-manual workers - we argue that the 
pattern of within and between industry changes in employment observed at the 1-digit 
occupation level is consistent with the ALM hypothesis that technical progress has 
displaced the labor of clerical and manual workers in all sectors of the economy but 
that differential productivity growth between manufacturing and service sectors has 
led to the growth in low-wage service employment (as originally proposed by Baumol 
[1967]). Section six documents that the well-known shift towards more educated labor 
has largely occurred within jobs and that there has been a rapid rise in educational 
attainment of workers even in the worst jobs. There are two possible interpretations 
of this. First, that there has been SBTC within jobs as we define them so that the 
consensus view on the importance of SBTC is correct. Secondly, that as the 
educational attainment of all groups in the population has risen but the job distribution 
has become more polarized, some educated workers are forced into the low-skill jobs 
at the bottom end of the distribution. The attraction of this view is that it can explain 
why there has been a simultaneous rise in the returns to education (the demand for 
educated workers has increased as the number of good jobs has increased) and in the 
level of over-education as some have claimed. Distinguishing between these
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hypotheses requires evidence on changing skill requirements within jobs that is hard 
to find. We review two pieces of evidence that might shed light on these questions 
although they are somewhat contradictory in their implications.
Section seven considers the extent to which the observed job polarization can 
explain the rise in wage inequality between the 1970s and 1990s. We find that a 
modest part of the rise in wage inequality can be explained by the polarization of jobs 
alone but that once one includes the fact that wage growth seems to be monotonically 
positively related to the quality of jobs one can explain most of the evolution of wage 
inequality. The implication is that the rise in ‘within-group’ wage inequality that 
others have emphasized is more a product of a restricted definition of a ‘group’ and 
that if one includes jobs controls then it largely disappears. However the finding that 
the wages in the lousy jobs are falling relative to those in the ‘middling’ jobs presents 
something of a problem for the ALM hypothesis as one might expect the opposite if 
relative demand is rising in the lousy relative to the middling jobs. The final section 
concludes.
I. ROUTINE JOBS, NON-ROUTINE JOBS AND TECHNICAL CHANGE
This section shows how the Autor, Levy and Mumane [2003] view of the impact 
of technology on the demand for different skills predicts job polarization. ALM use 
the US Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) to associate particular occupations 
with the intensity of use of five particular types of task. The types of task included in 
the analysis are chosen to represent those that are affected in different ways by 
technology -  they label them non-routine cognitive, non-routine interactive, routine
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cognitive, routine manual and non-routine manual (see Autor, Levy and Mumane 
[2003] for a more detailed description of the tasks given these labels).
ALM then show that industries that were relatively intensive users of occupations 
that use routine tasks had more computerization and that the extent of the use of 
routine skills has fallen in these industries. Here we pursue an angle of the ALM 
hypothesis that ALM do not develop -  namely that jobs that can be routinized are not 
distributed uniformly across the wage distribution. The central idea is that non­
routine manual jobs are concentrated in the lower percentiles of the wage distribution 
whereas non-routine cognitive and interactive jobs are concentrated in the top end of 
the wage range with routine jobs concentrated in the middle.
ALM argue that the non-routine cognitive and interactive tasks are 
complementary to technology, the routine tasks are substitutes and the non-routine 
manual tasks are not directly affected. However this should not be taken to mean 
there will be no effects of technology on employment in occupations that primarily 
consist of non-routine manual tasks. The reason is the general equilibrium effect first 
identified by Baumol [1967] -  employment will shift towards jobs in which 
productivity growth is low (because technology is not applied there) in order to keep 
the balance of output in different products. Baumol applied his argument to the shift 
in employment from manufacturing to services but it is relevant in the current context 
as well. As a result, technological progress can be expected to result in job 
polarization with employment growth in lovely and lousy jobs and employment falls 
in ‘middling’ jobs.
Table I presents a simple way of showing that the non-routine jobs are 
concentrated at the top and bottom of the wage distribution. We use wage 
information from the CPS MORG 1983 file and assign to each individual the five task
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measures in 1977 used by ALM based on their occupations4. All skills are measured 
on a 10-point scale, although these should not be taken to be comparable across tasks. 
Table I tabulates the fraction of workers that have DOT scores above the overall mean 
DOT score for the 5 different tasks as a percentage of total employment within the 
three terciles of the wage distribution. For example, only 17% of all workers in the 
lowest paid occupations are in jobs that require above average non-routine cognitive 
skills. But 88% percent of workers in the highest paid occupations are in jobs that 
require above average non-routine cognitive skill. A similar picture holds for the non­
routine interactive skills: occupations intensive in non-routine interactive skills are 
concentrated in the upper part of the wage distribution. In contrast, routine-intensive 
occupations are concentrated in the middle. Of workers in occupations earning 
between the 33rd and 66th wage percentiles, 63 % require above average routine 
cognitive and 58 % above average routine manual skills. These numbers are higher 
than for any other specified wage range. Finally, the lowest paid occupations require 
a higher fraction of non-routine manual skills and its fraction is higher than for any 
other occupation paying higher wages.
This section has shown some direct evidence that workers in the middling jobs 
used to do routine tasks, while workers in lousy and lovely jobs did non-routine tasks. 
Since non-routine jobs are concentrated in both tails of the wage distribution, the 
ALM hypothesis predicts an increasing polarization of the workforce into lousy and 
lovely jobs. This predicted process of polarization provides an explanation for the 
empirical “facts” in an ongoing debate about the quality of jobs mentioned in the 
introduction.
4 We are grateful to David Autor for making the DOT data available to us. The year 1983 is the earliest 
year for which the DOT occupations can be merged into CPS data.
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Table I
DOT Task Density by Wage Percentiles
DOT Task Measure Mean DOT Task 
Measure
Fraction of workers above mean DOT 
task measure by wage percentiles
<33 33-66 >66
Non-Routine Cognitive
3.755 0.17 0.48 0.88
Non-Routine Interactive
2.417 0.03 0.14 0.59
Routine Cognitive
4.582 0.37 0.63 0.43
Routine Manual
3.901 0.28 0.58 0.35
Non-Routine Manual
1.198 0.49 0.33 0.31
Notes: Task inputs are measured as in ALM [2003] and are between 0 and 10. The mean DOT task 
measure is the 1977 mean across 3-digit occupations. Wage percentiles are taken from the CPS MORG 
1983file.
II. THE DATA
The main data in this chapter comes from Britain but we would expect the task 
composition of occupations and the impact of technology to be very similar to that 
observed in the US. The data used in this chapter come from two sources, the New 
Earnings Survey (NES) and the Labor Force Survey (LFS). The New Earnings 
Survey is an annual panel dataset that started in 1968 though the first year for which 
computerized records are available is 1975, the sample being all individuals whose 
National Insurance number ends in ‘14’. In April of each year the tax records are 
used to contact the employer of each of these workers who reports information on 
pay, hours, and, importantly for this chapter, occupation and industry. Although the
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NES is in theory a random sample, it is known to under-sample certain groups in 
practice, notably part-time workers (if weekly earnings fall below the threshold for 
paying National Insurance then they are unlikely to appear in the tax records) and 
those who have changed jobs recently (as the sampling frame is drawn up early in the 
year and the survey is likely to be sent to the wrong employer in April).
For this reason we supplement the NES with data from the Labor Force Survey. 
The LFS was first conducted in 1975, then every two years until 1983, then annually 
until 1992 and quarterly since then (when a panel component was also introduced). 
The LFS has a much smaller sample than the NES (and until 1993 it did not contain 
any wage data) but does have the advantage that it is closer to a random sample.
In this chapter we define a ‘job’ as a particular occupation or as a particular 
occupation in a particular industry. The occupation part corresponds to the main 
usage of the term ‘job’ -  the question in the LFS used to obtain the information on 
occupation is ‘what was your main job in the week ending Sunday?’. The industry 
part of the definition of a job is more problematic but other papers in this area have 
used a similar definition and there are significant industry effects on wages even once 
one has controlled for occupation. However, it is important to realize that the 
occupation part of our definition is much more important than the industry part as one 
gets very similar results whether a job is defined by occupation alone or by an 
occupation-industry interaction.
We have explored using different levels of disaggregation by occupation and 
industry and the results seem robust to the level chosen. We have restricted the 
results reported in this chapter to using 3-digit occupation codes only (allowing for 
approximately 370 jobs) as well as the interaction of a 3-digit occupation and 1-digit 
industry classification (allowing for a maximum of 3700 jobs, although in practice
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only about 1600 exist as not all occupations are represented in all industries). One 
might wonder about whether there are jobs that are disappearing and new ones 
popping up. In practice this does not seem to be a problem: of the occupations that 
existed in the 1970s all still have workers in them in the late 1990s and there are 
essentially no new occupations that cannot be put into the 1970s classification.
III. TRENDS IN THE QUALITY OF JOBS
We start by looking at long-term trends in the quality of jobs. To do this, 
obviously requires a measure of the quality of a ‘job’. We first do this in a very 
simple way by using the median wage in the job at the beginning of the period (see 
OECD [2001] and Meisenheimer [1998] for a discussion of other ways of discussing 
the quality of jobs). One can think of it as a ‘single-index’ model of skill -  see Card 
and Lemieux [1996]. However, we then also take a slightly different approach based 
on the analysis of Juhn, Murphy and Pierce [1993] with very similar results.
First consider how the proportional change in employment from the late-1970s to 
the late-1990s is related to the initial level of wages. If the SBTC hypothesis is correct 
then one would expect to see a monotonic positive relationship between employment 
growth and initial wages. Figure I groups occupations into the ‘lowest 10%’, the 
‘second-lowest 10%’, up to the ‘top 10%’ based on their median wage and cell size in 
1979. For example, the worst job quality decile captures 10% of all workers 
employed in the lowest paid occupations. Figure I shows large growth in the share of 
employment in the top two deciles, but also growth, albeit smaller, in the share of jobs 
in the bottom decile. Also, there has been a significant decline in
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Figure I
Percentage Change in Employment Share by Job Quality Decile
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j ob quality decile (79)
Notes: Employment data are taken from the LFS using 3-digit SOC90 codes. Employment changes 
are taken between 1979 and 1999. Quality deciles are based on 3-digit SOC90 median wages in 
1979 taken from the NES.
middling jobs. Though the increase in the number of workers with bad jobs has been 
lower than the increase in the number of workers with good jobs, employment 
polarization into low paid and high paid work is clear from Figure I. It is this process 
of job polarization that is the central theme of this chapter.
Figure II presents the LFS data for the period 1979-99, where the size of the 
circles denotes the initial employment level in each occupation. On Figure II, we also 
include a kernel regression estimate of the mean of employment growth conditional 
on job quality.5 There is certainly no striking evidence of a positive monotonic 
relationship between employment growth and initial log median wages as the 
literature on SBTC might have led one to expect. Moreover, one can discern the J- 
shaped relationship that is going to appear in the regression results.
5 These are Nadaraya-Watson estimates, using a bandwidth of 0.1 and an Epanechnikov kernel.
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Figure II
Employment Growth by Job Median Wage
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Notes: Employment data are taken from the LFS using 3-digit SOC90 codes. Employment 
changes are taken between 1979 and 1999. Wages are 3-digit SOC90 median wages in 1979 
taken from the NES.
Figure I and Figure II relate to one measure of employment, one definition of a 
job and to one survey (the LFS). One would like to know whether the results are 
robust or not. Because it is tedious to present graphs for every possible outcome, we 
turn to a simple regression to summarize our results.
(1) Anj = p 0 + p iwj0 + p2w2j0
where Arij is the change in log employment in job j and wj0 is the initial log median 
wage in the job.
We experiment with a number of different measures of employment and jobs. 
Table Ha presents estimates combining employment for men and women. The top 
half of Table Ha measures employment in terms of bodies using different definitions 
for a job and different surveys: we report results from the LFS and the NES using 
either 3-digit occupation codes only or the interaction of a 3-digit occupation code 
with a 1-digit industry code. But the results tell a similar story. The linear term in (1) 
is negative and the quadratic term positive implying a U-shaped relationship between 
employment growth and the initial level of wages. One might be concerned that the 
downward-sloping part of this relationship contains no data points but, as the final 
column in Table Ha makes clear, this is not the case: substantial numbers of workers 
are in the downward-sloping part of the relationship6. These regressions support the 
view that there has been polarization in the quality of jobs, with the employment 
growth being at the extreme ends of the distribution. It should also be noted that the 
parameter estimates for the LFS and NES are very similar, which suggests that the 
non-random sampling in the NES is not too serious a problem. We have also 
experimented with further aggregation or disaggregation in the jobs classification but 
this does not seem to make a great deal of difference to the qualitative results.
One might think that these results are misleading because much of the growth in 
employment has been in part-time jobs and these tend to be low-paid. Hence, the 
estimates in the top half of Table Ha might be thought to over-state the employment 
growth in low-paid occupations. However, when we measure employment in terms of 
total hours, the results are very similar so this does not explain away the observed job 
polarization. One might also think that the feminization of employment can explain 
this job polarization, with women accounting for the growth in relatively low-paid
6 Inspection of the kernel regression line in Figure II should make it clear that this estimate of the 
proportion in the downward-sloping section is not an artifact of the quadratic specification adopted.
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Table Ha
The Relationship between Employment Growth and Initial Median Wage: Men
and Women Together
Sample Sample
Period
Data Employment
Measure
PI P2 Fraction
in
Declining
Section
Men+Women 1979-99 LFS
(occ)
Employment -4.541
(0.700)
2.107
(0.297)
52.93
Men+Women 1976-95 NES
(occ)
Employment -3.412
(0.664)
1.373
(0.267)
72.57
Men+Women 1979-99 LFS
(occXind)
Employment -4.804
(0.472)
2.109
(0.198)
62.80
Men+Women 1976-95 NES
(occXind)
Employment -3.957
(0.378)
1.581
(0.151)
74.69
Men+Women 1979-99 LFS
(occ)
Hours -4.218
(0.785)
2.047
(0.327)
28.42
Men+Women 1976-95 NES
(occ)
Hours -3.603
(0.775)
1.576
(0.319)
56.85
Men+Women 1979-99 LFS
(occXind)
Hours -4.331
(0.514)
1.969
(0.213)
49.67
Men+Women 1976-95 NES
(occXind)
Hours -4.145
(0.435)
1.748
(0.178)
62.22
Notes: Regressions are weighted by job cell size in the initial period. Occupation uses 3-digit 
SOC90 codes. Industry uses 1-digit SIC80 codes.
occupations. But, as Table lib and Table lie show, one observes similar patterns for 
male and female employment considered separately although, in fact, the trends are 
more marked for men.7
One might also be concerned that the quality ranking of jobs changes a lot over 
time so that the patterns of employment growth are sensitive to the point in time at 
which job quality is measured. Table III shows this is not the case.
7 Note that the last column in Table lie shows a missing if the quadratic term is not significantly 
different from zero.
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Table lib
The Relationship Between Employment Growth and Initial Median Wage: Men
Sample Sample
Period
Data Employment
Measure
PI P2 Fraction
in
Declining
Section
Men 1979-99 LFS
(occ)
Employment -5.807
(1.317)
2.447
(0.482)
39.66
Men 1976-95 NES
(occ)
Employment -3.080
(1.097)
1.267
(0.389)
43.33
Men 1979-99 LFS
(occXind)
Employment -6.039
(0.719)
2.413
(0.265)
55.84
Men 1976-95 NES
(occXind)
Employment -4.697
(0.535)
1.783
(0.191)
68.91
Men 1979-99 LFS
(occ)
Hours -5.022
(1.361)
2.246
(0.502)
27.98
Men 1976-95 NES
(occ)
Hours A m i
(1.266)
1.981
(0.463)
39.10
Men 1979-99 LFS
(occXind)
Hours -5.622
(0.755)
2.337
(0.281)
45.48
Men 1976-95 NES
(occXind)
Hours -5.906
(0.618)
2.309
(0.226)
64.32
Notes: Regressions are weighted by job cell size in the initial period. Occupation uses 3-digit 
SOC90 codes. Industry uses 1-digit SIC80 codes.
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Table He
The Relationship between Employment Growth and Initial Median Wage:
Women
Sample Sample
Period
Data Employment
Measure
PI P2 Fraction
in
Declining
Section
Women 1979-99 LFS
(occ)
Employment -1.580
(1.025)
1.222
(0.505)
Women 1976-95 NES
(occ)
Employment -0.657
(0.686)
0.584
(0.310)
Women 1979-99 LFS
(occXind)
Employment -3.363
(0.840)
1.942
(0.411)
54.69
Women 1976-95 NES
(occXind)
Employment -2.227
(0.517)
1.256
(0.239)
50.95
Women 1979-99 LFS
(occ)
Hours -1.441
(1.177)
1.415
(0.597)
Women 1976-95 NES
(occ)
Hours -0.776
(0.815)
0.887
(0.401)
Women 1979-99 LFS
(occXind)
Hours -3.199
(0.934)
2.034
(0.466)
34.17
Women 1976-95 NES
(occXind)
Hours -2.650
(0.618)
1.659
(0.306)
29.58
Notes: Regressions are weighted by job cell size in the initial period. Occupation uses 3-digit 
SOC90 codes. Industry uses 1-digit SIC80 codes.
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Table III
The Relationship between Employment Growth and Terminal Median Wage
Sample Sample
Period
Data Employment
Measure
PI P2 Fraction
in
Declining
Section
Men+Women 1979-99 LFS
(occ)
Employment -1.915
(0.491)
0.839
(0.166)
29.59
Men+Women 1976-95 NES
(occ)
Employment -2.920
(0.387)
1.090
(0.127)
54.96
Men+Women 1979-99 LFS
(occXind)
Employment -0.581
(0.289)
0.403
(0.097)
Men+Women 1976-95 NES
(occXind)
Employment -2.416
(0.231)
0.915
(0.076)
50.36
Men+Women 1979-99 LFS
(occ)
Hours -1.651
(0.519)
0.806
(0.171)
17.22
Men+Women 1976-95 NES
(occ)
Hours -2.770
(0.433)
1.101
(0.140)
38.97
Men+Women 1979-99 LFS
(occXind)
Hours -0.271
(0.286)
0.356
(0.094)
Men+Women 1976-95 NES
(occXind)
Hours -2.506
(0.264)
1.003
(0.085)
37.21
Notes: Regressions are weighted by job cell size in the terminal period. Occupation uses 3-digit 
SOC90 codes. Industry uses 1-digit SIC80 codes.
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III.B An alternative approach: Juhn, Murphy and Pierce
So far we have defined the quality of a job by the median wage in that job. 
Although this approach has the virtue of simplicity in that it enables us to label 
specific jobs as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ it does ignore the fact that there is substantial wage 
dispersion within jobs. One approach to dealing with this is taken by Juhn, Murphy 
and Pierce [1993] -  although that paper is better known for other contributions -  and 
Juhn [1999].
They assume that each job (defined here as an occupation) potentially uses labor 
from each percentile of the wage distribution. They compute the share of labor from 
each percentile used in each job in a base year. Assuming that these ‘factor shares’ 
remain constant, one can then predict changes in employment for each percentile of 
the wage distribution by allowing changes in the total levels of employment in each 
occupation. Note that now the same job potentially contributes to the predicted change 
in employment for each percentile rather than contributing only once as in the single­
index approach taken above.
Figure III plots these predicted employment changes between 1976 and 1995 for 
different percentiles of the 1976 wage distribution. As Figure III shows, employment 
growth is positive for all workers earning less than the 11th percentile and more than 
the 86th percentile. Predicted growth at the top end is strongest, between 35% and 
45%. Growth at the 5th percentile is between 8% and almost 20% percent whereas 
employment in the middling jobs is in decline. The conclusions derived are therefore 
the same as those derived from our more simplistic approach in the previous section 
that there has been increased polarization in the quality of jobs. It is noteworthy that 
only in the top 3 deciles does one see evidence of the positive relationship between 
skill and employment change as predicted by SBTC.
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Figure III
The Impact of Job Polarization on Employment Growth by Wage Percentile
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Notes: Data are taken from the NES using 3-digit SOC90 codes. Employment changes are taken 
between 1976 and 1995. Percentiles are the 1976 wage density percentiles.
III.C. Employment growth by occupation
What are the sorts of jobs that are growing and declining? Table IV presents a 
‘top 10’ by job growth for occupations that have cells of a respectable size using the 
LFS data8. The first column specifies the occupation. Since growth in the best jobs 
has been stronger than employment growth in the bad jobs, most of the jobs reported 
in Table IV pay above median hourly wages as can be seen from the second column 
in the table. Columns three and four report estimated employment levels by 
occupation and the final column calculates the percentage change in employment 
between 1979 and 1999.
8 There are some dangers in doing this as the occupations at the extremes o f the employment change 
distribution are quite likely to be ones for which a number of factors reinforce each other.
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Most of the ‘top 10’ rapidly-growing jobs are specialized occupations mainly in 
finance and business service industries located at the top end of the wage distribution. 
But positions 1, 6 and 7 in the ‘Top 10’ however are taken by low paid jobs -  care, 
education and hospital assistants. And, just outside the top-10 one finds large 
increases in the number of hotel porters, merchandisers, window dressers and travel 
and flight attendants, among other low-paid service occupations that are intense in 
non-routine manual tasks.
To document this, Table V lists the 10 lowest paying jobs given they are of 
considerable size, their median wage and employment in 1979 and 1999. The biggest 
absolute increase in those jobs listed has been for sales assistant and checkout 
operators. Given the emphasis in the literature on SBTC the presence of the good jobs 
in Table IV is probably no surprise but strong growth in many bad jobs in Table V 
might be more surprising. However, this pattern is exactly what we would expect to 
see according to the ALM hypothesis as the rapidly-growing lousy jobs are all ones 
where it has proved difficult to substitute machines or computers for human labor. To 
see further evidence supportive of the ALM hypothesis Table VI lists the bottom 10 
jobs by job growth. A comparison of the median job wages with the overall median 
suggests the decline in jobs has been largest for middling jobs in manufacturing 
occupations.
So far we have presented evidence for job polarization as an important 
phenomenon in the UK over the past 25 years and suggested that the pattern of 
employment changes is broadly consistent with the ALM view of the impact of 
technology on the demand for labor rather than the simple SBTC hypothesis. But, job 
polarization could be driven by factors other than technology. The next section 
provides a discussion of these issues.
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Table IV
Top 10 Occupations by Job Growth
Occupation Median 
wage in 
1979
Employment 
in 1979
Employment 
in 1999
% change 
in
employment
All 3.052 24 332 613 27 343 467 12.373
Care assistants & attendants 2.345 103 837 539407 419.474
Software engineers 5.008 34 009 171 769 405.065
Management consultants & 
business analysts
4.745 18811 81 803 334.868
Computer systems & data 
processing managers
5.065 43 239 178 701 313.286
Computer analysts & 
programmers
4.842 76 083 302 617 297.745
Educational assistants 2.272 45 040 173 763 285.793
Hospital ward assistants 2.572 7460 26 986 261.705
Actors, entertainers, stage 
managers & producers
4.719 22 549 73 030 223.870
Treasurers & company 
financial managers
5.105 37 794 119812 217.015
Financial institution and 
office managers
4.511 107 138 322 608 201.114
Notes: Employment data are taken from the LFS using 3-digit SOC90 codes. Wages are 1979 median
hourly wages taken from the NES using 3-digit SOC90 codes.
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Table V
Bottom 10 Occupations by Median Wage
Occupation Median 
wage in 
1979
Employment 
in 1979
Employment 
in 1999
% change 
in
employment
All 3.052 24 332 613 27 343 467 12.373
Hairdresser & barbers 1.745 123 986 96 073 -22.513
Bar staff 1.832 119455 188 319 57.647
Shelf fillers 1.938 49 699 97 144 95.462
Sales assistants 1.939 954200 1 321 251 38.466
Retail cash desk & check-out 
operators
1.969 112816 218 581 93.749
Petrol pump forecourt 
attendants
1.979 13 304 9 935 -25.321
Kitchen porters 2.003 178 758 143 092 -19.952
Waiters & waitresses 2.020 124780 187 391 50.177
Cleaners 2.132 854 535 649 362 -24.009
Beauticians 2.145 24 536 28 946 17.972
Notes: Employment data are taken from the LFS using 3-digit SOC90 codes. Wages are 1979 median 
hourly wages taken from the NES using 3-digit SOC90 codes
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Table VI
Bottom 10 Occupations by Job Growth
Occupation Median 
wage in 
1979
Employment 
in 1979
Employment 
in 1999
% change 
in
employment
All 3.052 24 332 613 27 343 467 12.373
Boring & drilling machine 
setters & setter-operators
3.584 29 276 1731 -94.086
Coal mine laborers 3.696 29782 1 818 -93.892
Face trained coalmining 
workers, shotfirers & deputies
5.237 76 301 5 095 -93.322
Grinding machine setters & 
operators
3.557 56 426 8 164 -85.531
Laborers in foundries 3.219 14 801 2 505 -83.070
Laborers in engineering & 
allied trades
3.025 58 243 12 758 -78.095
Electrical, energy, boiler & 
related plant operatives & 
attendants
3.684 36 352 8009 -77.968
Spinners, doublers & twisters 
(in textiles and tannery 
process operatives)
2.802 16 941 4 173 -75.363
Originators, compositors & 
print preparers (in printing 
and related trades)
3.404 48 878 12 162 -75.116
Rail signal operatives & 
crossing keepers
3.010 13 761 3 571 -74.045
Notes: Employment data are taken from the LFS using 3-digit SOC90 codes. Wages are 1979 median 
hourly wages taken from the NES using 3-digit SOC90 codes.
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IV. ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES FOR JOB POLARIZATION
IV A . Changes in labor supply
It is possible that changes in the structure of the labor force can explain some of 
the changes in the occupational structure of employment. The most important such 
changes are the increased feminization of the labor force and the increase in 
educational attainment though changes in the age structure and the proportion of 
immigrants could also conceivably be important. To assess the importance of these 
changes we did the following counter-factual exercise. First, we divided the labor 
force into cells (described in more detail below). Then keeping the initial 
occupational structure of employment within cells constant, we computed what the 
change in occupational employment would have been if the only change was the 
changing relative size of the cells in the overall labor force.
Figure IV shows the results for the changes divided by deciles. The first column 
in each decile shows the actual change in employment in each decile (this is the same 
as Figure I). The second column then shows the predicted change in employment in 
each decile when the labor force is divided into 2 gender and 12 age cells9. The 
predicted changes in the occupational structure are small compared to the actual. 
There is a small predicted rise in employment in the lousy jobs that is primarily 
caused by the increasing proportion of women in the labor force who are concentrated 
in the lowest-wage jobs. However this counter-factual takes no account of the 
substantial occupational up-grading of women over this period so is likely to over­
state the true contribution of the feminization of employment to job polarization.
9 We do not include immigrants as a separate category as the fraction of foreign-born in the UK labor 
force only rose from 7.3% in 1979 to 8.9% in 1999, making it a rather unimportant factor.
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Figure IV
The Impact of Changes in the Composition of the Labour Force
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Notes: Employment data are taken from the LFS using sing 3-digit SOC90 codes. Employment 
changes are taken between 1979 and 1999. Quality deciles are based on 3-digit SOC90 median 
wages in 1979 taken from the NES. The first bar gives actual employment changes as in Figure 
I. The second bar gives counterfactual employment changes keeping the 3-digit occupational 
composition within 24 gender-age cells constant over time. The third bar gives counterfactual 
employment changes keeping the 3-digit occupational composition within 96 gender-age- 
education cells constant over time.
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lovely jobs it is unhelpful in explaining the growth in lousy jobs. The conclusion 
must be that changes in the structure of labor supply are unable to explain the broad 
pattern of job polarization.
IV.B. Changes in labor demand other than technology
Changes in the occupational structure of employment may also be caused by 
changes in the demand for different sorts of labor that are not caused by technology. 
Here we briefly discuss two of these: trade and the structure of product demand.
The role of international trade and out-sourcing has been a perennial ‘alternative’ 
hypothesis to technology as a potential explanation of changes in wage inequality. It 
undoubtedly has been important for some occupations (for example, the large decline 
in ‘spinners, doublers and twisters’ seen in Table VI is the result of a continuing shift 
of textiles to countries where labor is cheaper). And trade may be more important in 
the future e.g. with the out-sourcing of more skilled jobs. But the overall assessment 
of Freeman (2003) is that trade has had much smaller impacts on labor markets than 
commonly believed10. We are not going to investigate this in detail here but one 
would have to oppose this conclusion to argue that trade was the most important 
factor behind job polarization.
Perhaps potentially more important are changes in the structure of the demand for 
different products that then have consequences for the demand for different 
occupations. For example the rise in the number of care and hospital assistants seen in 
Table IV is partly the result of more old people and more old people being cared for 
outside the family. But it is important to realize that technology also plays a very
10 This is consistent with many other studies. For example, Feenstra and Hanson [1998] estimate that 
expenditures on high-technology capital such as computers are about twice as important as outsourcing 
in explaining variation in relative wages of non-production workers in the US between 1979 and 1990. 
And, Boijas, Freeman and Katz [1997] find that immigration has had a larger impact on the skill 
composition than trade in the US between 1980 and 1990.
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important role here as the increase in the demand for care has not been met by any 
great improvements in the productivity of caring because of the difficulty in applying 
technology to non-routine tasks11. And the dramatic decline in many jobs in 
manufacturing seen in Table VI is mostly the result of relatively inelastic consumer 
demand together with the rapid productivity growth in those sectors where products 
are produced in ways that have proved relatively easy to routinize.
In sum, none of the other hypotheses considered here seem to have the ability to 
explain the basic feature of job polarization though they are undoubtedly important 
for some specific occupations. In contrast, the ALM hypothesis does seem to have 
•this broad explanatory power. But, before we uncritically accept the ALM hypothesis, 
we need to understand the evidence that is often quoted in support of SBTC. The next 
two sections consider two of these -  the growth in non-manual employment and the 
rise in the educational attainment of the workforce.
V. UNDERSTANDING THE GROWTH IN NON-MANUAL 
EMPLOYMENT
A number of papers (e.g. Berman, Bound and Griliches [1994], Berman, Bound 
and Machin [1998], Machin and Van Reenen [1998]) have presented evidence that 
employment has shifted towards non-manual jobs and that this shift has been much 
more important within than between manufacturing industries. As non-manual jobs 
tend to be better-paid than manual jobs this is interpreted as evidence that technical 
change is biased towards more skilled workers. And the fact that most of the shifts are
11 For example the Economist of March 13th 2004 quoted the inventor of the first industrial robot 
(Unimate, employed by General Motors in 1961), Joe Engelberger as saying that care of the elderly is 
the opportunity the robotics industry should be pursuing as “every highly industrialized nation has a 
paucity of help for vast, fast-growing ageing populations”.
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within industries suggests that this trend is related to technical change that has very 
pervasive effects on all sectors of the economy. As a statement about the average 
quality of jobs, this conclusion is undoubtedly right: our data also suggest that the 
‘average* job quality is increasing. But the simple binary distinction between manual 
and non-manual is simply not able to capture the increased polarization we have also 
argued is important12.
If the shift-share analysis is done for broader occupation groups and for the whole 
economy, not just manufacturing, we get the results presented in Table VII. For each 
occupation Table VII reports a manual/non-manual indicator taken from the LFS (M  
or NM respectively). Occupations are ranked by their median wage. Then, for each of 
the two data sets, the first column reflects the total percentage point change in the 
share of each occupation group between 1979 and 1999. The second column measures 
the percentage point change due to changes within industries whereas the final 
column reports the change due to workers moving between industries.
The results are rather more nuanced than earlier studies would suggest and in line 
with the ALM hypothesis. There is a large increase in the employment shares of 
managerial and professional workers, an increase in lovely jobs that is mostly ‘within’
12 Indeed any binary distinction between low- and high-skill workers (whether in theoretical or 
empirical work) cannot have separate mean and variance effects.
Table VH
Shift-share Analysis of Employment Shares by Occupation
Occupation Wage NES LFS
total within between Total within between
Professional occupations
(NM)
5.914 1.709 1.127 0.582 3.733 2.838 0.895
Managers and 
administrators (NM)
4.117 5.204 4.588 0.616 5.606 5.271 0.335
Associate professional and 
technical occupations (NM)
3.823 2.579 1.700 0.879 4.466 3.446 1.020
Craft and related 
occupations (M)
3.277 -8.158 -3.738 -4.420 -7.883 -3.461 -4.422
Plant and machine 
operatives (M)
3.055 -5.579 -1.809 -3.770 -5.195 -1.362 -3.833
Clerical and secretarial 
occupations (NM)
2.841 1.291 -1.879 3.171 -2.105 -5.388 3.283
Personal and protective 
service occupation (NM/M)
2.668 3.516 1.969 1.547 3.502 1.732 1.770
Other occupations
(M)
2.558 -2.527 -2.775 0.248 -3.398 -3.564 0.166
Sales occupations
(NM)
2.132 1.964 0.817 1.147 1.272 0.487 0.785
Notes: Employment changes are taken between 1979 and 1999for the LFS and 1976-1995for the NES. Reported wages are 1979 median hourly 
wages taken from the NES using 1-digit SOC90 occupations. The decomposition is done using 1-digit S1C80 industry codes.
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industries. Both craft workers and machine operatives have large negative within and 
between components reflecting both the impact of technical change and the shift 
towards services. Routine clerical occupations have large negative employment 
effects within industries together with a sizeable positive ‘between’ component 
reflecting the shift to services. The increase in the employment share of low-paid 
personal and protective services and sales occupations has a large within and between 
component reflecting the fact that technology has not managed to do these jobs and 
the shift toward services.
Therefore studies that use a simple manual/non-manual split (usually out of 
necessity rather than choice) and concentrate on manufacturing miss important 
features of the way the structure of employment is evolving. If one broadens one’s 
view then one does see evidence for the ALM hypothesis.
VL EDUCATION AND OCCUPATION
Another piece of widely cited evidence in favor of the SBTC hypothesis is that 
there has been a rapid increase in the level of educational attainment together with a 
rise in the returns to education. It is true that there is a lot of evidence that the average 
educational attainment of workers within jobs has changed. The evidence in Figure 
IV that the assumption of a fixed occupational structure within education groups 
predicts a fall in lousy jobs when there has been a rise implies a rise in the educational 
attainment of workers in low-wage occupations. A more direct way of seeing this is 
Figure V that shows the change in the fraction of workers that have education at ‘A’ 
level or above -  at least 12 years of education -  for each occupation. Almost all 
occupations show an increase, evidence of educational up-grading within occupations
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Figure V
Change in Fraction of Workers by Education and Job Median Wage
o O*
o
o
< o o
o
c
o
c
1.5 2
log median wage (79)
Notes: Employment data are taken from the LFS using 3-digit SOC90 codes.
as the changes are above the horizontal axis.13
There are two interpretations of these findings. First, that what we have defined 
as a ‘job’ is not constant over time and the educational and/or skill requirements 
within jobs has risen possibly because of SBTC within jobs. Secondly, that as the 
educational attainment of the labor force has increased and middling jobs become 
relatively scarcer some educated workers have been forced to take lousier jobs than 
previously -  this is the idea of the literature on over-qualification (see, for example, 
Sicherman [1991], Hartog [2000] and, for the UK, Green et al. [1999], Chevalier 
[2000] and Green and McIntosh [2002]) that typically finds that high proportions of 
people report that they are employed in jobs for which their educational qualifications 
are unnecessary. Employers may also respond by raising the minimum educational
13 The rise in this proportion is smallest in some of the high-wage jobs but this is because the 
proportion of educated worker sin these jobs was already close to one in the 1970s leaving little scope 
for educational up-grading using ‘A’ levels as the cut-off.
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standards to get certain jobs -  what is known as credentialism. To distinguish these 
two hypotheses requires some information on changes in skill use within occupations. 
This is not so easy to find but we present two pieces of disparate information relevant 
to the question.
First, consider the data on the use of the five DOT measures used by Autor, Levy 
and Mumane [2003]. Table VIII presents data on the average level of skill use in 
1977, the change from 1977 to 1991 and the decomposition of this change into a 
within-occupation and a between-occupation component. Panel A of Table VIII pools 
all occupations together and shows an overall increase in non-routine cognitive and 
interactive tasks together with a decrease in routine tasks (especially cognitive ones) 
and a smaller decrease in non-routine manual tasks. But, the decomposition suggests 
that, within occupations, there is only a rise in the non-routine interactive task and all 
other skills show declines, the decline being particularly large for the routine 
cognitive task. But from the point of view of educational up-grading it is what is 
happening in the lousy jobs that is perhaps of more interest. Panel B therefore does 
the same exercise for jobs in the bottom half of the wage distribution. Again one sees 
a big rise in the non-routine interactive task and large declines in routine tasks. But, 
most of the increase in skill requirements is between-occupation: within-occupation 
task requirements are generally falling. There is little evidence here that there is 
substantial SBTC within occupations (Spenner [1983] reaches similar conclusions).
Our second piece of evidence on changing skill requirements within occupations 
comes from the UK Social Change and Economic Life Initiative (SCELI) survey 
conducted in 1986 and the 2001 Skills Surveys14. Both of these surveys asked
14 We are grateful to Francis Green for doing these computations for us.
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Table VHI
DOT Task Shifts Within and Between Occupations
DOT Task Measure Mean 1977 Change 1977-1991
Panel A : Good and Bad Occupations
total within Between
Non-Routine Cognitive 3.755 0.084 -0.047 0.131
Non-Routine Interactive 2.417 0.504 0.137 0.367
Routine Cognitive 4.582 -0.854 -0.564 -0.290
Routine Manual 3.901 -0.146 -0.025 -0.121
Non-Routine Manual 1.198 -0.132 -0.094 -0.038
Panel B: Bad Occupations
Non-Routine Cognitive 3.338 -0.027 -0.106 0.079
Non-Routine Interactive 2.169 0.367 0.019 0.348
Routine Cognitive 3.929 -1.116 -0.871 -0.245
Routine Manual 3.879 -0.224 -0.065 -0.159
Non-Routine Manual 0.847 -0.037 -0.032 -0.005
Notes: Task inputs are measured as in ALM [2003] and are between 0 and 10. For Panel A, the 
reported means are weighted using 463 3-digit COC occupations. Panel B uses 208 occupations with 
hourly earnings below overall average wages using 1984 CPS data. Changes between 1977 and 1991 
are measured using 3-digit COC occupations and employment changes between 1984 and 1997.
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workers about the educational qualifications necessary to get the job they do and were 
then also asked whether these qualifications were necessary to do the job. Only data 
at the 1-digit occupation level are comparable in the two datasets. Table IX presents 
some relevant information. The second column gives the change from 1986 to 2001 
in the educational qualifications needed to get a job where qualifications are measured 
on a 5-point scale with 1 representing no qualifications and 5 a college degree. In all 
occupations there is a rise in the level of qualifications required, with a very large rise 
in sales occupations and elementary occupations. This could reflect greater skill 
requirements within occupations or a greater use of credentialism. There is evidence 
(shown in the third column) that more workers report in 2001 that the education 
required to get the job is not necessary to do the job but, in the absence of any 
information on the extent to which education is under-utilized, one cannot know 
whether this effect is large enough to outweigh the positive effect on skill levels of an 
increase in the level of education required.
These two pieces of disparate evidence are not entirely consistent. The DOT data 
do not suggest any significant skill up-grading within occupations, while the 
SCELI/SS data suggest an increase in the level of education required by employers 
although also an increasing proportion of workers reporting that this education is 
unnecessary to do the job. But, it does seem that the supply of skills may be 
increasing faster than the demand in the bottom half of the distribution because the 
extent of over-qualification does not seem to be falling over time and, according to 
some estimates (e.g. Felstead, Gallie and Green [2002]), is actually increasing.15
15 It has always been something of a puzzle to reconcile these findings of widespread over-qualification 
with rising employment and relative wages of educated workers. Our finding of increased job 
polarization can explain why both phenomena may co-exist. The increased supply of skills that has 
been necessary to meet the increased number of lovely jobs poses a problem for die increased number 
of lousy jobs. Because there has been an increase in the mean but no increase in the variance of 
educational qualifications, those in lousy jobs are increasingly likely to have higher levels of education 
than necessary for doing the job.
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Table IX
Changes in Skill Requirements within Jobs, 1986-2001
Occupation Change in education level 
required to get job, 
1986-2001
Change in fraction 
reporting required 
education not necessary to 
do job, 1986-2001
Managerial 0.25 0.014
Professional 0.12 0.021
Associate
Professional
0.31 0.072
Clerical 0.10 0.046
Craft 0.25 0.043
Personal Services 0.50 0.110
Sales 0.54 0.093
Operatives 0.08 0.063
Elementary 0.24 0.076
Notes: Data come from 1986 SCELI data and 2001 Skills Survey. Education required is measured on a 
5-point scale with 1 being no qualifications and 5 a college degree.
Consistent with this, Felstead, Gallie and Green [2002] report that there is excess 
demand for workers with no qualifications, an excess supply of people with low-level 
qualifications and a rising use of credentialism among the lowest-level occupations.
VH. JOB POLARIZATION AND THE RISE IN WAGE INEQUALITY
All the analysis so far has been about the quantity side of the labor market -  what 
is happening to the employment of different types of workers. But, the polarization of 
employment could also be expected to have led to increased wage inequality. Of 
some interest is what fraction of the rise in wage inequality can be explained by this 
polarization of employment. This is the subject of this section.
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In Figure VI we present the evolution of two measures of actual wage inequality 
over the period 1976-1995, the log(90/50) and the log(50/10) differentials, as well as 
a prediction of what would have happened if the only change in the wage distribution 
taking place is the change in the distribution of jobs in the economy. To this end we 
assign everyone in the base year (here, 1976) a weight that is equal to the total number 
of workers in a job in a given year divided by the job cell size in the initial period. We 
then compute counterfactual percentiles of the re-weighted wage distribution. As is 
well-known actual wage inequality rose very strongly in this period following a fall in 
1977 (the result of the ‘Social Contract’ incomes policy then in place). The rise in 
inequality is somewhat larger at the top of the distribution than at the bottom. Since 
the counterfactual log median increases only very little, the rises in the counterfactual 
log(90/50) and log(50/10) reflect large polarization. In comparison with the actual 
changes, increased job polarization can explain 33% of the increase in the log(50/10) 
differential between 1976 and 1995 and 54% of the increase in the log(90/50) wage 
differential. It should also be noted that this process of polarization seems relatively 
smooth throughout the period: one cannot readily identify sub-periods in which all the 
change occurred. The remaining rise in wage inequality can be thought of as coming 
from one of two sources: differential changes in median wages across jobs and within- 
job wage inequality. For example, wage inequality will rise if median wages have 
risen faster in good jobs than bad jobs. The other potential source of increased wage 
inequality is an increase in within-job pay dispersion. To look for evidence of this 
Table X reports regression estimates of median wage growth onto the log of the initial 
median wage16. Since estimates will be biased downwards when using the initial 
wage on both sides of the regression equation, we use the NES
16 We experimented with the inclusion of a quadratic term but this was never significant.
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Figure VI
How Much of Actual Wage Dispersion Can Be Explained by Job Polarization?
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Notes: Data are taken from the NES. The figure uses 3-digit SOC90 codes as the definition o f  a job. 
The counterfactual keeps constant median wage and wage dispersion within occupations.
Table X
Relationship between Wage Growth and Initial Median Wage
Sample Sample
Period
Data Relative
to
1976
Relative
to
1977
Men+Women 1976-
95
NES
(occ)
0.239
(0.029)
0.267
(0.029)
and run regressions using wages in 1977 (rather than 1976) as a covariate. All point 
estimates are positive and all are statistically significant. These results suggest 
allowing median wages to change over time while keeping the variance of pay within 
each job constant could close the actual-counterfactual gap further. The implications 
for wage inequality are presented in Figure VII. Here, we do the re-weighting 
described earlier and also adjust wages in every job cell by the change in log median 
wage in that cell. Now 51% of the increase in the log(50/10) differential between 
1976 and 1995 and 79% of the increase in the log(90/50) wage differential can be 
explained.
Figure VII
The Impact of Job Polarization and Changing Relative Wages Across Jobs on
Wage Inequality
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Notes: Data are taken from the NES. The figure uses 3-digit SOC90 codes as the definition o f  a 
job. The counterfactual keeps constant wage dispersion within occupations but allows the actual 
median wage to vary in line with the data.
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VILA Within and between group wage inequality
One implication of this is that the rise in within-job wage inequality has a 
relatively minor part to play in explaining the overall rise in wage inequality. This is 
in contrast with some studies that try to explain wage inequality in terms of age and 
education that typically find that most of the rise in inequality is due to rising within- 
group wage inequality (see Levy and Mumane [1992] and Katz and Autor [1999] for 
a survey of the US literature and Machin [2003] for the UK). The studies are correct 
given the variables they use to try to explain the rise in wage inequality but the 
evidence here suggests that this conclusion is sensitive to how the groups are defined. 
Unfortunately, a small industry has been established based on the premise that wage 
inequality has risen very markedly among ‘identical’ workers and has been building 
theoretical explanations of this ‘fact’.
One particularly simple way to understand this is to consider what is happening to 
the R2 in earnings functions. Figure VUI graphs the R2 from an earnings function 
estimated for each year on the NES in which the dependent variable is log hourly 
earnings, and the covariates include a complete set of dummies for age, industry and 
occupation, all interacted with gender. There are two things to note: first the/?2 is 
high -  averaging almost two-thirds -  compared to the one-third found in a standard 
specification using the US CPS. Secondly, there is no marked trend in the R2 over 
time if one also includes the most recent years for which data are available (we 
believe this is also true for the US CPS, see for example Lemieux [2002]). The 
consequence is that the rise in the residual variance can explain only 1/3 of the total 
rise of the variance in log wages.
The conclusion that the importance of within-group wage inequality depends on 
the controls one includes in an earnings function seems also consistent with US
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studies that have more detailed controls than is usual in earnings functions. For 
example, Dunne et al. [2000] have controls for establishment fixed effects (which are 
obviously better than industry) and find they can explain much of the rise in wage 
inequality by widening between-plant wage gaps. It seems likely that much of these 
wage gaps between plants can be explained in terms of the characteristics (in gender, 
age, education and occupation) of the workers within them -  for example Hellerstein 
at al. [1999] find that a fairly rudimentary set of controls (less than 30) can explain 
40% of the variation in average wages across establishments.
Figure VIII
The Changing R2 in the UK Earnings Function
.65
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year
Notes: Data are taken from the NES. The dependent variable is log hourly earnings and the 
covariates included are age, industry and occupation dummies, all interacted with gender. The
demand for bad jobs has not resulted in a rise in wages at the bottom relative to the 
median. The rise in the number of bad jobs has coincided with a decline in their pay 
not just relative to the good jobs that are increasing in number but also relative to the 
middling jobs that are decreasing in number. If the labor market is competitive this 
does not seem consistent with a view in which technology causes a shift in the 
demand for different types of labor but the supply curve is stable and the observed 
changes in wages and employment are simply movements along this supply curve17.
In a competitive labor market it is wages in different segments that determine the 
position on the supply curve, so to reconcile the observed increase in relative 
employment in the worst jobs together with a fall in their relative wages one would 
have to try to explain how a fall in wages at the bottom end of the labor market 
increases labor supply in that part of the labor market. While this might not be 
impossible (e.g. the labor supply curve could conceivably be backward-bending) it 
does not seem especially plausible. It is perhaps more plausible to think that the labor 
supply curve is not stable and the labor force has changed in a way that has increased 
the number of workers who typically do lousy jobs. But, the results in section four 
suggest that the changing composition of the workforce can only explain a small part 
of changing wage distribution.
It is possible that the relative skill requirements of middling and lousy jobs have 
been changing. For example Figure V suggests somewhat greater educational up­
grading in middling than in lousy jobs. If this is the case then the average level of 
human capital may have risen in middling relative to lousy jobs and this can account 
for the relative wage movements.
17 The discussion paper version of this chapter -  Goos and Manning (2003) presents a simple three-skill 
competitive model of the labor market that can be used as a more formal justification for the discussion 
that follows. Juhn [1994] presents a model in which she claims that a fall in the demand for ‘middling’ 
jobs reduces wages more at the bottom but hers is really only a model with 2 types of skill but 
‘middling’ people with some combination of both skills. In this example there is no well-defined sense 
of a fall in demand for middling jobs.
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Another possible explanation for why wages have been falling in lousy jobs 
relative to those in ‘middling’ jobs is to think of the labor market as being non­
competitive in some way. There are a number of ways in which this could be done.
For example, Acemoglu (2001) presents a model of a labor market with frictions 
in which an increase in the supply of skilled workers encourages employers to create 
more lovely and lousy jobs and fewer middling jobs. In this type of model ‘supply 
creates its own demand’ and there is no need to resort to demand shocks caused by 
technological change to explain job polarization. But it is a little bit hard to see how 
supply shocks of this type can explain the pattern of changes in occupational 
employment documented above -  technology seems much more plausible as an 
explanation for these changes. But, the Acemoglu story may have some relevance for 
explaining what is happening within occupations when employers often have a 
decision about what level of skill to require of workers doing these jobs.
Another ‘non-competitive’ explanation is that institutions have changed in such a 
way as to lead to a fall in wages at the bottom end of the wage distribution. There is 
now a small literature in the US (DiNardo at al. [1996], Lee [1999], Teulings [2000]) 
that suggests that the evolution of unionization and the minimum wage can do a very 
good job in explaining what is happening to the bottom half of the wage distribution. 
The UK has also seen a marked decline in unionization, a decline in minimum wages 
(though they were never very strong) and the indexation of welfare benefits to prices 
not wages. Perhaps these changes can account for the rise in wage inequality in the 
bottom half of the distribution in the 1980s. We leave the further exploration of this 
to another paper.
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v m . CONCLUSIONS
There is little doubt that technology has a powerful impact on the labor market. 
But, the dominant current view about the nature of its impact, the hypothesis of skill- 
biased technical change is only a partial truth and cannot explain all of the important 
changes in the labor market (see Card and DiNardo [2002] for an additional list of 
puzzles and problems). Crudely, the SBTC hypothesis seems best able to explain 
what is happening in the top half of the wage distribution but not its bottom half. 
There, the more nuanced view about the impact of technology proposed by Autor, 
Levy and Mumane [2003] seems appropriate and it seems plausible that demand for 
‘middling’ jobs has fallen. This chapter has provided UK evidence of increased job 
polarization that is consistent with the ALM hypothesis. It would be interesting to 
know whether similar phenomena can be observed in the Continental European 
countries that have not had the rises in wage inequality seen in the UK and the US.
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CHAPTER II
THE IMPACT OF SHOP CLOSING HOURS ON LABOR AND 
PRODUCT MARKETS
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past forty years, the majority of restrictions on shop opening hours have 
been repealed or declared unconstitutional in most US states, the UK, Canada and
1 fisome European countries. Often, proponents and opponents of liberalizing opening 
times have based their arguments on their expectations of employment effects from 
deregulation. Using that different US states deregulated their Sunday Closing Laws at 
different points in time and building on what we know about the structure of retail 
markets, it is therefore the aim of this chapter to shed some light on how deregulation 
most likely affects retail labor and product markets and therefore ultimately 
employment.
This chapter first examines the most commonly imposed restriction on US shop 
opening hours known as Sunday Closing Laws or Blue Laws.19 The impact of 
deregulation on employment, sales and the number of shops is then analyzed in two 
ways. First, given that between 1977 and 1992 ten states deregulated at different 
points in time, this chapter uses the Census of Retail Trade data for years 1977, 1982, 
1987 and 1992 to show that deregulation increases employment with 4.4 to 6.4 
percent, revenue with 3.9 to 10.7 percent and the number of shops with 1 to 1.5 
percent in deregulating industries. Second, given that no states deregulated after 1992, 
this chapter then uses the 1997 Census of Retail Trade to further test the hypothesis 
that employment, revenue and die number of shops in regulated industries are
18 For example, see Section I for a discussion of the history of Sunday Closing Laws in the US, Maher 
[1995] for the UK, Skuterud [2004] for Canada and Kajalo [1997] for Europe.
There is disagreement about the origin of the term “Blue Laws”. Some claim it refers to the color of 
the paper upon which the first laws of New Haven were printed in 1665. New Haven ordered 500 
hundred copies of its laws to be printed in England. These printed laws were returned on blue-colored 
paper. Others claim that the blue referred to by the term “blue laws” bears testimonial to the strictness 
with which the laws were observed^by the Puritans. Just as a “true blue” dye never fades, so a person of 
fixed principles will not be easily swayed to depart from them. See Laband and Heinbuch [1987] for 
further discussion.
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significantly smaller in states with Sunday Closing Laws. This is true looking at the 
fraction of total retail for regulated industries or comparing outcomes per consumer or 
per dollar of personal disposable income. Also, it is shown that deregulation is most 
likely to decrease employment, revenue and the number of shops in industries 
exempted from Sunday Closing Laws suggesting that deregulation can also have an 
important impact on the composition of employment across different industries. 
Finally, evidence suggests these quantity adjustments seem to happen without much 
of an impact on wages or prices.
This chapter finally presents a model building on standard assumptions about 
retail markets to explain the observed impact of deregulation on employment, sales 
and the number of shops in deregulating and non-deregulating industries. For 
deregulating industries, it is argued that longer shop opening hours will increase 
employment because labor partially is a quasi-fixed input factor that only varies with 
opening times (threshold labor effect). Also, in so far the observed increase in revenue 
due to increased product demand reflects an increase in the volume of sales, 
employment will further increase (sales effect). Finally, if the increase in revenue 
offsets the increase in labor costs, retailers will find it profitable to extend their 
opening hours in the short-run. In the long-run, the number of shops will therefore 
increase, further increasing employment (entry effect). However, to the extend that 
consumers substitute income towards deregulating industries, employment will fall in 
non-deregulating industries because of a decrease in total spending (sales effect) and a 
decrease in the number of shops (exit effect). In line with the empirical evidence, 
these are the channels through which it is argued that deregulation affects retail labor 
and product markets and therefore ultimately employment.
There is a small but growing literature related to the idea that product market 
regulation affects employment. Blanchard and Giavazzi [2002] present models in
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which monopolistic competition in the product market is combined with different 
bargaining regimes between employers and workers. In their baseline model, real 
wages increase and unemployment decreases following an exogenous increase in 
product market competition. However, the increase in real wages implies profits will 
fall and therefore the number of firms will decrease in the long-run. This in turn 
decreases product market competition such that the impact of deregulation on 
employment and real wages are partly self-defeating over time. But Blanchard and 
Giavazzi [2002] also show that deregulation of entry restrictions are more likely to be 
favorable since entry of firms leads to lower mark-ups and thus lower unemployment 
and higher real wages even in the long-run. In line with Blanchard and Giavazzi 
[2002], Krueger and Pischke [1997] argue that employment growth in many European 
countries may have been hampered by the presence of entry costs. To this end, 
Bertrand and Kramarz [2002] examine spatial variation in zoning laws (regulating the 
start-up of companies) for French retail industries to conclude that retail employment 
could have been more than 10 percent higher in the absence of such laws.
This chapter argues that deregulation of store opening hours in general and 
Sunday opening in particular can also have a lasting impact on the distribution of 
employment through its impact on retail markets. As far as the employment impact of 
Sunday opening is concerned, two recent empirical studies are noteworthy. First, 
Skuterud [2004] examines Sunday opening by shops in different Canadian provinces 
and first uses a difference-in-difference specification to find that deregulation 
increases employment in deregulating industries. Starting from a conditional labor 
demand specification, he then concludes this employment gain is driven by an 
estimated increase in threshold labor that is larger (in absolute value) than an 
estimated negative productivity effect. But this conclusion is problematic for three 
reasons. First, the positive threshold labor and negative productivity effects are
imprecisely estimated since both have to be identified from the sales adjusted 
variation in employment. Second, the negative productivity effect reflects that Sunday 
opening smoothes consumption across days of the week and the concavity of the 
production function. But below we will point to existing microeconomic evidence that 
the relationship between the volume of shop sales and labor is unlikely to be very 
concave. If this is the case, a third puzzle then is why retailers would decide to extend 
their opening hours if the zero estimated sales effect is not attenuated due to poor data 
on sales.
Second, Burda and Weil [2001] do not restrict their analysis to the impact of 
Sunday opening on labor demand. They present a general equilibrium model 
including a common leisure externality and a business poaching externality for 
regulation to have real effects on employment, output, wages and prices. However, 
since their model really is one where supply generates its own demand, employment 
gains are directly and exclusively predicted from an increase in labor supply, ignoring 
the possible employment impact derived from the impact of deregulation on 
competition in retail product markets.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section I documents the US 
history of Sunday Closing Laws. Section II describes the main data used and Section 
III shows that after deregulation, employment, revenue and the number of shops are 
most likely to increase in deregulating industries and possibly decrease in industries 
exempted from such laws. Also, we do not find support for an equally strong impact 
of deregulation on wages and output prices. Section V then starts from what we know 
about retail markets to present an integrated model of retail labor and product markets 
that predicts the observed impact of deregulation on deregulating and non­
deregulating industries. The final section concludes.
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I. SUNDAY CLOSING LAWS
Sunday Closing Laws are an ancient institution in American law. The first Sunday 
law passed on American soil was enacted by the Colony of Virginia in 1610. By the 
end of the 18th Century, all thirteen colonies had Sunday closing laws written in their 
statutes. During the heydays of Sunday Closing Laws at the end of the 19th Century, 
state regulation of Sunday commerce was so prevalent that 46 states restricted at least 
some businesses to open on Sunday.20 In 1961 Sunday Closing Laws were ascribed 
the purpose of securing a common day of rest by the United States Supreme Court, 
making them binding in all thirty-three states in which statutes had not been repealed
yt
or declared unconstitutional by that tune.
After 1961, a further twenty-five states deregulated their Sunday Closing Laws.22 
Of these, Figure I shows the ten states that deregulated after 1979 (with dates when 
statutes were repealed or declared unconstitutional) as well as all eight states that still 
have Sunday Closing Laws today. 23 It is this variation that will be exploited in this 
chapter to identify the impact of shop closing hours on retail labor and product 
markets.
20 Dilloff [1980] and Laband and Heinbuch [1987] provide more details on the early history of Sunday 
Closing Laws.
21 See Theuman [2004] for further details of McGowan v Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) and its 
companion cases.
22 Theuman [2004] further discusses state and federal cases decided since 1961 regarding the validity, 
construction and effect of Sunday Closing Laws.
23 Appendices A and B contain more detailed legal references to the relevant (superseded) state 
statutes. Excluded are laws regulating automobile shops are shops selling alcohol on Sunday to avoid a 
patchwork of legislation. I would like to thank Neil Dilloff, David Laband and Duncan Alcroft for 
helping me find these references.
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Figure I
The US History of Sunday Closing Laws, 1979-1997
— Regulated states in 1997
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H. DATA
The main data used in this study is the Economic Census of Retail Trade. The 
Census of Retail Trade is part of the Economic Census conducted every five years 
ending in 2 or 7. The strength of the Census of Retail Trade is that it aims to sample 
all retail activity in the US. From every survey, total weekly employment (number of 
paid employees in the week including March 12), real total annual revenue, the 
number of establishments and real total annual payroll are collected for a number of 
industries in retail. The procedures for data collection and dissemination can be found 
on the Census Bureau web-page.
The first main data set used in this chapter collects state level data for the years 
1977, 1982, 1987 and 1992 from a variety of Census sources for eight SIC industries 
in retail. However, one difficulty is that only measures for every two consecutive 
years are comparable. This is due to changes in the sampling criteria and industry 
classification between 1977 and 1982 and changes in the industry classification 
between 1982 and 1987 and 1987 and 1992. To this end, the Census Bureau has made 
available two data sets for 1982 and 1987, one comparable with the previous sampling 
year and one comparable with the following sampling year.
The second main data set used in this study is the 1997 Census of Retail Trade. 
The advantage of this data is that it measures activity for more narrowly defined 
NAICS industries in retail. However, the more precise NAICS classification 
introduced in 1997 is no longer compatible with the SIC classifications used in earlier 
surveys. A second comparability problem between the 1997 Economic Census and 
previous waves arises because the 1997 Census of Retail Trade for the first time 
includes some new store types such as computer shops, office supply dealers, building 
material stores and other wholesalers generally open to the public. Nevertheless, given
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that deregulation did not happen after 1992, the 1997 Census of Retail Trade can still 
provide a consistent estimate of the long-run impact of deregulation. Moreover, 
because the 1997 Census of Retail Trade has information on more narrowly defined 
industries in retail, the impact of deregulation on shops only selling exempted 
products (food, prescription drugs or gasoline) can be more closely analyzed.
HI. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
III.A Regulated and other industries in retail
Table I provides some information about the different types of shops in retail 
using the 1977-1992 Censuses of Retail Trade. The group of “Regulated Industries” 
consists of all industries prohibited to open on Sunday if a state has or would have 
Sunday Closing Laws. The remaining store retailers are listed in the group of “Other 
Industries”. For this latter group it is less clear whether industries generally represent 
shops subject to or exempted from Sunday Closing Laws. For example, the group of 
food stores mainly consists of supermarkets and convenience stores. And even though 
supermarkets and convenience stores also sell food (which is an exempted product), 
there has been some controversy about their Sunday opening.24 Similarly, the industry 
of drug and propriety stores generally represents beauty stores as well as pharmacies. 
Since beauty stores most often do not sell prescription drugs (another exempted 
product), they have mostly been prohibited to open on Sunday in contrast to 
pharmacies. Finally, the group of gasoline stations (another exempted product) 
generally represent exempted businesses in contrast to the industry of miscellaneous 
retailers even though this industry also includes the non-store retailers.
24 See Theuman [2004] for a number of cases.
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Table I
Percentages of Total Retail by Industry, 1977-1992
Weekly
employment Annual Revenue Number of Shops
Regulated Industries
Building materials and garden stores 6.405 8.107 7.600
(1.179) (1.719) (1.928)
General merchandise stores 20.32 17.80 4.047
(2.439) (2.451) (1.107)
Apparel and accessory stores 10.50 7.259 13.74
(1.564) (1.382) (1.764)
Furniture and home furnishing stores 6.291 6.382 10.23
(0.700) (0.913) (1.030)
Other Industries
Food stores 26.91 30.18 18.34
(2.319) (2.248) (2.545)
Drug and propriety stores 5.532 5.088 5.016
(0.776) (0.961) (0.921)
Gasoline service stations 7.490 11.34 12.83
(1.498) (2.131) (2.150)
Miscellaneous retailers 16.54 13.84 28.20
(2.750) (3.776) (3.971)
Notes: Data are taken from the Census of Retail Trade. Weekly Employment measures the number of 
paid employees in the week including March 12. Annual Revenue is in 1985 dollars. The industries 
listed are the most disaggregate information available from the data and are based on SIC industry 
codes. Mean percentages are calculated after pooling states and years and the numbers in brackets are 
standard errors.
The numbers in Table I are average percentages for each industry and the reported 
standard errors therefore reflect variation in the industry composition between states 
and years. For the regulated industries, general merchandise stores (mainly 
department stores) are the largest employers in contrast to furnishing and home 
furnishing stores which seem relatively small. For other industries, food stores are the 
biggest employer whereas gasoline stations are relatively small. All in all, these 
findings do not seem counter intuitive.
60
Table I gives mean percentages after pooling all states and years. To get an idea 
whether regulation has any impact, one would like to see whether these means differ 
significantly between states with and without Sunday Closing Laws at any point in 
time. This is done in Table II. Each row in Table II provides point estimates for 
Px using the following regression specification:
(1) to y s -  Po + A h  + £ s
with y s total weekly employment, annual revenue or the number of shops in 
regulated industries as a fraction of total retail in state s. The dummy variable I s
equals zero in states with Sunday Closing Laws and is therefore expected to be 
positive (negative) if deregulation has a positive (negative) impact. Table II shows 
that all estimates of are positive suggesting deregulation increases employment 
with about 2 percent, increases revenue with 3 to 5 percent and the number of shops 
with 1 to 5 percent.25
7/7.2? Returns to deregulation for regulated industries
Even though the results in Table II do suggest some impact of deregulation, the 
reported coefficients will not reflect its causal impact on regulated industries if also 
other industries are indirectly affected by such laws. Moreover, equation (1) does not 
use that between 1977 and 1992, ten states deregulated at different points in time.
To use this variation in our analysis, an important question is how the Census 
sampling coincides with the timing of deregulation. The first column of Table HI 
therefore lists the states that deregulated between 1977 and 1992 and the crosses
25 Excluded are North Dakota and Missouri. North Dakota is excluded because it only deregulated in 
1991. Missouri is excluded because deregulation in 1979 implied counties could opt-out of state 
regulation. This happened gradually with 34 counties choosing to opt-out between 1979 and 1985, a 
further 19 counties between 1986 and 1990 and 12 counties opted-out between 1991 and 1992. See 
Appendix B for more details.
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Table U
Percentage Difference in Mean Fraction of Regulated Industries between 
States with and without Sunday Closing Laws, 1977-1992
Weekly
Employment Annual Revenue Number of Shops
1992 0.023 0.053 0.052
(0.025) (0.043) (0.025)
1987 0.018 0.029 0.010
(0.021) (0.029) (0.021)
1982 0.021 0.038 0.018
(0.023) (0.034) (0.019)
1977 0.023 0.048 0.019
(0.025) (0.030) (0.022)
Notes: Data are taken from the Census of Retail Trade. The numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
For the grouping of states into those with and without Sunday Closing Laws, see Appendices A and B.
reflect their effective date of deregulation relative to the Census sampling years. 
Depending on how long the impact of deregulation takes to complete, the group that 
deregulated by 1980 was most likely affected during the period 1977-1982. Similarly, 
the perceived impact period for the group that deregulated by 1983 is most likely to be 
1982-1987 and for the group that deregulated by 1987 it is the period 1987-1992. 
Assuming a positive impact of deregulation, also note that the estimated returns to 
deregulation will be attenuated in so far the true and perceived impact periods do not 
overlap.
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Table III
The Timing of Deregulation and Census Sampling, 1977-1992
Deregulated by 1980
Pennsylvania 
Connecticut 
New Jersey 
Deregulated by 1983 
Vermont 
Massachusetts 
Deregulated by 1987 
Mississippi 
Texas  
Louisiana
1977 1982 1987 1992
Notes: References to exact dates o f  deregulation are found in Appendix B.
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For each group of states, Table IV then compares outcomes in each deregulating 
industry with the same industry in non-deregulating states and other industries in every 
other state during the perceived impact period. This is done using the following 
specification:
(2) Ain 7* = p 0 + pjjs +AS+ Bt + eu
with Alnyfa the change in the log of employment, revenue or the number of shops in 
industry i and state s. The returns to deregulation are given by px since /„ a dummy equal 
to 1 if industry i in state s deregulated in that period. Term As is a vector of state fixed 
effects to capture the sensitivity of retail activity to geographically dispersed 
macroeconomic shocks and cycles. 26 Finally, 2?, is a vector of industry dummies to 
account for industry specific time shocks or trends common across states.
Columns [1], [3] and [5] suggest the returns to deregulation for deregulating 
industries are positive and point estimates range from 3.5 to 6 percent for employment,
4.5 and 10 percent for sales and 1 and 2 percent for the number of shops. Clustered 
standard errors indicate point estimates are marginally significant. To see whether state 
dummies mainly take out different shocks or cyclical variation between states, columns
[2], [4] and [6] replace the state dummies with differences in the log of the state wide 
unemployment rate, personal disposable income and population. Also, because these 
controls seem to vary similarly within the five geographical divisions used by the Census 
Bureau, five region dummies are also added as additional controls to potentially exclude 
further bias. The point estimates and corrected standard errors are very similar to those 
obtained using the state dummies indeed suggesting that state specific time varying
26 See Dzialo, Shank and Smith [1993] for a discussion of how different macroeconomic shocks and cycles 
have affected different regions in the LJS between 1977 and 1992.
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Table IV
The Impact of Deregulation using All Industries, 1977-1992
Weekly
Employment Annual Revenue Number of Shops
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Period 1977-1982
[5] [6]
Dummy for deregulating industries 0.038 0.044 0.043 0.036 0.011 0.011
(0.017) (0.020) (0.042) (0.045) (0.013) (0.019)
State dummies X X X
State controls and region dummies X X X
Period 1982-1987
Dummy for deregulating industries 0.060 0.054 0.097 0.085 0.021 0.012
(0.042) (0.038) (0.027) (0.028) (0.020) (0.018)
State dummies X X X
State controls and region dummies X X X
Period 1987-1992
Dummy for deregulating industries 0.035 0.048 0.046 0.042 0.013 0.009
(0.027) (0.032) (0.021) (0.015) (0.022) (0.019)
State dummies X X X
State controls and region dummies X X X
Notes: Data are taken from the Census of Retail Trade. The first specification includes industry and states 
dummies. The second specification includes industry dummies, growth in state wide unemployment, 
population and personal disposable income and 5 region dummies. Standard errors are clustered by 
whether the industry belongs to the group of deregulating industries or not interacted with state cells. The 
number of observations is between 389 and 400.
controls and region dummies are sufficient to capture state specific shocks and cycles 
even if state dummies can no longer be added to the difference-in-differences 
specification.
The estimates in Table IV do not necessarily reflect the true return to deregulation for 
deregulating industries if also other industries are indirectly affected by deregulation. To 
this end, consider the following specification using only the sample of regulated 
industries:
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(3) Ain = p0 + PXIS + 02AXs +Ar + Bt + eb
with AXS the change in the log of the unemployment rate, personal disposable income
and population and with Ar a set of five region dummies. Note that relative to equation 
(2), equation (3) further provides a specification test in that all right-hand side 
coefficients are now specific to deregulating industries, just like the coefficient of 
interest /?,.
The point estimates in Table V suggest that deregulation increases employment with
4.5 to 6.5 percent, revenue with 4 to 10 percent and the number of shops with 1 to 1.5 
percent in deregulating industries. Clustered standard errors reveal many of the estimated 
returns are statistically significant. Two further points are noteworthy. First, the estimated 
returns are relatively large. Given that our data suggest the average cyclical upswing 
increases revenue with about 20 to 30 percent (see for example Figure m  below), an 
increase of sales by about 5 percent seems important. Second, the similarity of point 
estimates between Tables II, IV and V suggests that the estimated returns for other 
industries are largely zero. Note however this is not necessarily inconsistent with the idea 
that deregulation has a negative impact on more narrowly defined exempted industries as 
will be argued below.
Finally, an interesting question is whether all or just some deregulating industries 
gain from deregulation. To capture the possible non-linearity in (3), Table VI therefore 
uses the following specification for each deregulating industry in its perceived impact 
period:
(4) M nY,= P0 + PtI ,+ fi2M :,+ A r +£,
with A In Ys the change in the log of annual revenue. Table VI shows that point estimates
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Table V
The Impact of Deregulation using Regulated Industries, 1977-1992
Returns to deregulation
Returns to deregulation
Returns to deregulation
Change in Log (Dependent Variable)
Employment A™1131 Revenue Number of Shops
0.044
(0.021)
0.064
(0.038)
0.046
(0.032)
Period 1977-1982
0.039
(0.046)
Period 1982-1987
0.107
(0.028)
Period 1987-1992
0.044
(0.015)
0.012
(0.019)
0.015
(0.018)
0.009
(0.019)
Notes: Data are taken from the Census of Retail Trade. All regressions include changes in the log of the 
state wide unemployment rate, population and personal disposable income, 5 region dummies and industry 
dummies. Standard errors are clustered by state. The number of observations is between 197 and 200.
are generally positive though OLS standard errors are relatively large. The largest impact 
is estimated for the group of building materials and garden stores, furniture and home 
furnishings stores and clothes stores.
III.C R obustness checks
If deregulation is more likely to happen in states that have different persistent trend 
growth, the estimated returns to deregulation are biased. One way to see whether this is 
true is to estimate the returns outside the perceived impact period. To this end, Figure II 
plots the point estimates in Table V together with point estimates for other periods. For 
example, the first three bars in the top panel of Figure II draw the point
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Table VI
The Impact of Deregulation on Annual Revenue in Each Regulated Industry, 1977-
1992
Period
1977-1982 1982-1987 1987-1992
Building materials and garden stores 0.076 0.127 0.033
(0.094) (0.114) (0.088)
General merchandise stores -0.001 0.086 0.127
(0.063) (0.046) (0.087)
Apparel and accessory stores 0.032 0.105 0.054
(0.041) (0.068) (0.058)
Furniture and home furnishing stores 0.037 0.106 0.038
(0.071) (0.089) (0.057)
Notes: Data are taken from the Census of Retail Trade. All regressions include changes in the log of the 
state wide unemployment rate, population and personal disposable income and 5 region dummies. The 
number of observations is between 48 and 50.
estimates given in the top panel of Table V. The next three bars estimate the returns to 
deregulation for states that deregulated by 1980 for the period 1982-1987 and so forth. It 
is clear from Figure II that the estimated returns in Table V do not seem largely affected 
by differing trends or measurement error in the timing of deregulation. Indeed, it can be 
shown that point estimates of trend-adjusted difference-in-differences for the group of 
deregulating industries are very similar to those presented in Table V.
The point estimates presented earlier could also wrongly state the true returns to 
deregulation because of changes in data stratification by the Census Bureau. For example, 
whereas most of the point estimates in Table V are between 1 and 5 percent, the 
estimated returns for states that deregulated by 1982, Massachusetts and Vermont, seem 
relatively large. To see whether this reflects changes in Census procedures in those states,
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Figure II
The Impact of Deregulation using Regulated Industries 
by Period, 1977-1992
Deregulated by 1980
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Notes: Data are taken from the Census o f  Retail Trade. All regressions include changes in the log 
o f the state wide unemployment rate, population and personal disposable income, 5 region 
dummies and industry dummies. Standard errors are clustered by state. The number o f  
observations is between 195 and 200.
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Figure III
Differences in Annual Retail Revenue between Massachusetts and New York,
1978-1992 (1978=100)
CO -
o -
1983 19851977 1979 1981 1987 1989 1991 1993
Massachusetts (deregulated in 1983) —  New York
o _
otr
CL O  -
1
1983 19851977 1979 1981 1987 1989 1991 1993
Massachusetts (deregulated in 1983) 1 New York
Notes: Data are taken from the annualized Monthly Retail Sales Survey. The series in the lower 
panel are constructed by taking the difference between actual (deflated and normalized to 
1978=100 as in the top panel) and predicted revenue. Predicted revenue is expected revenue from 
changes in the log o f state wide unemployment, population and personal disposable income.
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Figure IE uses an annualized measure of real retail revenue derived from the Monthly 
Retail Trade Survey between 1978 and 1992. Despite the fact that these historical series 
are only available for a few states, a useful comparison between Massachusetts (which 
deregulated in December 1982) and New York (which did not deregulate) can be made. 
The top panel of Figure HI gives the raw differences between both states suggesting a 
difference-in-differences between 1982 and 1987 of about 10 percent, similar to the point 
estimate given in Table V. But one concern is the possibility that the difference-in- 
differences between 1982 and 1992 of about 3 percent is the better measure of the long- 
run impact of deregulation. However, the bottom panel of Figure HI draws the series 
adjusted for changes in the unemployment rate, personal disposable income and 
population. The regression adjusted series suggests that deregulation did have a persistent 
and relatively large impact of 7 to 8 percent on retail revenue in Massachusetts. Note 
however that this does not imply the differences-in-differences presented in the second 
panel of Table V and the bottom panel of Figure IE are necessarily unbiased. For 
example, deregulation in Massachusetts and Vermont did coincide with a strong cyclical 
upswing in consumer confidence in those states that could not entirely be controlled for 
by changes in the unemployment rate, personal disposable income or population.
Finally, despite controlling for state-industry fixed effects, state-time and industry- 
time specific shocks as well as persistent differences in trend growth, an important 
question remains about the randomness of deregulation. Ideally, deregulation is 
randomized and there are two good reasons to think why this might at least partially be 
the case here. First, Sunday Closing Laws have been declared unconstitutional by courts
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rather than directly repealed by state legislators in four out of ten deregulating states.27 
Deregulation will therefore be closer to a randomized experiment if the outcome of 
litigation procedures is less predictable. Second, the history of deregulation suggests part 
of the decision to deregulate is driven by a long-run West-to-East pattern across states not 
clearly correlated with any long-run patterns in product or labor market outcomes.
In sum, using that between 1979 and 1992 a number of states deregulated their 
Sunday Closing Laws at different points in time, employment, revenue and the number of 
shops are expected to increase in deregulating industries. This seems to be true using a 
number of specifications and different data sets. These insights will be further amplified 
in the next section using the 1997 Census of Retail Trade. Moreover, the next section also 
examines what is most likely to happen to employment, sales and the number of shops in 
exempted industries.
III.D Returns to deregulation for exempted industries
Given that deregulation did not happen after 1991, Table VII uses the 1997 Census of 
Retail Trade to derive a comparison similar to the analysis in Table n. The first row of 
Table VII gives mean percentages of total retail for all regulated industries in states with 
Sunday Closing Laws. The second row calculates mean percentages for the same 
industries in states without Sunday Closing Laws. The third row then gives the difference 
between the second and the first row, suggesting regulated industries are relatively 
smaller in states with Sunday Closing Laws in 1997. The final row of Table VII reports 
these differences as a fraction of row I. What these fractions suggest is that deregulation 
could increase employment, revenue and the number of shops with 6 to 7
27 See Appendix B for further details.
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Table VH
Mean Percentages of Total Retail for Regulated Industries in States with and 
without Sunday Closing Laws, 1997
Weekly
Employment Annual Revenue Number of Shops
1. States with Sunday Closing Laws 57.11
(1.145)
54.80
(1.363)
61.09
(0.798)
II. States without Sunday Closing Laws 60.71
(0.608)
58.67
(0.518)
65.59
(0.598)
I I -1 3.596
(1.410)
3.868
(1.273)
4.496
(1.341)
(ll-l)/l 0.060
(0.023)
0.068
(0.022)
0.070
(0.020)
Notes: Data are taken from the 1997 Census of Retail Trade. The numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
For the grouping of states into those with and without Sunday Closing Laws, see Appendix A.
percent in regulated industries. Despite changes in the industry classification and 
sampling criteria in more recent Census data, these numbers are roughly comparable to 
those presented in Table II.
A further test is to see whether mean differences exist per consumer. The results are 
found in the top panel of Table VIII. The first row suggests that in deregulating 
industries, deregulation increases employment with 2.5 workers per thousand consumers, 
annual expenditure with $603 per person per year and the number of shops with 0.096 per 
thousand consumers. One can compare these estimated mean differences with mean 
differences for other industries given in the second row of Table VIII. For example, if 
retail is generally larger in regulated states as suggested by the mean differences for other 
industries, the difference-in-differences given in the third row of Table VIII suggest that 
deregulation increases employment with 3.4 jobs per thousand consumers, annual
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Table VJLll
Mean Differences between States with and without Sunday Closing Laws, 1997
Regulated Industries
Other Industries
Difference-in-differences
Regulated Industries
Other Industries
Difference-in-differences
Weekly
Employment
Annual Revenue 
($1000) Number of Shops
Per 1000 inhabitants
2.481 603.0 0.096
(1.090) (192.2) (0.158)
-0.917 37.39 -0.204
(0.202) (20.79) (0.021)
3.399 565.6 0.301
(0.914) (100.4) (0.099)
Per $21.7m o f personal disposable income
-1.200 108.8 -0.223
(1.822) (235.9) (0.228)
-3.576 -349.3 -0.410
(1.323) (133.8) (0.141)
2.376 458.1 0.187
(2.252) (271.2) (0.268)
Notes: Data are taken from the 1997 Census of Retail Trade. The numbers are mean differences between 
states with and without Sunday Closing Laws. The numbers in brackets are standard errors. For the 
grouping of states into those with and without Sunday Closing Laws, see Appendix A.
expenditure with $565 per person per year and the number of shops with 0.3 per thousand
inhabitants in deregulating industries.
Rather than comparing differences per consumer in each state, the bottom panel of
Table VIII compares mean differences per dollar of personal disposable income. To allow
for the numbers to be roughly comparable to those presented in the top panel, all means
are multiplied with average personal disposable income per thousand inhabitants. The
final row of Table VIE estimates that deregulation could increase employment with 2.4
per thousand inhabitants, annual expenditure with $458 per person per year and the
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number of shops with 0.19 per thousand inhabitants. Note that these differences are very 
similar to those presented in the top panel.
An interesting question is whether suppressed expenditure on regulated goods in 
states with Sunday Closing Laws affect all regulated industries equally. Table IX 
therefore gives mean differences for annual revenue similar to those presented in the first 
rows of the top and bottom panel of Table VUI for each regulated industry.28 Table EX 
suggests these differences are all positive and roughly similar (except for department 
stores using the income normalization which could be explained by the relative low 
number of shops in those industries). If anything and in line with the findings in Table 
VI, the results in Table EX suggest consumers spend more mainly on building material 
and garden stores and furniture and home furnishings stores after deregulation.
Finally, the more detailed industry classification available from the 1997 Census of 
Retail Trade not only allows to examine how regulation affects activity in regulated 
industries but also shops exempted from Sunday Closing Laws. In particular, Table X 
breaks down drug and propriety stores into beauty shops and pharmacies since 
pharmacies together with gasoline service stations are most likely to generally represent 
shops exempted from Sunday Closing Laws in contrast to beauty shops. Similar to the 
comparisons in Table IX, Table X then compares average annual revenue between states 
with and without Sunday Closing Laws using both the population and income 
normalizations. Point estimates suggest that deregulation increases sales in regulated 
industries (cosmetics, beauty and perfume stores) and, if anything, decreases sales in
28 In contrast to Tables I and VI, note that the group of miscellaneous retail stores has now been listed under 
“Regulated In dustriesThe reason for doing so is that the more aggregate industry classification used by 
the Census Bureau before 1997 does not allow excluding the non-store retailers from this group.
75
Table IX
Differences in Means for Annual Revenue (in thousands of $) between States with 
and without Sunday Closing Laws for Each Regulated Industry, 1997
Per 1000 inhabitants Per $21.7m of PDI
Building material and garden stores 156.4 44.34
(83.12) (107.3)
General merchandise stores 107.7 -72.21
(107.7) (135.1)
Apparel and accesory stores 95.34 24.76
(84.55) (71.56)
Furniture and home furnishings stores 138.0 76.13
(48.18) (41.50)
Miscellaneous retail stores 105.5 35.77
(11.63) (11.48)
Notes: Data are taken from the 1997 Census of Retail Trade. The numbers are mean differences between 
states with and without Sunday Closing Laws. The numbers in brackets are standard errors. For the 
grouping of states into those with and without Sunday Closing Laws, see Appendix A.
Table X
Differences in Means for Annual Revenue (in thousands of $) between States with 
and without Sunday Closing Laws for Some Other Industries, 1997
Per 1000 inhabitants Per $21.7m of PDI
Drug and propriety stores -7.647 -73.35
(48.08) (40.29)
Cosmetics, beauty and perfume stores 17.17 8.402
(1.663) (1.452)
Pharmacies and drug stores -24.82 -81.75
(45.20) (38.68)
Gasoline service stations -53.41 -169.8
(77.60) (106.2)
Notes: Data are taken from the 1997 Census of Retail Trade. The numbers are mean differences between 
states with and without Sunday Closing Laws. The numbers in brackets are standard errors. For the 
grouping of states into those with and without Sunday Closing Laws, see Appendix A.
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industries exempted from such laws (pharmacies and drug stores and gasoline service 
stations).
III.E Deregulation, average weekly wages and prices
Table XI therefore uses the 1977-1992 Census data to examine the impact of 
deregulation on average weekly wages. This is made possible because the Census Bureau 
also provides a measure of annual payroll for industries in retail. Comparing the 
percentage changes in employment with the percentage changes in annual payroll, it is 
then possible to say something about the impact of deregulation on average weekly 
wages. The first column of Table XI reproduces the point estimates found in the first 
column of Table V. The second column in Table XI gives point estimates for annual 
payroll using a similar specification and correction of standard errors. The point estimates 
are very similar and if anything somewhat larger for the payroll data indicating a small 
but insignificant increase in average weekly wages.
Whether the increase in total revenue documented above is driven by an increase in 
output prices or the volume of sales (or both) ultimately depends on how retailers set 
prices given demand for their products and retailing costs. It might therefore come as no 
surprise that the theoretical literature on the price effect of liberalizing opening times is 
mixed and inconclusive.29 For example, Burda and Weil [2001] predict that prices will 
increase after deregulation because of a fall in the productivity of finding a customer 
given all other shops are open longer. However, Clemenz [1990] more explicitly
29 Despite a lack of theoretical and empirical research on the impact of longer opening times on 
employment, sales, the number of shops or wages, a small literature has emerged examining its impact on 
retail prices. Inderst and Irmen [2004] provide the most recent survey of this literature to conclude that it is 
divided about whether prices should increase or decrease after deregulation.
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Table XI
The Impact of Deregulation on Average Weekly Wages using
Regulated Industries, 1977-1992
Change in Log (Dependent Variable^ 
Annual PayrollWeeklyEmployment
Returns to deregulation
Returns to deregulation
Returns to deregulation
Period 1977-1982
0.044
(0.021)
0.055
(0.033)
Period 1982-1987
0.064
(0.038)
0.073
(0.046)
Period 1987-1992
0.046
(0.032)
0.061
(0.032)
Notes: Data are taken from the Census of Retail Trade. All regressions include the change in the log of 
state wide unemployment, population and personal disposable income, 5 region dummies and industry 
dummies. Standard errors are clustered by state. The number of observations is between 198 and 200.
examines the role of search for equilibrium prices under imperfect information to 
conclude that deregulation could reduce prices if longer shopping hours facilitate price 
comparisons. And although these studies do differ in their conclusions, a common theme 
does emerge, namely that the price impact of deregulation is relatively small. 
Consequently, the model presented below first examines the impact of deregulation on 
employment, sales and the number of shops in regulated and exempted industries before 
also accounting in equilibrium for its possible impact on wages and prices.
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IV. A MODEL TO ANALYZE THE IMPACT OF EXTENDING OPENING 
HOURS ON LABOR AND PRODUCT MARKETS
Throughout this section, it is assumed that each shop has some market power by 
offering a differentiated product. Building on these and other standard assumptions about 
retail markets, this section then provides a framework to explain the observed impact of 
deregulation by accounting for changes in consumer behavior, retail competition and 
ultimately labor demand. We will consider the case of Sunday opening, although the 
model equally applies to any extension of opening times. The model presented here is 
informal and a more technical exposition can be found in Appendix C.
IV.A The impact o f extending opening hours on employment and sales in 
deregulating industries
Empirical evidence suggests that employment costs in retail vary with opening times 
and the volume of sales (Nooteboom [1982, 1983] and Thurik [1982]). The idea that part 
of labor costs only vary with opening times can be justified by noting that one must 
employ at least one worker at all times. Furthermore, there seems to be considerable 
empirical evidence in favor of constant marginal labor costs. Total labor costs per week 
therefore write as
(5) C = cdD + cxX
with cD threshold labor costs per day, D the number of opening days a week, cx constant 
marginal labor costs and X  the volume of weekly sales. Weekly employment is then given 
by
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(6) N  = nDD + nxX
with no threshold labor per day and nx inverse marginal labor productivity.
Equations (5) and (6) are related by that cd — w no  and c x =  wrix with w the wage per 
unit of time. For example, assume that weekly sales are given by X=l/nx (N - no D) UN  
strictly exceeds the required amount of threshold labor and zero otherwise. Besides a 
standard production function, this relationship can also reflect a first order approximation 
to Nooteboom’s [1983] “isomenes” (equal-waiting curves). In Nooteboom’s model, 
employment depends positively on sales since firms want to keep their waiting time 
relative to service time at approximately nx. This gives N  = NdD + nxX if X  > 1/nx and 
zero otherwise. Integrating over wages then gives (5).
The impact of Sunday opening on weekly employment can then be analyzed through 
an increase of D in (6). If consumers only inter-temporally substitute income from others 
days of the week to Sunday, the volume of weekly sales does not increase and weekly 
employment only increases with the additional required threshold labor (threshold labor 
effect). However, in line with the empirical evidence shown above, total weekly sales in 
deregulating industries are expected to increase.30 If this is the case, X  will increase and 
therefore employment will further increase (sales effect).
IV.B The impact o f extending opening hours on the number o f shops in 
deregulating industries
30 This would be the case if shopping at different days of the week are not perfect substitutes. For example, 
Grunhagen, Grove and Gentry [2002] present some evidence that consumers perceive Sunday shopping and 
shopping on other days of the week as distinct activities. Alternatively, an increase in total sales could be 
explained by that consumers were more rationed in their shopping time before deregulation. Jacobsen and 
Kooreman [2005] present a model along these lines and based on time-use data find that consumers 
increase their total shopping time following an extension of opening hours. It is not clear, however, whether 
their findings identify a model in which consumers are rationed ex ante or whether shopping on different 
days of the week are not perfect substitutes in consumption.
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If the increase in total revenue outweighs the increase in labor costs, profits will 
increase and retailers will decide to open on Sunday.31 In line with the empirical evidence 
shown above, the number of shops will therefore increase until all profits are exhausted. 
In sum, employment is likely to increase because of increased threshold labor, an increase 
in the volume of sales but also an increase in the number of shops. Assuming all shops 
are identical for simplicity, this is easily seen since total labor demand in the steady state 
is given by
(7) SN = nDSD + nxSX
with S the number of shops in deregulating industries. First, an increase in D increases 
threshold labor in each shop (threshold labor effect). Second, if an increase in D increases 
S, total threshold labor will increase (entry effect). Finally, if an increase in D increases S 
and X  and therefore SXt the total volume of sales will increase resulting in a further 
increase in employment (sales effect).
IV.C The impact o f extending shop opening hours on deregulating and non­
deregulating industries
If total expenditure in regulated shops increases after deregulation, expenditure on 
goods or services in other industries will fall if total income is constant. If anything, 
deregulation is therefore expected to have a negative impact on total revenue, the number
31 If threshold labor costs are too high, it is not immediately clear why retailers would decide to extend their 
opening hours. One possibility is that Sunday opening increases shop space utilization or that Sunday 
opening implies the optimal shop size becomes smaller because of a reduction in peak demand. If these cost 
savings outweigh the additional costs of Sunday opening, retailers will find it profitable to extend their 
opening hours. However, the predicted impact of deregulation on employment in deregulating industries 
remains as is described in this section.
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of shops and therefore employment in exempted industries as was already argued in the 
data.
To allow for this possibility, assume two types of shops exist: type s shops for which 
opening hours are being deregulated and type m shops for which opening hours are not 
being deregulated. Type m shops can either remain prohibited to trade on Sunday after 
deregulation or be exempted from Sunday Closing Laws before deregulation. Denote the 
number of type s shops as S and the number of type m shops as M. Also assume for 
simplicity all type s shops and all type m shops are identical but type s and type m shops 
can have different cost parameters.
Define the solid lines in Figure IV as the long-run zero-profit curves for type s shops 
(vertical axis) and type m shops (horizontal axis) before deregulation. First, the intercepts 
Sm=o and Ms=o are assumed to be finite and to depend positively on personal disposable 
income and negatively on threshold labor costs. Second, the zero-profit curves are 
assumed to be downward sloping for S  and M  strictly positive. To see this, consider the 
zero-profit curve for type s shops. If type s and type m goods are substitutes, an increase 
in M  requires a decrease in the total fraction of income spent on type s goods. 
Consequently, higher M  reduces profitability in type s industries which decreases S. 
Third, the intersection of the zero-profit curves determines the equilibrium number of 
shops S* and M* before deregulation.
32 An important question is whether the analysis as drawn in Figure IV can exist under standard 
assumptions about retailing costs, consumer preferences and retailer behavior. Appendix C therefore 
formally derives the analysis summarized in Figure IV using a Dixit-Stiglitz type model of monopolistic 
competition assuming labor costs are as in (5). Besides the standard Dixit-Stiglitz restrictions on the utility 
parameters, the appendix proofs that for a unique stable equilibrium to exist it is sufficient to assume that 
the substitutability of goods between shops of different type is less than the substitutability between goods 
of similar type. This assumption does not seem too restrictive.
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Figure IV
The Impact of Deregulating Shop Closing Hours on the Number of Shops in 
Deregulating and Non-deregulating Industries
M=0
S= 0
Assuming personal disposable income is constant, deregulation decreases Sm=o to 
S ’m=o because of increased total threshold labor costs. But deregulation also rotates 
upwards the zero-profit curve for type s shops around S ’m=o and rotates inwards the zero- 
profit curve for type m shops around Ms=o- The zero-profit curve for type s shops rotates 
upwards and for type m shops rotates inwards because consumers spend a larger fraction 
of total income on type s goods after deregulation. Also note that the zero-profit curves 
rotate around their intercepts because the intercepts do not change if personal disposable 
income is constant. A new equilibrium is reached at (S**,M**)- Because S** must lie on 
the zero-profit curve for type s shops that has shifted upwards, total expenditure on type s
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goods must increase. Moreover, if it is profitable for retailers to open on Sunday, the 
increase in total revenue outweighs the increase in threshold labor costs and S**>S*.
In line with the empirical evidence presented in the previous section, total 
employment in deregulating industries will increase because of an increase in threshold 
labor (threshold labor effect), total revenue (sales effect) and the number of shops (entry 
effect). However, the inward rotation of the zero-profit curve for type m shops reflects an 
unambiguous decrease in total expenditure on type m goods. In the short-run, some type 
m shops will make losses and eventually the number of type m shops unambiguously 
decreases. Total employment in non-deregulating industries is therefore expected to fall 
because of a decrease in total revenue (sales effect) and the number of shops (exit effect).
IV.D The impact o f deregulation on wages and prices
If wages increase significantly (maybe because of legally imposed requirements for 
working Sundays), threshold and marginal labor costs will increase. It then is 
straightforward to show that the increase in total revenue, the number of shops and 
therefore employment in deregulating industries will be smaller. And consequently, the 
decrease in non-deregulating industries will be smaller too.
Finally, note that the analysis assumed that all type s shops set a unique price and all 
type m shops set a unique price before and after deregulation.33 Consequently, the 
analysis above explicitly accounts for the possibility that deregulation affects aggregate 
prices since Figure IV allows for type s and type m shops to charge different prices in 
equilibrium. For example, assume labor productivity in type s shops is higher than in type
33 In the model presented in Appendix C retailers perceive demand to be iso-elastic and charge a constant 
mark-up over marginal costs. Deregulation therefore has no impact on the price set by each retailer.
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m shops such that type s shops charge a lower price. In this case, part of the increase in S 
and decrease in M  is explained by consumers substituting income towards deregulating 
industries because type s workers are more productive. The more productive type s 
workers are, the bigger will be the gains (losses) for type s (type m) industries, the bigger 
will be the increase in average productivity and the bigger will the decrease in the 
aggregate price index. However, in so far the observed increase (decrease) in total 
revenue for deregulating (non-deregulating) shops reflects a change in prices, the 
expected impact of deregulation on employment in deregulating (non-deregulating) 
industries will be smaller.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has argued there are important deficiencies in our understanding of how 
shop closing hours affect consumer behavior, competition and therefore ultimately 
employment. Using Census of Retail Trade data, it was first shown that deregulation 
increases total employment, total revenue and the number of shops in deregulating 
industries. This is true for a number of specifications including a number of different 
control groups, different time periods and different data. However, estimates also suggest 
that deregulation decreases total employment, revenue and the number of shops in non- 
deregulating industries.
Building on standard assumptions about retail markets, this chapter then provided a 
framework to explain the observed impact of deregulation by accounting for changes in 
consumer behavior, retail competition and ultimately labor demand. Consistent with the
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empirical findings, it was shown how employment in deregulating industries increases 
because of an increase in threshold labor (a threshold labor effect), an increase the total 
volume of sales (sales effect) and an increase in the number of shops (entry effect). 
However, it was also argued that employment in exempted industries will fall because of 
a decrease in total expenditure in exempted industries (sales effect) as well as a decrease 
in the number of shops (exit effect).
In any future debate about the employment impact of extending opening hours, it 
seems therefore important to simultaneously account for consumer preferences, retailer 
costs and pricing behavior, the competitive nature of retail markets and wage policies in 
predicting its impact on retail employment in both deregulating and non-deregulating 
industries.
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Appendix A
Current Sunday Closing Laws
Alabama
Kentucky
Maine
New Hampshire
Oklahoma
Rhode Island
South Carolina
West Virginia
Ala. Coda 13A-12-1: T he keeping of an open store 
on Sunday is prohibited.*
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 436.160: ”Any person who works 
on Sunday or employs another person on Sunday shall 
be fined not less than $2 and not more than 50$ for 
each violation.”
Me. Rev. S ta t Ann. Tit. 17:3204: ‘Businesses cannot 
be open to the public on Sundays [...].*
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 332-D:2: Opening of shops or 
selling any merchandise is prohibited on Sunday.
Okla. S ta t T it 21:918: ‘Secular labor, trades and all 
manner of public selling of any commodities are acts 
forbidden to be done on the first day of the week, the 
doing of which is Sabbath-breaking*
R.L Gen. Laws 5-23-1: ‘Retail establishments 
licensed by the town council or any town may be 
permitted to open for business on Sundays between 
noon and 6 p.m and on holidays during normal working 
hours.”
S.C. Code Ann. 53-1-5: ‘It shall be unlawful for any 
person to sell at retail any goods on Sunday before 
1.30 p.m on Sunday.”
W. Va. Code 61-10-25: ‘It shall be unlawful to engage 
in work, labor or business on Sunday.*
Ky. Rev. S ta t Ann. 436-165: ‘Any legaslative body of 
any city or county may further permit or regulate retail 
sales on Sunday [...].”
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 332-D:4: T he governing body of 
any city or town may adopt bylaws and ordinances 
permitting and regulating retail businesses.”
S.C. Code Ann. 53-1-150 to 170: ‘Counties also have 
the option of suspending certain Sunday closing laws.”
W. Va. Code 61-10-28: T h e  county court of any 
county is hereby authorized to call a local option 
election for the purpose of determining the will of the 
voters as to whether the provisions of section 61-10-25 
shall continue to have effect in said county.”
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Appendix B
The US history of Sunday Closing Laws, 1979-2004
North Dakota
Louisiana
Mississippi
Texas
Massaehussetts
Vermont
Missouri
New Jersey
Connecticut
Pennsylvania
______________ Sunday Closing Law______________
N.D. Cant. Cod# 12.1-30-01: "It is a misdemeanor for 
any person between the hours of twelve midnight and 
twelve noon on Sunday to conduct a business or labor 
for profit
La. Stat Ann. 51-191: "All stores, shops, saloons and 
all places of public business, [...], shall be closed at 
twelve o'clock on Saturday nights, and remain closed 
continuously for twenty-four hours, during which time 
no proprietor thereof shall give, trade, barter, 
exchange or sell any stock or any article of 
merchandise kept in his establishment."
Ms. StaL Ann. 97-23-67 generally prohibited sales on 
Sunday.
Tx. StaL Ann. 132-9001 prohibited the sale of goods 
on both the two consecutive days of Saturday and 
Sunday.
Ma. Gen. Laws Ann. 136.5: "Sunday shall be a 
common day of rest. Whoever on Sunday keeps open 
his shop, [...], or does any labor, business or work, 
except works of necessity and charity, shall be 
punished [...]."
VL Stat. Ann. 13-3351/52 related to the establishment 
of a common day of rest and the prohibition of 
business on such day.
Mo. Rev. StaL 578.100: "On Sunday, it is a 
misdemeanor to engage in in the business of selling 
clothing and wearing apparel and accessories; 
furniture; housewares; home business or office 
furnishings and appliances; hardware; tools; paints; 
building and lumber supply materials; jewelry; 
silverware; watches; clocks; luggage; musical 
instruments and recordings or toys."
N J .  Stat. Ann. 2A-171-1 prohibited wordly 
employment or business on Sunday.
Ct. Gen. StaL Ann. 53-302a: "No person, firm or 
corporation shall engage in work, labor or business, or 
employ others in work, labor or business on Sunday.”
Pa. StaL Ann. 18-7361: "A person is guilty of a 
summary offense if he does or performs any worldly 
employment or business whatsoever on Sunday."
______________ Date of Deregulation
Repealed February 1991.
Repealed December 1986.
Repealed July 1986.
Repealed September 1986.
Ma. Gen. Laws Ann. 136.50: "It is no longer 
prohibited to keep open a store or shop and sell retail 
goods therein [...] provided [...] any store or shop shall 
not open for business on Sunday prior to the hour of 
noon." Effective December 1982.
State v. Ludlow Supermarkets Inc. 141 VL 261,448
A2d 791 struck down the entire state wide scheme. 
Effective May 1982.
Mo. Rev. Stat. 578.110: "Any counties may exempt 
itself from provisions 578.100 by vote of qualified 
voters at any election (for larger counties) or public 
hearing (for smaller counties)." Between November 
1979 and June 1985,34 counties deregulated, 
between April 1986 and November 1990,19 counties 
deregulated and between April 1991 and April 1995,
22 counties deregulated.
Repealed September 1979.
Caldoi's Inc. v. Bedding Bam Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 
417 A.2d struck down the entire state wide scheme. 
Effective April 1979.
Kroger Co. v. O'Hara Tp. 392 A2d 266 481 Pa. 101
struck down the entire state wide scheme. Effective 
October 1978.
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Appendix C
This appendix presents a formal Dixit-Stiglitz type model of monopolistic 
competition to analyze the impact of deregulating shop closing hours. The informal 
model described in the text can be summarized using representative utility given by
(C.l) U =
1-1 v j-i ;
M m
X L - +
i= l
‘P
W=1
with xiJm consumption from shop i on day j  given the opening hours of the shop were not 
deregulated (type m shop) and xijs consumption from shop / on day j  given the opening
hours of the shop are being deregulated (type s shop). The number of type m shops is M  
and the number of type s shops is S. The number of hours per week type m shops can 
trade is Dm and the number of hours per week type s shops can open is Ds . For the 
indifference curves to be convex and finite we need that 0< 5  < 1, 0 < y < 1, 0 < p < l .  
Also assume that p  <y or that the substitutability between type m and type s shops is 
smaller than the substitutability between shops of similar type. Also note that consumer 
tastes for shopping during extended opening hours is captured by l/S  .
Demand for retail goods
Denote Pm and Ps as the standard Dixit-Stiglitz price indices for each type m and 
type s shop and Pm and Ps the standard price indices for all type m and s goods 
respectively. If in equilibrium all type m shops set a unique weekly price pm and all type s 
shops set a unique weekly price ps , Pm and Ps simplify to
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<5 -1
A n  i  «  <5 - 1
(C.2) Pm = J = Dm~ p m
<5 - 1
(
A ,  5  <5 <5 - 1
. 7 = 1
Given (C.2) and (C.3), Pm and P, write as
. i d
— J L |  r r - 1 <5- 1
(C.4) = « 7 D . 7 f t
r-i
— J l ] r Izi £zl(C-5) = S r D , s p , .
Weekly demand at each type m and s shop is then given by
(C.6) X„ =
(C.7) X ,=
l N
PJ±
—  J _
\ P m Y ~ 1  J
<j Y = <t —  
M
( i >
p ,~ '
—  7
P s Y ~  1
(1-07 =  0- 0 -
with crm the fraction of total income Y spent on all type m shops which in equilibrium is 
given by
(C.8) <r„ =
_  P
P .~ '
—  P —  P
P L p - 1  + P . P - 1
Supply o f retail goods
Each shop sells a differentiated product. Shops have some monopoly power and 
enough shops exist such that each store perceives its demand only to depend on its own
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price. The first order conditions for maximizing profits then gives the familiar result that 
prices are a constant mark-up over marginal costs or pmy = cm. Similarly, in equilibrium 
we must have that psy = cs. Assuming free entry of shops this gives the following zero- 
profit conditions:
(C.9) ^ c mX„=Fm
(C.10) l— L CsX,= F ,
with F  threshold labor costs and other costs independent of sales.
Substituting (C.4) and (C.5) into (C.8) and (C.2), (C.4) and (C.8) into (C.6) and (C.6) 
into (C.9) and rearranging terms gives the following zero-profit condition for type m 
shops:
(C.ll) S = M M
r(p-i) , ^  ^rl4zl)
p(r-i) Dr 
v A y
5(r-i)
with
(C.12) Ms=0 =_ l ~7
r \
\ c m J
Y_
F_
Similarly, the zero-profit condition for all type s shops can be written as
r(S-i)
(C.13) M = S W-1) D‘ )
S ( r - 1)
(C.14) SUm0^ - ^ - c ,
r
r v Y_
F,
If y > p , zero-profit conditions (C.l 1) and (C.13) have vertical asymptotes at M  = Oand 
5 = 0 respectively. Inspection of the first order derivatives of S with respect to M  in
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(C.l 1) and M  with respect to S in (C.13) learns that for all possible parameter values the 
first order derivative is strictly negative if M < Ms=0 in (C.l 1) and S < SM=0 in (C.13)
and zero if M = Ms=0 in (C.l 1) and S = SM=Q in (C.13). For all possible parameter values
the second order derivatives are strictly positive for all M < Ms=0 in (C.ll) and all
S < SM=0 in (C.13). Figure IV illustrates the equilibrium . Also note that in
(C.ll) an increase in S of one requires a decrease in M  less than one and in (C.13) a 
decrease in M of one requires an increase in S of less than one. This implies the 
equilibrium is stable.
The impact o f deregulating shop closing hours
Using (C.ll) for any given 5, an increase in Ds (relative toDm) requires a fall in M. 
Using (C.13), an increase in Ds requires an increase in S for any given M. The increase 
in S further decreases M  in (C.l 1) and the decrease in M  further increases S in (C.13) 
until a new stable equilibrium is reached. Assuming fixed daily costs of production are 
sufficiently small, the number of type s shops unambiguously increases and the number 
of type m shops unambiguously decreases following an increase in Ds . The dashed lines 
in Figure IV reflect the impact of deregulation on the number of type m and s shops in 
equilibrium.
Also note from (C.l 1) and (C.13) that for any given(5*,M*)the increase in S and the 
decrease in M  following an increase in Ds are bigger if <5 is smaller or consumers have a 
preference for shopping on Sunday. Similarly, the increase in S and the decrease in M
92
following an increase in Ds are bigger if p  is bigger or the substitutability of goods 
between type m and type s shops is higher.
From (C.4), (C.5), (C.8), (C.ll) and (C.13) it follows that an increase in Ds reduces
the fraction of total income spent on type m goods, <rm. The increase in S and the 
decrease in M  further decrease <rm as consumers will consume from every shop in 
equilibrium. The prediction therefore is that total sales in type m shops decrease and total 
sales in type s shops increase following an increase inD,. Consequently employment in 
type m shops will decrease and employment in type s shops will increase.
It can also be shown that following an increase in Ds, the decrease (increase) of total
sales in type m (s) shops will be larger if 8 is smaller or if consumers have a preference 
for shopping on Sunday. Similarly, if type m and s goods are more substitutable in 
consumption, the decrease (increase) of total sales in type m (s) shops will be larger if p 
is bigger.
Multiple stable equilibria
The solid line in Figure C.l gives zero-profit conditions if y{p - l) /p (y  -1) is an 
even integer (and the dotted lines parts of the zero-profit conditions if y{p -1)/ p(y - 1) 
is not an even integer) and shows multiple equilibria. The analysis remains qualitatively 
unchanged. For example, the comparative statics for an increase in Ds / Dm are given by 
the dashed lines. In all cases, S increases and M increases as before.
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Figure C.I 
Multiple stable equilibria
CHAPTER HI
THE RECENT EXPANSION OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN 
BRITAIN, COLLEGE PREMIUMS AND WAGE INEQUALITY
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INTRODUCTION
The continuous increase in the college-high school wage gap together with the 
relative increase in educated employment over the past twenty-five years has made many 
to believe that a secular increase in the relative demand for educated workers can go a 
substantial distance towards explaining college premiums (see Author, Katz and Kearney 
[2004] for the most recent overview of a very large literature). While this is probably 
true, little attention has been given to the importance of changes in the relative supply of 
college workers. One notable exception is Card and Lemieux [2001] (CL). More 
specifically for the UK, CL use the 1975-1996 General Household Survey (GHS) to 
argue that college premiums for cohorts bom between 1955 and 1970 are higher due to a 
slowdown in the growth of educational attainment between 1973 and 1988.
This chapter uses the 1975-2003 GHS to analyze the impact of Britain’s expansion in 
higher education between 1988 and 1994 documented by Walker and Zhu [2005]. If the 
CL hypothesis is correct, one would also expect to find evidence for it in falling college 
premiums for cohorts bom between 1970 and 1976. To see whether this is true is the first 
aim of this chapter. The second aim of this chapter then is to analyze how important these 
inter-cohort differences in college attainment growth rates are in explaining changes over 
time in the average college premium and wage inequality.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section I follows CL in
presenting a simple supply and demand framework to explain variation in college 
premiums across age-year groups. The model presented shows that in a period of
accelerating (decelerating) educational attainment, age group specific educational
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premiums are likely to twist so that inequality among younger workers compresses 
(expands) relative to the old if younger and older workers are not perfect substitutes.
Section II then examines the expansion of higher education in Britain between 1988 
and 1994 in two ways. Pooling all years between 1975 and 2003, it first documents the 
slowdown in educational attainment growth rates for cohorts bom between 1955 and 
1970 and the consequent acceleration for cohorts bom between 1970 and 1976. Second, 
regression residuals of relative supply measures regressed onto age and year fixed effects 
are plotted to show how these inter-cohort changes in educational attainment growth rates 
can explain part of the variation in the relative supply of college workers across age-year 
cells.
Section in then turns to estimates of college premiums to test the CL hypothesis in 
two ways. First, college-high school wage gaps by age-year cells are decomposed directly 
into age, year and cohort fixed effects. Using the increase in educational attainment 
between 1988 and 1994, this approach provides some evidence of lower relative earnings 
for the youngest cohorts. Second, substituting measures of relative supply of college 
workers by age-year cells for the cohort fixed effects provides some further evidence in 
support of the CL hypothesis. This is true accounting for the aging of cohorts bom 
between 1955 and 1970 using the post-1996 sampling years or accounting for Britain’s 
recent expansion in higher education.
Section IV then turns to the proximate question whether a steady trend in the relative 
demand for college workers is sufficient to explain the rise in the average college 
premium and therefore wage inequality after 1980. Accounting for a steady trend in the 
relative demand for and supply of college workers, Section IV shows that a significant
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part of the increase in the average relative wage of college workers and therefore a 
significant part of the rise in wage inequality can be explained by inter-cohort differences 
in college attainment growth rates. Relative to the secular increase in the relative demand 
for college workers, Britain’s recent expansion of its higher education system is therefore 
expected to significantly decrease the college premium and therefore wage inequality. 
The final section concludes.
L COLLEGE PREMIUMS AND THE RATE OF CHANGE IN INTER­
COHORT EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT
This section follows CL in deriving an estimable structural equation relating relative 
wages for college workers for different age-year groups to changes in their relative 
supply. To see this, start by assuming aggregate output in period t takes the following 
CES form:
(i) Yt =(ehlH? +eac?y<>
where Qht and 6ct are technological efficiency parameters (assumed to be time specific) 
and where -oo < p < 1 is a function of the elasticity of substitution (p = 1 -  \/<rE) 
between high school (Ht) and higher education graduates ( C,) in production.
If younger and older workers with the same education are not perfect substitutes in 
production, Ht and C, represent CES aggregates given by
where a y and pj are age specific relative efficiency parameters and where -  oo < 77 < 1 is
a function of the elasticity of substitution (77 = 1 -  1/cr^ ) between high school or college 
graduates of a different age. Note that (2) nests the less general case of perfect 
substitution between workers of different age, corresponding to the extreme case where 
77 = 1 or <j a is not finite and where the CES aggregates are just the sum of workers across 
age groups.
Efficient utilization of different skill groups then requires that the relative wages of 
college workers equal their relative marginal product within each age-year group. Writing 
the mean wage of high school and college workers of age j  at time t as Wjt and
Wi respectively, one obtains the following estimable equation:
Wc B Q
(3) log(-£) = -log(-^) + log(-2-) +
"  jt  a j  “ ht
l ° g £ - ) - ( — )lo g (-^ ) + £j
H ,  < * A  H t ,
The second term on the right-hand side of (3) reflects changes in the relative efficiency of 
college labor such as skill-biased technological change or other relative demand shocks. 
The third term accounts for changes in the aggregate relative supply of educated labor 
over time whereas the fourth term reflects the importance of age-year specific variation in 
the relative supply of college graduates (relative to changes common across age groups) 
and its coefficient thus measures the imperfect substitutability between workers of a 
different age. The final term reflects sampling error.
If college attainment rates are increasing at a constant rate, the relative supply of 
college workers by age-year groups would increase proportionately over time. If this 
would be the case, all the variation in college premiums would be captured by just a time 
trend (making abstraction of any relative age-eamings profile assumed constant over time
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as well as sampling variation). Equation (3) thus provides a test for the importance of any 
acceleration or deceleration in educational attainment if part of the variance in (Cjt /HJt)
used to identify <rA is driven by differences in cohort attainment growth rates. More 
precisely, (3) shows that in a period of accelerating (decelerating) educational attainment, 
age group specific educational premiums are likely to twist so that inequality among 
younger workers compresses (expands) relative to the old if erA is finite. In explaining 
changes in college premiums, this model thus shows that it is not just the level of 
educational supply that matters but also its rate of change.
n. THE RECENT EXPANSION OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN BRITAIN
Figure I documents the fraction of higher education graduates by birth cohort pooling 
all GHS samples from 1975 to 2003. The group of college graduates consists of all 
workers with a college degree or a diploma from a professional institution below degree 
level but above GCE ‘A’ level standard. In contrast, the group of high school graduates 
consists of those whose highest qualification is any number of ‘A’- or ‘O’-levels, 
apprenticeships or workers with no qualifications. Relative supply measures are 
constructed by summing up usual weekly hours worked by all male workers. The Data 
Appendix provides more detailed information on how the relative supply of college 
graduates is measured consistently over time.
Figure I reflects the sharp and sudden changes in educational attainment growth rates 
in the UK for different birth cohorts. First, as already documented by CL using the 1975- 
1996 GHS, there was a slowdown in the inter-cohort trend of increasing
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Figure I
College Attainment by Birth Cohort
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Notes: See the Data Appendix for more details about the construction o f  relative supply measures.
educational attainment starting with cohorts bom just after 1955 and up to 1970. Second, 
Figure I also shows the recent expansion in Britain’s higher education system between 
1988 and 1994, corresponding to higher college attainment growth rates for cohorts bom 
between 1970 and 1976. According to Walker and Zhu [2005], the recent expansion of 
higher education followed the removal of quotas on student numbers and the payment 
from central government for teaching each student, encouraging institutions to expand 
student numbers.
The inter-cohort differences in educational attainment growth rates shown in Figure I 
imply that the relative supply of college graduates might differ systematically by age. To 
see this more clearly, Figure II plots the residuals from a regression of log hours
1 0 1
Figure II
Age Group Specific Relative Supplies of College Graduates
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Notes: The relative supply indices are the residuals from a regression of the log difference between 
hours worked by higher education graduates and high school graduates by age group and year group 
onto age group fixed effects and year group fixed effects. Residuals for age groups 51-55 and 56-60 
are excluded from the graph. Year groups are defined as two year periods.
worked by education-age-year cells onto a dummy for college graduates, age group and 
year group fixed effects. Residual relative supply of workers aged 26-30 started to 
decrease in the early 1980’s following the slowdown in college attainment growth rates
the variation shown in Figure I as the slowdown in educational attainment for cohorts 
bom between 1955 and 1970 runs through the age bands up to the age of46-50.
m . COHORT EFFECTS IN THE RETURNS TO COLLEGE
Table I tabulates college-high school wage gaps by age groups and year groups. The 
table entries are estimates of the difference in mean log weekly wages between men with 
a college degree versus those with any A-level or O-level qualification. Each year group 
contains a rolling age group and regressions for each age group within each year group 
include a linear age term and a dummy for which GHS sample the data are drawn from.34 
The Data Appendix contains more details about how the relative earnings measures have 
been constructed.
The entries in Table I provide a variety of information. First, comparisons down a 
column of the table show the change in the college premium for any given age group over 
time. Generally, relative wages for higher educated workers fell in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s before showing an increase from the 1980s onwards except for periods of 
relative stagnation in the early 1990s and early 2000s. Comparisons across the rows of 
Table I reveal the age profile of the college-high school wage gap at any point in time. As 
would be expected from the human capital literature (predicting that higher education 
graduates need to be on steeper earnings profiles), there seems to be evidence for a 
persistent concave relative age-eamings profile.
3 4 By rolling age group is meant that, for example, for year group (t-2)-(t+2) workers aged 24 to 58 are 
used in (t-2), workers aged 25 to 59 in (t-1), workers aged 26 to 60 in t, workers aged 27 to 61 in (t+1) and 
workers aged 28 to 62 in (t+2).
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Table I
College-High School Wage Gaps by Age Groups and Year Groups
Age groups
Year groups 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60
1975-1977 0.159 0.256 0.356 0.356 0.378 0.412 0.460
1978-1982
(0.026)
0.110
(0.031)
0.240
(0.038)
0.291
(0.038)
0.367
(0.051)
0.360
(0.058)
0.361
(0.070)
0.426
1983-1987
(0.018)
0.194
(0.020)
0.241
(0.025)
0.335
(0.029)
0.364
(0.035)
0.385
(0.044)
0.402
(0.057)
0.499
1988-1992
(0.022)
0.274
(0.024)
0.375
(0.026)
0.388
(0.034)
0.325
(0.039)
0.465
(0.043)
0.439
(0.053)
0.369
1993-1996
(0.027)
0.262
(0.028)
0.405
(0.029)
0.436
(0.030)
0.335
(0.039)
0.406
(0.047)
0.352
(0.070)
0.307
1997-2000
(0.033)
0.325
(0.033)
0.485
(0.035)
0.568
(0.036)
0.483
(0.042)
0.499
(0.063)
0.472
(0.097)
0.315
2001-2003
(0.040)
0.310
(0.042)
0.419
(0.053)
0.433
(0.052)
0.440
(0.060)
0.416
(0.071)
0.520
(0.103)
0.490
(0.034) (0.033) (0.035) (0.036) (0.040) (0.045) (0.077)
Notes: The table entries are estimates of the difference in mean log weekly wages between men with a higher education 
degree versus those with A-level or O-level qualifications. Each year group contains a rolling age group and regressions 
for each age group within each year group include a linear age term and a dummy for which GHS sample the data are 
drawn from. See the Data Appendix for more details about the construction of higher education wage gaps by age 
groups and year groups.
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However, given the evidence presented in Figures I and n, it is unlikely that all the 
variation in college premiums by age-year cells will be captured by age and year fixed 
effects only. For example, cohorts bom between 1955 and 1959 enter the sampling frame 
in 1983-1987, twisting the relative age-eamings profile upwards. This seems to be true 
for all periods up to 1993-1996 when those bom between 1965 and 1969 enter the 
sampling frame. A similar pattern can be detected for the 31-35 year olds between 1988 
and 2000, for the 36-40 year olds after 1993 and for the 41-45 year olds after 1996.
Turning to the cohorts bom between 1970 and 1976, the relative earnings of 26-30 
year olds increased in 1997-2000. However, this increase seems small relative to an 
apparent positive year fixed effect. Also, relative earnings of 31-35 year olds dropped by 
more between 1997-2000 and 2001-2003 relative to other age groups suggesting lower 
relative earnings for cohorts bom between 1970 and 1976 (though this seems to depend 
somewhat on the increase in the relative earnings for the oldest age groups).
A better test for the importance of inter-cohort differences in educational attainment 
growth rates would be to decompose the variance in the relative wage of college 
graduates by age-year cells into age group, year group and cohort fixed effects. 
Alternatively, the twisting of the series shown in Figure II can be used to identify the 
elasticity of substitution between different age groups in (3). The remainder of this 
section will take both approaches in turn.
IH.A Cohort effects in the college premium
One way to look for the importance of changes in inter-cohort trends in educational 
attainment is to directly decompose the variation in relative earnings into age group, year
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group and cohort fixed effects. More formally, one can use the following regression 
equation:
(4) log(w; /Wjt) = Aj +Bt + Dt_j + e,
where Aj and Bt capture age group and year group fixed effects respectively and where
Dt_j is the product of a vector of year-of-birth dummies and their coefficients. The final
term reflects sampling error.
Table II presents point estimates for year group and cohort coefficients using (4). The 
first two columns restate the results reported in CL. The first specification only uses 
cohorts bom before 1950 and includes nothing but age and year fixed effects. The 
reported year effects show a decline in the college premium in the late 1970s and relative 
stability thereafter. The second column fits the data for all cohorts available up to 1996 
but restricts cohort effects to be the same for those bom before 1950 to allow for 
identification. It is clear from a comparison between the first and second column that the 
slowdown in educational attainment growth rates for cohorts bom after 1950 goes some 
distance towards explaining variation in college-high school wage gaps by age-year cells. 
The third and fourth columns aim to replicate the CL findings using the more recent 
1975-2003 GHS. The reported coefficients on the cohort dummies and their standard 
errors are very similar indeed.
Given the expansion of higher education in Britain between 1988 and 1994, the 1975- 
2003 GHS also allows to see whether cohorts bom between 1970 and 1976 have lower 
returns to college. To this end, the final column of Table II includes data on all available 
cohorts. Remarkably, relative wages for the youngest cohorts are about fifty percent 
lower than for cohorts bom a decade earlier. Also note that the coefficients for
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Table n
Decompositions of College-High School Wage Differentials by Age and Year into
Cohort, Age and Time Effects
C-L 1975-1995 1975-2003
oldest cohorts oldest cohorts 
only same
oldest cohorts oldest cohorts 
only same
oldest cohorts 
same
Year effects 
1975-1977 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1978-1982 -0.086 -0.076 -0.026 -0.035 -0.034
(0.021) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018)
1983-1987 -0.057 -0.069 0.003 -0.021 -0.015
(0.025) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.021)
1988-1992 -0.041 -0.037 -0.001 0.005 0.016
(0.028) (0.025) (0.026) (0.023) (0.024)
1993-1996 -0.060 -0.039 -0.033 -0.021 -0.013
(0.038) (0.031) (0.036) (0.029) (0.029)
1997-2000 - - - - 0.044
2001-2003
(0.033)
-0.021
Cohort effects 
1950-1954 -0.009 0.006
(0.044)
-0.001
1955-1959
(0.019)
0.075
(0.018)
0.089
(0.018)
0.074
1960-1964
(0.025)
0.134
(0.024)
0.140
(0.024)
0.113
1965-1969
(0.032)
0.162
(0.032)
0.146
(0.030)
0.160
1970-1974
(0.046) (0.047) (0.037)
0.113
1975-1979
(0.047)
0.103
Degrees of freedom 14 20 14 20
(0.073)
30
R-squared 0.85 0.92 0.84 0.91 0.89
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Models are fit by weighted least squares to the age group by 
year group wage gaps shown in Table I. Weights are the inverse sampling variances of the estimated wage 
gaps. All models include age group fixed effects.
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cohorts bom between 1955 and 1970 are similar to those in column four despite the fact 
that column five allows these cohorts to affect older age bands too through the inclusion 
of more recent GHS sampling years. If anything, this is evidence in support of the 
hypothesis that part of the variation in college-high school wage gaps by age-year groups 
can be explained by inter-cohort differences in educational attainment growth rates.
III.B  Estimating the substitutability among cohorts
Equation (3) can be simplified to
(5) log(W;/W;) = EJ - F , - ( \ ! a  A) Iog(CJr / H f ) + /a Jt
where E} is the product of a vector of age group dummies and their coefficients and 
where Ft captures skill-biased technological change, changes in aggregate relative supply 
or any other parallel shift over time of a relative age profile. The third term reflects the 
importance of age-year group specific variation in identifying a finite elasticity of 
substitution between workers of a different age. The final term reflects sampling error.
The first column of Table ID replicates the point estimates found in CL reporting an 
elasticity of substitution of about 4 (1/0.233). The second column aims to reproduce this 
result using the 1975-2003 GHS and finds an almost identical estimate for<7 ,. Also note 
that though the level of the estimated time effects (relative to the omitted year group 
1975-1977) are somewhat larger in the current data set, the log point changes are very 
similar. The final column of Table HI further includes sampling years 1996 to 2003. Just 
as in Section DI.A, the use of more recent sampling years provides a twofold test of the 
CL hypothesis. First, it allows cohorts bom between 1955 and 1970 to grow older and 
therefore to relatively increase the college premium for older age groups too. Second,
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Table III
Estimated Models for the College-High School Wage Gap by Age and Year
C-L 1975-1995 1975-2003
Age-group specific -0.233 -0.240 -0.210
relative supply (0.058) (0.065) (0.050)
Year effects
1975-1977 0.000 0.000 0.000
1978-1982 -0.032 0.068 0.056
(0.023) (0.034) (0.029)
1983-1987 0.060 0.143 0.162
(0.034) (0.067) (0.054)
1988-1992 0.149 0.203 0.231
(0.039) (0.079) (0.063)
1993-1996 0.199 0.266 0.285
(0.044) (0.093) (0.074)
1997-2000 • 0.356
(0.090)
2001-2003 0.384
(0.086)
Degrees of freedom 23 23 35
R-squared 0.86 0.87 0.87
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Models are fit by weighted least squares to the age group by 
year group wage gaps shown in Table I. Weights are the inverse sampling variances of the estimated wage 
gaps. All models include age group fixed effects.
Britain’s expansion in its higher education system between 1988 and 1994 possibly 
decreases college premiums for cohorts bom between 1970 and 1976. Accounting for 
both, the final column of Table HI finds an estimated partial elasticity of substitution 
between different age groups of about 5 (1/0.210) which is remarkably similar to 
estimates derived from the first and second column. The evidence in Table HI therefore 
suggests that the CL hypothesis cannot be easily rejected.
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In sum, it is intuitive to think that young college graduates are more suited to doing 
certain tasks relative to older college graduates. But what is remarkable is that differences 
in inter-cohort trends in the relative supply of educated labor seem to go a substantial 
distance towards explaining college premiums by age-year groups. This seems to be true 
whether looking for first-order evidence of cohort effects or whether using a more 
structural approach.
IILC Alternative specifications
One possible caveat using equation (5) is that comparisons are based on age and not 
experience cohorts. That is, high school graduates potentially have more experience than 
higher education graduates of the same age. Since relative earnings of higher education 
graduates are expected to rise over the life cycle according to the human capital literature 
(college graduates are on the steeper part of the age-eamings profile later in life), any 
change over time in the relative returns to experience correlated with changes in 
(Cjt / Hjt) will give biased estimates ofcr,. One way to assess the importance of this bias
is to examine time variation in college premiums for experience groups rather than age 
groups.
Table IV pools workers with similar levels of labor market experience and repeats the 
analyses done in Tables II and HI. Only those with 6  to 36 years of experience are used in 
the regressions using five-year experience groups. The assumption of the five-year 
bracket was made mainly for convenience to correspond to the five-year observation 
intervals used previously.
110
Table IV
Decompositions of College-High School Wage Differentials by Experience Groups
1975-1995 1975-2003 1975-1995 1975-2003
Experience-group 
specific relative 
supply
- - -0.088
(0.083)
-0.068
(0.047)
Year effects
1975-1977 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1978-1982 -0.032 -0.034 0.012 -0.005
(0.019) 0.020 (0.052) (0.047)
1983-1987 -0.016 -0.017 0.091 0.058
(0.021) 0.022 (0.095) (0.083)
1988-1992 0.001 0.005 0.152 0.011
(0.024) 0.025 (0.113) (0.097)
1993-1996 -0.031 -0.022 0.154 0.108
(0.030) (0.030) (0.128) (0.112)
1997-2000 * 0.028
(0.033)
0.172
(0.131)
2001-2003 -0.043
(0.045)
0.232
(0.140)
Cohort effects
1950-1954 0.006
0.019
0.009
(0.019)
- -
1955-1959 0.051
0.026
0.048
(0.025)
1960-1964 0.133
0.036
0.105
(0.031)
“
1965-1969 0.164
0.055
0.150
(0.039)
" "
1970-1974 0.143
(0.051)
"
1975-1979 0.086
(0.096)
Degrees of freedom 46 66 23 35
R-squared 0.53 0.64 0.33 0.51
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Models are fit by weighted least squares and weights are the 
inverse sampling variances of the estimated wage gaps. The wage gaps represent the wage difference 
between higher education and high school graduates with the same level of potential labor market 
experience. Only those with 6 to 36 years of experience are used in the regressions using five-year 
experience groups. The assumption of the five-year bracket was made to correspond to the five-year 
observation intervals.
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The first two columns of Table IV decompose the variation in relative wages by 
experience-year cells into experience fixed effects (not reported), year fixed effects and 
cohort fixed effects while restricting the coefficient for all cohorts bom before 1950 to be 
the same. Using years 1975 to 1996, the point estimates are relatively similar to those 
found in the fourth column of Table n. The second column of Table IV uses all available 
data and shows that the college premium for cohorts bom after 1970 decreased in line 
with point estimates in the final column of Table n, though not significantly so before 
1975.
Point estimates of the elasticity of substitution between different experience groups 
are reported in the last two columns of Table IV. Assuming the large standard errors are 
driven by measurement error in the dependent variable (potential rather than actual 
experienced is used in the analysis), the estimated elasticity of substitution between 
workers with different experience is finite and between 11 and 14.
The results in Table IV seem to require some caution for the evidence in support of 
the CL hypothesis found in Table in. However, point estimates in Table IE are biased 
only if the relative returns to experience are unstable over time and have changed in a 
way consistent with changes in the relative supply by age groups. Also, point estimates of 
the elasticity of substitution derived from Table IV are likely to be upward biased since 
measurement error in true experience will bias the reported point estimates towards zero. 
Finally, though using experience groups rather than age groups in the analysis has the 
advantage of comparing workers with similar potential experience, one disadvantage is 
that the analysis in Table IV does not compare individuals who attended high school 
together and were subject to the same influences in their decision as to whether or not
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pursue further education. All in all, the evidence presented in Table IV does not seem 
sufficiently convincing in order to reject the CL hypothesis.
IV. COLLEGE ATTAINMENT GROWTH RATES, THE AVERAGE 
COLLEGE PREMIUM AND WAGE INEQUALITY
IV.A Changes in the average college premium and wage inequality 
Figure m  uses the 1975-2003 GHS to illustrate the well documented decrease in 
wage inequality during the late 1970s and its subsequent increase during the 1980s in the 
UK. Figure HI also shows a similar pattern for the overall average college premium. This 
section will therefore examine the proximate question whether a significant part of the 
increase in the average college premium and therefore wage inequality during the 1980s 
can be attributed to the decreased growth of college attainment for cohorts bom between 
1955 and 1970.
Pooling observations into age groups and year groups as in the previous section, 
Figure IV plots the average college premium across age groups over time. That is, the 
solid line in Figure IV is given by
(6) l0g(FF//O  = I > y > g ( ^ ; ^ )
j
where sJt is the fraction of all workers aged j  at time t. In line with the estimated college 
premiums in Figure HI, also this approach shows a sharp increase in the college premium 
after 1978-82.
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Figure III
Wage Inequality and the Average College Premium
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Notes: The college/high-school wage gap is the weighted mean across age groups o f  the estimated 
difference in mean log weekly wages between men with a higher education degree versus those with A-level 
or O-level qualifications for each two-year period. Each period contains a rolling age group and 
regressions for each age group within period include a linear age term and a dummy for which GHS 
sample year the data are drawn from.
IV.B Secular and non-secular changes in the average college premium and wage 
inequality
The dashed line in Figure IV consists o f the predicted college premium in any given 
year using (5) and the full sample. More specifically, the plotted predicted wage gap for 
any year group t is given by:
(7) \b%(w;iwh1,)=YdsJI\o%(!v;iwi)
j
with
(8) log( w; / w; )  = E j - F t -(l/< T jlog(C „ / HJt)
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Figure IV
Actual, Predicted and Counterfactual Wage Gaps
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Notes: The predicted wage gap is the weighted mean across age groups o f the predicted difference in mean 
log weekly wages between men with a higher education degree versus those with A-level or O-level 
qualifications for each year group using equation (5). The counterfactual predicted wage gap uses GHS 
sampling years 1975 to 1990 to provide estimates o f the predicted counterfactual impact o f the secular 
increase in the relative demand for and supply o f college workers between 1975 and 2003 and therefore 
does not account for the impact o f inter-cohort differences in educational attainment growth rates.
where a hat reflects the use of coefficient estimates. As would be expected from the high 
R-squared found in the last column of Table III, predicted and actual college premiums 
move closely together, indicating the accuracy of the simple relative supply-demand 
model presented above.
However, changes in the predicted average college premium are not necessarily 
informative about the relative importance of a slowdown in educational attainment 
growth rates after 1978-82. More specifically, the fixed time effects in (8) also account 
for the impact of higher relative demand for college workers as well as an increase in the
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relative supply of college workers common across all age groups. A simple way to 
distinguish between secular relative demand or supply shifts and age group specific 
relative supply shocks is to construct a counterfactual series of the average college 
premium assuming there was no fall in educational attainment growth rates for cohorts 
bom between 1955 and 1970.
Looking back at Figure I, it is clear that educational attainment rates grew at pretty 
much a constant rate for cohorts bom before 1955. This implies that all(Cjt / Hjt) were 
increasing proportionately (say, at rater;) as more educated cohorts gradually entered 
older age brackets. If this is the case and if an increase in the relative demand for college 
workers is also best described by a linear time trend (say, with slope y ), equation (5) 
rewrites as:
(9) log(fV;t /Wj!) = EJ - F t - ( l/o -J lo g (Cjt/H Jt) + n Jt 
where
(10) Ft = log( C 1975 / H ]975 ) + y |975 + (r; + y )t 
and
(1 1 ) log(Cjt / H jt) = log(CJl97S / Hj]975 ) + 771 .
Using only cohorts bom before 1955 and corresponding estimated fixed time effects 
from (9), parameter estimates of all coefficients in (10) and (11) can be obtained, hi 
practice, this implies restricting the GHS sample to years between 1975 and 1992. The 
decision to also include the late 1980s when estimating (1 0 ) and (1 1 ) (since cohorts bom 
after 1955 start entering the sampling frame already in 1983-87) was made for several 
reasons. First, if cohorts bom after 1955 do have a positive impact on the estimated time 
trends, the importance of inter-cohort differences in educational attainment growth rates
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will be understated. Second, it is sometimes argued that the 1980s were characterised by 
increased growth in the relative demand for college workers. Extending the time frame to 
include the late 1980s partially accounts for this possibility.
Equation (9) then shows that coefficient estimates from (10) and (11) together with 
the coefficient estimates used in (8 ) are sufficient to predict college premiums by age- 
year cells. Using (6 ) then gives the counterfactual predicted college premium for each 
year group between 1975-77 and 1988-92. Moreover, since predictions for (9) now only 
depend on the initial distribution of college attainment in 1975 and time /, the 
counterfactual college premium can easily be predicted for all year groups. This is the 
counterfactual series given by the dashed-dotted line in Figure IV.
Figure IV shows that between 1978-82 and 1997-00 the actual college premium 
increased with 16 log points from 0.28 to 0.44. Counterfactual wage gaps show that the 
college wage premium would have increased by 8  log points if only the relative demand 
and supply of college workers would have grown proportionately over time as they did 
before 1983-87. This suggests that the slowdown in educational attainment growth rates 
for cohorts bom after 1955 could have increased the average college premium by as 
much as 8  log points or about half of its total increase. Similarly, Figure HI showed a 40 
log point increase in the log(90/10) wage differential from 0.92 in 1980 to 1.32 in 2000. 
Assuming that an 8  percentage point increase in the college premium leads to about a 16 
log points increase in the log(90/10) wage differential, the fall in educational attainment 
growth rates for cohorts bom after 1955 can explain as much as forty percent of the total 
increase in wage inequality.
117
The estimated impact of inter-cohort differences in educational attainment growth 
rates on the average college premium and wage inequality is derived from what is merely 
more than back-on-the-envelope computations. Their relevance should therefore be 
judged with some caution. Most importantly, counterfactual trends only account partially 
for the possibility of skill-biased technological change in the late 1980’s (relative to 
previous periods) leading to an overstatement of the importance of age group specific 
differences in relative supply. However, there has been some confusion about whether or 
not the 1980s were the decade in which technological innovation increased worker 
productivity by more (see Card and DiNardo [2002] for a discussion). Moreover, there 
are also reasons to believe why the above numbers could be understating the importance 
of inter-cohort differences in educational attainment growth rates. First, the 
counterfactual series in Figure IV partially accounts for the impact of higher relative 
wages for workers bom between 1955 and 1965 since the counterfactual time trends are 
estimated using sampling periods 1975-77 to 1988-1992 thereby including cohorts bom 
after 1955 up to the age of 35. Second, because cohorts bom after 1955 have not entered 
the oldest age brackets yet, the full impact of the slowdown in educational attainment 
growth rates on the increase in the actual college premium still is incomplete.
IV C  The recent expansion o f Britain’s higher education system, the average 
college premium and wage inequality
If inter-cohort differences in educational attainment growth rates could go a 
substantial distance towards explaining changes in the college premium and therefore 
wage inequality, predictions can be made about the impact of the recent expansion in
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Britain’s higher education system. Inspection of Figure I learns that the acceleration in 
educational attainment for cohorts bom after 1970 is about as large as the deceleration for 
cohorts bom between 1955 and 1970. Relative to the secular increase in the demand for 
and supply of college workers, the college premium is therefore expected to fall by about 
8  percentage points and wage inequality by about 16 log points as the post 1970 birth 
cohorts will come of age.
V. CONCLUSIONS
There is little doubt that a simple model accounting for the “secular” increase in the 
relative demand for and supply of college workers can go a substantial distance towards 
explaining changes in the average college premium and wage inequality over time. 
However, in line with Card and Lemieux [2001], this chapter has argued that fluctuations 
in the rate of growth of the relative supply of college workers can also explain an 
important part of the variation in earnings dispersion. More specifically, the “episodic” 
events of a slowdown in educational attainment growth rates for cohorts bom between 
1955 and 1970 and the subsequent acceleration for cohorts bom after 1970 seem 
important in understanding what has happened and will happen to the college premium 
and wage inequality over time.
This chapter first provided a twofold test of the Card and Lemieux [2001] (CL) 
hypothesis. Using the 1975-2003 GHS rather than the 1975-1996 GHS, it was shown that 
college premiums for cohorts bom between 1955 and 1970 are higher, in line with the CL 
hypothesis since these cohorts are characterised by lower college attainment growth rates.
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Moreover, the more recent data also accounted for the impact of Britain’s expansion in 
higher education between 1988 and 1994, finding lower college premiums for those bom 
between 1970 and 1976.
What many would see as the proximate question is whether a steady trend in the 
relative demand for college workers is sufficient to explain growing wage inequality after 
1980. Using that for cohorts bom before 1955 educational attainment growth was more or 
less constant, it was conjectured that only half of the increase in the average college wage 
premium could be explained by secular changes in the relative demand for and supply of 
college workers. Therefore, the fall in educational attainment growth rates for cohorts 
bom between 1955 and 1970 could explain an important part of the rise in the average 
college premium and therefore wage inequality after 1980. Consequently, as cohorts bom 
after 1970 will come of age, the college premium and wage inequality are expected to fall 
relative to the impact of a secular increase in the relative demand for college workers.
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Data Appendix
A. Relative Supply Measures
U.K. workers are divided into five education groups for the purpose of 
constructing supply measures of higher education graduates relative to high school 
graduates using the 1975-2003 GHS. The group of higher education graduates 
consists of all workers with a higher degree (Census Level A); a first 
degree/university diploma or certificate/qualifications obtained from colleges of 
further education or from professional institutions of degree standard (Census Level 
B); HNC/HND/BEC/TEC Higher/City & Guilds Full Technological 
Certificate/university diploma or certificate/Qualifications obtained from colleges of 
further education or from professional institutions below degree level but above GCE 
‘A’ level standard (Census Level C). The group of high school graduates consists of 
those whose highest qualification is any number of A-levels or O-levels with or 
without commercial qualifications; clerical and commercial qualifications without 
GCE ‘O’ level; GCE ‘O’ level in grades D or E; apprenticeships; no qualifications.
Relative supply measures are constructed by summing up usual weekly hours of 
work of all male workers (self-employed and wage and salary workers) by age and 
year. Because of the relative small size of the GHS samples, working hours are 
summed over age groups and year groups. For example, years 1978 to 1982 pool 
workers aged 24 to 58 in 1978, aged 25 to 59 in 1979, aged 26 to 60 in 1980, aged 27 
to 61 in 1981 and workers aged 28 to 62 in 1982. Similar rolling age bands are used to 
construct other year groups and relative supply measures by age group within each 
year group.
B. Relative Wage Measures
Wage gaps in Table I are based on samples of weekly wages for men with a 
higher education degree and an A- or O-level degree. For years 1983 to 1987, 
reported wages are divided by pay period to construct average weekly wages.
The wage gaps are estimated in separate regression models for each age 
group/year group combination. These regressions all include a dummy for having a 
higher education degree, a linear age term and dummies for which GHS sample the 
observation was drawn from. A similar procedure is used to compute wage gaps by 
experience groups, except that the regression models for each experience group 
include a linear experience term instead of a linear age term. The inverse of the 
estimated variance of the coefficient on the dummy for having a higher education 
degree is used as weight in the models reported in the chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
CYCLICALITY AND FIXED EFFECTS IN GROSS JOB 
FLOWS: A EUROPEAN CROSS COUNTRY ANALYSIS
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, a growing body of research has emerged focusing on the 
analysis of gross flows of jobs. Using different US data, Blanchard and Diamond 
(1990) and Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) document the existence of 
continuous job creation and destruction, even within narrowly defined sectors, regions 
and plant types. Furthermore, they show that job creation is pro-cyclical whereas job 
destruction is counter-cyclical. Also, during the 1970s and 1980s, variation in job 
turnover (i.e. the sum of absolute job creation and job destruction) has been counter­
cyclical and driven by the higher volatility of job destruction over the business cycle.
A number of models have been developed to explain the behavior of job flows. 
All these models start from the premise that workers or firms are subject to real 
idiosyncratic shocks that cause heterogeneity among economic agents to explain the 
continuity in employment flows. Moreover, the combination of micro shocks with 
reallocation frictions, like search or adjustment costs, provides a mechanism through 
which common demand or productivity shocks cause aggregate economic 
fluctuations. For example, Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) provide a model in which 
workers and firms are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks in a matching 
framework where the formation of worker-firm pairs is time consuming. Another 
example is Caballero and Hammour (1994), formalising the idea that business cycles 
(and in particular recessions) provide a cleansing mechanism for reducing 
organisational inefficiencies and resource misallocations.
Following the seminal work by Blanchard and Diamond (1990) and Davis, 
Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996), a host of new empirical studies has emerged.
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Estimates of employment dynamics are included in Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson 
(1989) and Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) for the United States and Baldwin, Dunne 
and Haltiwanger (1998) for the United States and Canada; Konings (1995) and 
Blanchflower and Burgess (1996) for the United Kingdom; Leonard and Van 
Audenrode (1993) for Belgium; Boeri and Cramer (1992) for Germany; Broersma and 
Gautier (1997) for the Netherlands and Albaek and Sorensen (1995) for Denmark. 
Finally, the analysis of gross job flows has recently become increasingly important in
•sc
understanding restructuring in developing and emerging economies.
Although attempts have been made to compare gross job flows between countries, 
concerns have been raised about spurious time-series and cross-country variation in 
gross job flow measures due to the unavailability of comparable micro data. For 
example, the unit of observation could be the firm or the plant, sector composition 
could be different or the period of observations may differ between the various 
studies.37 One paper allowing for a consistent comparison of gross flows of jobs 
between two countries is Baldwin, Dunne and Haltiwanger (1998) using harmonised 
data for manufacturing industries in Canada and the US. They find that 1) job 
destruction is more cyclically volatile than job creation in both countries but more so 
in the US and 2) industries with high (low) gross job flows in Canada are 
characterized by high (low) gross job flows in the US. Accordingly, this result 
suggests that country specific differences are not important and that the process of job 
reallocation in both countries is best explained by an industry fixed effect.
35 Examples are Konings, Lehmann and Schaffer (1996), Roberts and Tybouts (1998) and Haltiwanger 
and Vodopivic (2002).
36 Examples are Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) and OECD (1994,1996).
37 Examples of how different sampling procedures can give rise to different conclusions are found in 
the OECD (1994) and Boeri (1996).
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This chapter uses information on manufacturing establishments during the 1990s 
in four European countries: Belgium, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. The 
strength of the analysis comes from the fact that the data are comparable across 
countries: the sampling criteria, the time frame and the sector composition are 
uniformly defined. Furthermore, the data cover the majority of manufacturing 
employment in all four countries.38 Finally, following the approach taken by Baldwin, 
Dunne and Haltiwanger (1998) this study is the first to provide measures of gross job 
flows for disaggregated industries within manufacturing for the listed European 
countries. The key issues addressed here are 1) whether time series of employment 
dynamics behave differently across European countries 2) whether persistent 
differences exist that are country specific and 3) whether persistent differences exist 
that are industry specific. The answers are yes, yes and no.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides a general 
framework to analyse steady-state and out-of-steady state paths of job creation and 
job destruction. Section II describes the data and explains how job flow rates have 
been measured. Section HI examines the cyclical pattern of gross job flows in all four 
countries. Section IV aims to explain the between-variation in gross job flows as a 
function of country and sector specific effects. Finally Section V concludes.
I. A FRAMEWORK TO ANALYSE CYCLICALITY AND FIXED 
EFFECTS IN GROSS JOB FLOWS
38 In 1999, the number of firms for which employment flows can be calculated covers 87% of total 
manufacturing employment in Belgium, 63% in France, 54% in Italy and 62% in the UK. See Section
II for further discussion.
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Given a sufficiently long sampling frame, steady-state implies that 
(1) (POS^-NEGIC)=0 V i s e
where POS is the job creation rate, NEG is the job destruction rate and where bars 
indicate sample averages across time. Subscript ic indicates industry i in country c. 
Equation (1) says that steady-state job creation and job destruction rates must be equal 
within each industry. However, different industries can have different job creation and 
destruction rates, even in the long-run. For example, Figure I depicts an industry with 
lower steady-state job creation and destruction (the bottom black square on the 
diagonal) and another industry with steady-state job creation and destruction closer to 
the top-right comer (the top black square on the diagonal). If this is the case, industry 
fixed effects capture time persistent differences in job creation or destruction rates 
between industries and are expected to go some distance towards explaining variation 
in gross job flows. Similarly, time persistent differences in job creation and 
destruction rates between countries (assuming two countries and a single industry in 
Figure I) could account for an important part of the total variation in job flows if 
countries systematically differ, even in the long-run.
If the sampling period is only long enough to average out the business cycle, out- 
of-steady-state dynamics could change the distribution of sector employment shares
if[p OS^ - NEG( C 0. Note that this could happen without a change in the steady-
state unemployment rate. For example, Figure I shows the case where both industries 
have the same job creation rate but different job destmction rates (the solid white 
squares) and such that economy wide job flows remain the same as before or
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Figure I
Job Creation and Job Destruction
2 industries, 1 country
POS
U
NEG
M steady-state
□  out-of-steady-state with no deviations from the economy-wide natural 
rate of unemployment
□  out-of steady-state with deviations from the economy-wide natural rate 
of unemployment
[p OSc -  NEGC)= 0 (the black square in the middle of the diagonal).
Finally, at any point in time the natural rate of unemployment will deviate from its 
steady-state level following temporary aggregate demand or productivity shocks. 
More precisely, based on predictions from Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), 
Pissarides (2000) and Caballero and Hammour (1994), aggregate demand or
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productivity shocks will move job creation and destruction rates in opposite directions 
over the business cycle and cause transitory dynamics in the economy wide 
unemployment rate. The behavior of job creation and destruction over the business 
cycle is illustrated in Figure I (the dotted white squares). An economy wide boom 
would be a relatively short period in which job creation is higher and job destruction 
is lower in each industry (relative to the solid white squares) whereas a slump would 
result in relatively higher job destruction and lower job creation in each industry. It is 
also intuitively clear that the volatility of job creation and destruction rates over the 
business cycle can depend on different reallocation frictions across countries.
H. DATA AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES
II.A Data
The data used are based on the reported unconsolidated company accounts of 
manufacturing establishments covering the years 1991-1999. The data are taken from 
a commercial data source compiled by Bureau Van Dijk, specialized in data collection 
and dissemination. The data source is referred to as the Amadeus database of 
establishment accounts. For France, Italy and the UK, to be included one of the 
following criteria has to be satisfied: operating revenue must be 1.5 million Euros or 
higher, total assets must be 3 million Euros or higher or the number of employees 
must be 15 or more. For Belgium the sampling criteria are somewhat less restrictive, 
given the respective numbers are 1 million, 2 million or 10 employees.
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Only continuing establishments are retained in the analysis. However, this does 
not imply a balanced panel since a continuing establishment is defined as any 
establishment reporting strict positive employment in two consecutive years. The 
reason to exclude employment flows at the extensive margins of establishment 
employment is to avoid misclassification of establishment birth or death. Some papers 
have focussed on the impact of establishment entry and exit on employment flows, 
however not without difficulties.39
Table I presents the annual average amount of continuing establishments observed 
in each country-industry match as well as average establishment size. The distribution 
of establishments within each country is dispersed but seems similar across countries. 
Besides persistent differences in concentration and establishment size between 
industries, observed establishments seem to be bigger in the UK and Italy relative to 
Belgium and France. This is also seen from Figure II showing censored densities of 
average establishment size. The relative importance of small Belgian firms in the data 
is possibly due to the less restrictive sampling criteria. Nevertheless, Figure II shows 
another advantage of the Amadeus data set over most existing administrative sources: 
even though small establishments are likely to be underrepresented, they account for 
most of the observed establishment population in all four countries.
Table II compares sampled employment in continuing establishments with total 
paid manufacturing employment reported by the ILO and OECD. For each country, 
the first two columns of Table II give the ratio of observed total employment
39 The problems of including entry and exit have been analysed by OECD Employment Outlook 
(1994,1996) for a number of OECD countries and Boeri and Cramer (1992) for Germany.
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Table I
Number of Observations and Average Firm Size by Industry and Country
Belgium France Italy UK
number o f firms firm size number o f firms firm size number o f firms firm size number o f firms firm size
Food (15) 2125 31 3115 51 2110 63 915 401
Tobacco (16) 24 128 1 974 11 91 13 1613
Textiles (17) 836 43 686 54 2116 65 568 188
Apparel (18) 489 25 903 42 1021 65 297 242
Leather (19) 76 33 299 63 995 47 120 237
Wood (20) 690 15 1018 28 490 42 287 90
Paper (21) 229 59 433 106 562 72 448 199
Publishing (22) 1664 17 2631 29 792 75 1564 116
Petroleum (23) 16 275 39 510 104 75 41 866
Chemicals (24) 454 131 875 160 1200 112 825 320
Rubber (25) A ll 44 956 94 1229 58 666 167
Other non-metals (26) 797 39 957 64 1283 66 333 269
Basic metals (27) 167 252 293 246 743 113 428 174
Fabricated metals (28) 2116 21 4138 37 2939 62 1987 144
Machinery (29) 774 49 1996 65 3042 79 966 234
Office machinery (30) 30 23 77 217 110 128 172 411
Elec. machinery (31) 313 75 629 107 1003 105 682 238
Communication (32) 96 182 467 143 338 174 332 266
Precision (33) 299 19 1084 48 472 73 450 323
Vehicles (34) 209 188 377 373 368 389 188 921
Other transport (35) 109 73 275 257 223 266 234 377
Furniture (36) 1065 19 1254 36 1434 48 1293 120
Recycling (37) 205 14 332 18 58 38 36 49
All sectors: 13263 40 23063 67 22645 79 12849 223
Notes: Industry numbers in brackets refer to 2-digit NACE Rev.I classifications. The number of firms refers to the annual average number of firms reporting employment 
changes. Firm size refers to time averaged number of employees in these firms.
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Figure II
Distribution of Continuing Firms According to Employment Size for Belgium 
_______________and France (Censored at 100 Employees)_______________
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Figure II (cont.)
Distribution of Continuing Firms According to Employment Size for Italy and 
_____________ United Kingdom (Censored at 100 Employees)_____________
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Table II
Coverage and Net Employment Growth in Manufacturing: Amadeus versus ILO and OECD
Belgium France
coverage net employment growth (in %) coverage net employment growth (in %)
Year
ILO OECD Amadeus ILO OECD ILO OECD Amadeus ILO OECI
1991,, - 0.59 -0.34 - -1.64 - - - -1.44 -1.45
1992 - 0.78 -1.95 - -2.52 0.18 0.18 -0.59 -3.26 -3.25
1993 0.81 0.81 -3.23 - -4.49 0.24 0.24 -3.58 -4.75 -4.76
1994 0.84 0.84 -2.30 -3.81 -3.93 0.24 0.24 -1.03 -2.87 -2.86
1995 0.85 0.85 -0.24 -0.69 -0.62 0.34 0.34 0.39 0.01 0.08
1996 0.84 0.84 -3.39 -1.75 -1.88 0.50 0.50 0.84 -1.06 -1.06
1997 0.87 0.87 -0.18 -2.11 -1.99 0.52 0.52 -0.29 -1.12 -1.12
1998 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.95 0.94 0.56 0.56 0.18 0.20 0.23
1999 0.87 0.87 -0.32 -0.91 -0.93 0.63 0.63 0.25 -0.31 0.17
Notes: Coverage is defined as the ratio of summed employment in continuing firms in Amadeus divided by ILO and OECD measures of paid employment in manufacturing. 
Net employment growth in Amadeus is defined as the average establishment level net employment growth weighted by the share of establishment employment in total 
employment. See equation (7) in the text for a formal definition. ILO and OECD net employment growth rates are defined as the change in the number ofpaid employees as a 
percentage of average manufacturing employment in the current and previous year.
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Table II (cont.)
Coverage and Net Employment Growth in Manufacturing: Amadeus versus ILO and OECD
coverage 
ILO OECD
Italy
net employment growth(in %) 
Amadeus ILO OECD
Year
1991,, -0.44
1992 - 0.34 4.64 - -0.74
1993 0.31 0.31 1.79 - -0.92
1994 0.34 0.35 1.35 -0.51 -0.93
1995 0.41 0.42 2.77 -1.53 -0.13
1996 0.48 0.48 1.72 -0.40 0.63
1997 0.58 0.58 -0.54 -0.45 -0.15
1998 0.56 0.56 0.75 1.96 1.32
1999 0.54 0.54 -1.76 0.07 1.21
United Kingdom
coverage net employment growth (in %)
ILO OECD Amadeus ILO OECI
0.55 0.45 -6.76 -8.69 -4.93
0.68 0.56 -5.03 -5.18 -5.16
0.73 0.58 -3.66 -4.44 -1.71
0.75 0.65 -1.57 0.43 -8.11
0.76 0.67 0.48 2.46 1.32
0.76 0.65 -2.37 1.00 2.97
0.75 0.66 -3.23 1.40 -0.91
0.67 0.60 -5.3 0.50 -0.13
0.62 0.54 -5.91 -3.59 -2.08
Notes: Coverage is defined as the ratio of summed employment in continuing firms in Amadeus divided by ILO and OECD measures of paid employment in manufacturing. 
Net employment growth in Amadeus is defined as the average establishment level net employment growth weighted by the share of establishment employment in total 
employment. See equation (7) in the text for a formal definition. ILO and OECD net employment growth rates are defined as the change in the number ofpaid employees as a 
percentage o f average manufacturing employment in the current and previous year.
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in Amadeus divided by the ILO and OECD estimates respectively. For Belgium, 
coverage ranges from 81% to 87%. In France, the sample captures between 18% and 
63% of total manufacturing employment. The respective numbers for Italy are 31% 
and 54% and for the UK coverage is between 55% and 76%. For each country, the 
third, fourth and fifth column of Table II allow to compare net employment growth 
derived from the Amadeus with ILO and OECD information. Using the more 
complete OECD time series, coefficients of correlation and p-values are 0.79 (0.01) 
for Belgium, 0.91 (0.01) for France, -0.56 (11.30) for Italy and 0.72 (0.04) for the 
UK40.
II.B Measuring gross job flows
Job creation, job destruction, net growth and job reallocation are measured as in 
Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996). The employment growth rate (get) of 
establishment e at time t is defined as the change in establishment employment (n) 
from t-1 to t, divided by the average of establishment employment at time t and t-1 or
(2) g * -  2
This non-conventional growth rate measure is symmetric about zero and lies in the 
closed interval [-2,2]. For small values, get is approximately equal to the
conventional growth rate.
Job creation for group j  at time t is measured as the size-weighted sum of 
employment growth in all expanding firms in group j  at time t. The job creation rate
40 Using ILO net employment growth estimates for the UK and including all years gives a coefficient 
of correlation of 0.76 (0.02).
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for group j  at time t reflects job creation as a percentage of total employment in group 
j  averaged over the current and previous period. So POSjt is given by
(3) POSj, = Nm
N t
where NJt is the employment size of group j  averaged over the current and the 
previous period. Together with the density of establishment size, the density of 
employment growth rates therefore determines the job creation rate.
Job destruction is defined as the sum of employment losses (in absolute value) in 
all contracting firms. Job destruction is converted to the job destruction rate by 
dividing through by a measure of total employment given by the average employment 
in the current and previous period. Algebraically, the job destruction rate for group j  is 
defined as
(4) NEGj, s  £  k
eej
&«< o
He
N*
The job reallocation rate (SUM) is the sum of the job creation rate and the job 
destruction rate.
(5) SUM, = POSj, + NEGj, =
eej
a*
N„
The net growth rate (NET) is defined as the difference between the job creation 
rate and the job destruction rate.
(6) NETj, s  POSj, -  NEGj, = '£ g a
eej
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m . CYCLICALITY IN GROSS JOB FLOWS
Figure I predicted job creation to behave pro-cyclically and job destruction to 
behave counter-cyclically if anything. But no predictions could be made about the 
cyclical pattern of job reallocation rates in general. Empirically, Blanchard and 
Diamond (1990) and Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) document the higher 
volatility of US job destruction. Baldwin, Dunne and Haltiwanger (1998) repeat these 
findings using US and Canadian data. Konings (1995) shows the counter-cyclicality 
of job reallocation due to strong volatility of job destruction for the UK However, 
whether the counter-cyclicality of job reallocation should be regarded as a stylised 
fact still remains unanswered. Boeri (1996) and Garibaldi (1998) document that job 
reallocation and net employment growth rates are uncorrelated in Canada, Denmark, 
Germany, Norway, Italy and Sweden whereas in France job reallocation and net 
growth rates are significantly positively correlated.
Different explanations have been given to the apparent empirical dichotomy in job 
reallocation rates between Anglo-Saxon and European countries. First, Garibaldi 
(1998) argues the difference could be explained by the existence of firing permissions 
in continental Europe. The key deviation from the dynamics in Mortensen and 
Pissarides (1994) is the introduction of an exogenous firing permission characterised 
by a Poisson arrival frequency. Job destruction is therefore not only costly, it is also 
time consuming and the Mortensen-Pissarides equilibrium no longer predicts 
overshooting of the job destruction rate if a negative macro-shock arrives. Second, 
Boeri (1996) suggests the counter-cyclicality of job reallocation in the US and UK
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could be a statistical artefact. Suppose job creation and destruction behave 
symmetrically over the business cycle for the economy as a whole but observed 
establishment size is censored at some lower bound through the sampling procedure. 
Also assume net employment growth to be bigger for smaller firms throughout the 
business cycle. Boeri (1996) then shows that by reducing the observed time-series 
variation of job creation rates, the correlation coefficients between job turnover and 
net employment growth rates are downward biased.
Estimates of aggregate gross job flows are given in Table HI and Figure HI. The 
time averages in Table III show that Belgian and French job creation and destruction 
rates are lower on average and are least dispersed over time. Considering the reported 
OECD and ILO net growth rates in Figure HI, the strong process of job creation in the 
first half of the 90s in Italy and job destruction in the second half of the 90s in the UK 
could be explained by the weighting when calculating job flow rates as well as the 
sampling procedure.
Formally, pair wise Spearman correlations are given in columns (1 )-(4) of Table 
IV. It follows from Table IV that job creation is strongly positively correlated with net 
growth in all countries. The Spearman correlations are significant at the 1% level for 
Belgium and France, at the 7% level for Italy and the 15% level for the UK. The job 
destruction rate is strongly negatively correlated with net employment growth for 
Belgium, Italy and the UK and a weakly negative correlation exists for France. Except 
for Italy, the rank correlation between the job creation and job destruction rate is 
negative. The job reallocation rate is most negatively correlated with the net growth 
rate in the UK. For Belgium, France and Italy, the Spearman correlations are small
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Table III
Job Flow Rates by Year for Belgian and French Manufacturing (in %)
job
Belgium
job net job job
France
job net job
creation destruction change reallocation creation destruction change reallocation
Year
1991 4.43 4.77 -0.34 9.20 - - - -
1992 3.27 5.23 -1.95 8.50 4.34 4.93 -0.59 9.28
1993 2.90 6.13 -3.23 9.03 2.86 6.44 -3.58 9.30
1994 2.99 5.29 -2.30 8.28 4.28 5.31 -1.03 9.59
1995 3.51 3.75 -0.24 7.26 5.18 4.80 0.38 9.98
1996 3.47 6.86 -3.39 10.34 4.40 3.56 0.84 7.97
1997 4.23 4.41 -0.17 8.64 4.33 4.63 -0.29 8.96
1998 5.14 4.27 0.87 9.41 5.29 3.46 1.83 8.75
1999 4.19 4.51 -0.32 8.69 8.52 5.98 2.54 14.50
Mean 3.79 5.02 -1.23 8.82 4.90 4.89 0.01 9.79
Std. Dev. 0.75 0.98 1.52 0.84 1.53 0.98 1.77 1.86
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Table m  (cont.)
Job Flow Rates by Year for Italian and UK Manufacturing (in %)
Italy United Kingdom
job job net job job job net job
creation destruction change reallocation creation destruction change reallocation
Year ,
1991 ~ ~ ~ - 2.69 9.45 -6.76 12.15
1992 10.02 5.38 4.64 15.42 4.08 9.11 -5.03 13.20
1993 8.49 6.70 1.79 15.20 3.46 7.11 -3.65 10.57
1994 6.22 4.87 1.35 11.09 5.32 6.89 -1.57 12.21
1995 8.42 5.65 2.77 14.07 5.91 5.43 0.48 11.33
1996 10.47 8.76 1.72 19.23 5.03 7.39 -2.36 12.42
1997 7.08 7.62 -0.53 14.70 5.41 8.63 -3.23 14.04
1998 7.61 6.86 0.75 14.47 5.71 11.01 -5.30 16.72
1999 7.22 8.98 -1.76 16.20 5.26 11.18 -5.91 16.44
Mean 8.19 6.85 1.34 15.05 4.76 8.47 -3.70 13.23
Std. Dev. 1.47 1.52 1.95 2.27 1.04 1.82 2.18 2.02
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Figure III
Aggregate Job Flow Rates for Belgium and France (continuing firms only)
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Figure III (cont.)
Aggregate Job Flow Rates by Country for Italy and UK (continuing firms only)
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Table IV
Correlations Between Gross Job Flows and Net Employment Change
Country
Belgium
France
Italy
UK
(1)
(POS-NET)
0.78
(0.01)
0.95
(0.00)
0.67
(0.07)
0.52
(0.15)
(2)
(NEG-NET)
-0.95
(0 .00)
-0.48
(0.23)
-0.64
(0.08)
-0.90
(0.00)
(3)
(POS-NEG)
- 0.68
(0.04)
-0.38
(0.35)
0.09
(0.82)
- 0.22
(0.57)
(4)
(SUM-NET)
-0.17
(0.67)
-0.05
(0.91)
-0.05
(0.91)
-0.38
(0.31)
(5)
VAR(NEG)
VAR{POS)
1.72
0.41
1.08
3.08
(6) (7)
VAR(POS) VAR(NEG)
POS
0.15
0.55
0.26
0.25
NEG
0.19
0.22
0.34
0.44
Notes: Columns (l)-(4) report Spearman correlations with marginal significance levels in parentheses. The variance ratio’s reported in column (5) are F- 
distributed if populations are (nearly) normal and independent. Under the null hypothesis that VAR{NEG) < VAR{POS) ,  the test statistics reported in 
column (5) have to be compared to the 5% critical values of 3.18 for Belgium and the UK and 3.44 for France and Italy. Columns (6) and (7) report coefficients 
of variation.
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and highly insignificant, suggesting job destruction is as volatile as job creation. 
Column (5) restates the counter-cyclical path of the job reallocation rate in the UK 
and its a-cyclical dynamics in Continental European countries. Finally, columns (6) 
and (7) report the coefficients of variation for both the job creation and destruction 
rate. Expressed as a percentage of their mean, job destruction rates seem to be more 
volatile than job creation rates in the UK whereas less clear results hold for Belgium 
and Italy and the opposite seems to be true for France. Job reallocation rates are 
counter-cyclical in the UK due to stronger counter-cyclicality in job destruction rates 
whereas job reallocation rates are a-cyclical in Belgium and Italy and pro-cyclical in 
Fiance.
Given high average establishment size in the UK, regression-to-the-mean bias 
could imply the results above. However, the reported coefficients in columns (6) and 
(7) of Table IV partially control for sample selection since the estimates reflect 
standardised measures of volatility. Moreover, for the regression fallacy to be at work, 
two conditions need to be satisfied: growth rates must be higher for smaller 
establishments and there must be some degree of sample selection. If samples are 
randomly drawn within each country, differences in population firm size distributions 
might still imply differences in the cyclical behavior of job creation and destruction 
rates if growth rates are not proportional. Given the identical sampling criteria for 
France, Italy and the UK, sample selection can only occur if reporting employment 
changes is more likely for bigger firms in the UK and smaller firms in France and 
Italy. However, there is no obvious reason why this hypothesis would be likely to 
hold. It is therefore more likely differences in establishment size densities explain the
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counter-cyclicality of job reallocation in the UK relative to mainland European 
countries.
Table V examines the counter-cyclicality of job turnover for each country- 
industry cell. The estimates reflect that the rank correlation between job reallocation 
and net employment growth can be negative or positive even within countries. For 
example, the correlation coefficient is positive and significant for France when 
pooling all industries. However, 9 out of 23 industries still report negative 
correlations. In Italy, 8 out of 23 industries report positive rank correlations whereas 
overall the estimate is negative and significant. Even in the UK where the pooled 
estimate is negative and highly statistically significant, 9 sectors report insignificant 
correlations. However, since no clear industry pattern can be found across countries, 
the cyclicality of employment flows seems to be partially country-industry specific.
So far it has been assumed all time variation in employment flows to emerge from 
temporary productivity or demand shocks. However, part of the variation in job flow 
rates can be due to time trends in flow series. Regressing job flow rates onto a 
constant and a linear time trend informs that job creation has increased gradually in 
the UK during the 1990s. The estimate (marginal significance level) is 0.31% (1.4%). 
In France, job creation also shows a significant upward trend of 0.48% (4.1%) but 
median and robust regressions both make the coefficient insignificant due to the 
influential year 1999. Using the job destruction rate as the dependent variable, robust 
regression yields an estimate of -0.35% (8.8%) for France whereas 0.44% (4.7%) is 
found for Italy using OLS. The job reallocation rate shows an upward trend in the UK 
of 0.58% (2.2%) annually. An upward trend in net growth rates is found for France
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Table V
Coefficients of Correlation between Job Reallocation and Net Growth by Conntry-Indnstry Cells
Industry
Belgium France Italy UK
Food (15) -0.60 (0.09) 0.09 (0.82) -0.67 (0.07) 0.07 (0.86)
Tobacco (16) -0.77 (0.01) -1.00(0.00) -0.25 (0.54) -0.97 (0.00)
Textiles (17) -0.45 (0.22) -0.26 (0.53) 0.02 (0.95) -0.67 (0.05)
Apparel (18) -0.75 (0.02) -0.59(0.12) -0.78 (0.02) -0.28 (0.46)
Leather (19) -0.50(0.17) -0.76 (0.03) -0.57(0.14) -0.15 (0.70)
Wood (20) -0.18(0.64) 0.26 (0.53) 0.21 (0.61) 0.10(0.80)
Paper (21) -0.48 (0.19) 0.31 (0.45) 0.26(0.53) -0.28 (0.46)
Publishing (22) 0.30 (0.43) 0.17(0.69) -0.48 (0.23) -0.08 (0.83)
Petroleum (23) -0.50(0.17) -0.24 (0.57) 0.24 (0.57) -0.42 (0.26)
Chemicals (24) 0.22 (0.57) -0.52(0.18) 0.55(0.16) -0.68 (0.04)
Rubber (25) 0.08 (0.83) 0.40 (0.32) -0.09 (0.82) -0.47 (0.20)
Other non-metals (26) -0.23 (0.54) 0.07 (0.87) -0.19(0.65) -0.62 (0.08)
Basic metals (27) -0.43 (0.24) -0.43 (0.29) -0.64 (0.08) -0.67 (0.05)
Fabricated metals (28) 0.15 (0.70) 0.14(0.73) -0.24 (0.57) -0.52(0.15)
Machinery (29) -0.65 (0.06) 0.00(1.00) 0.24 (0.57) -0.82 (0.01)
Office machinery (30) 0.48 (0.19) -0.36 (0.38) -0.33 (0.42) -0.07 (0.86)
Elec. machinery (31) -0.53 (0.14) 0.05 (0.91) 0.26 (0.53) -0.51 (0.15)
Communication (32) -0.53 (0.14) 0.76(0.03) -0.02 (0.95) -0.57 (0.11)
Precision (33) -0.33 (0.38) -0.26(0.53) -0.14(0.73) -0.27 (0.49)
Vehicles (34) -0.20 (0.60) 0.33 (0.42) -0.36 (0.38) -0.88 (0.00)
Other transport (35) -0.47 (0.20) -0.74 (0.04) 0.48 (0.23) -0.15(0.70)
Furniture (36) -0.52(0.15) 0.26 (0.53) -0.45 (0.26) -0.72 (0.03)
Recycling (37) 0.17(0.67) 0.67 (0.07) -0.09 (0.82) 0.53(0.14)
All sectors -0.09 (0.18) 0.19(0.01) -0.15(0.04) -0.29 (0.00)
Notes: the numbers reported are Spearman correlation coefficients (marginal significance level) between SUM and NET.
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with an average annual increase of 0.61% (1.8%) and a negative trend of -0.67% 
(0.8%) is found for Italy due to observed high job creation in the first half of the 
sampling period. The observed upward trends in job creation in the UK and France 
and job destruction in Italy as well as the estimated downward trend of job destruction 
in France suggest structural changes in employment dynamics.
To summarise, this section observed pro-cyclical job creation and counter-cyclical 
job destruction rates in all four countries. Moreover, estimates show job destruction is 
more cyclically volatile in the UK, implying counter-cyclical job reallocation. Job 
reallocation rates are a-cyclical in Belgium and Italy and pro-cyclical in France. 
Symmetry of job creation and destruction can arise as a Mortensen-Pissarides 
outcome in which it is time consuming for firms to lay-off workers, as shown by 
Garibaldi (1998). However, besides country specific differences in job flow series, 
time variation in employment flows using country-industry cells learns that cyclical 
behavior differs between industries within each country. Moreover, the results suggest 
cyclicality is partially country-industry specific since no clear industry pattern can be 
found across countries. Finally, part of the observed variation in employment flows is 
captured by linear trends in job creation and destruction rates. Estimates for France 
reveal an upward trend in job creation and a downward trend in job destruction. Job 
destruction in Italy has gradually increased during the sampling period whereas for 
the UK a significant upward trend in job creation is found, reflecting persistent 
structural changes in employment dynamics.
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IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF COUNTRY, INDUSTRY AND YEAR 
FIXED EFFECTS IN GROSS JOB FLOWS
This section aims to decompose the variation in job flow rates into within-group 
and between-group components. Within-group variation reflects changes of job flow 
rates over time within a country-industry cell. Between-group variation only uses 
country, industry or country-industry cell specific differences that are persistent over 
time. To quantify alternative sources of variation in employment-flow data, estimating 
equations take the following form:
4  2 3  8
(7) xict = H + Y .ac * countryc + £  A * industry, + £  y, *yeart +sict
c= l /=1 f= l
4  2 3  8
such that = 0 a n d = 0 and ^ y t = 0.
c= l /=1 /=1
where xlct is the job creation, job destruction, job reallocation or net growth rate of
industry i in country c at time t and n  is the grand mean. Vectors countryc, industry,
and year, are column vectors of country, industry and time dummies respectively.
Vectors a c, ft, and yt are row vectors of country dummy, industry dummy and time
dummy coefficients and £tct is an idiosyncratic shift parameter. The country and
industry dummies capture part of the between-variation in the dependent variable. 
Country dummy coefficients capture country specific differences that are common 
across industries and over time or a country fixed effect. Similarly, industry dummy 
coefficients capture an industry fixed effect.
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Table VI shows the time-averaged gross job flows for each country-industry 
cell. Differences in the estimates of Table VI between countries give rise to a country 
fixed effect whereas differences between industries common across countries reflect 
an industry fixed effect. In line with Figure I, Figure IV plots the time-averaged job 
creation and destruction rates from Table VI. It immediately follows from Figure IV 
that taking time averages controls for the business cycle but does not exclude 
transitory dynamics in job creation and destruction rates. Comparing countries, the 
majority of Belgian and British industries experienced higher job destruction on 
average. French industries are equally distributed around the diagonal whereas the 
majority of Italian industries had stronger job creation. Finally, time dummies capture 
part of the within-variation in the dependent variable or a time fixed effect.
IV A  Country fixed effects
A necessary condition for country specific differences to be important is a 
relatively large R-squared using (7) and setting /?, and yt equal to zero.41 The R- 
squareds are given in Table VII and are 17.62% (job creation rate), 3.38% (job 
destruction rate), 10.94% (job reallocation rate and 2.27% (net growth rate). In
41 The fact that the R-squared obtained after applying OLS to (7) while setting and yt equal to 0
measures the between country variation common across industries is also seen through the following 
variance decomposition:
I-1 c - l  (-1  / - I  e - l  » - l N  / - I  c-1  c-1
where bars indicate averages. The left hand side measures overall variation in x^. The first term on the 
right hand side captures within-group variation. The penultimate term on the right hand side measures 
the importance of between industry variance within countries whereas the last term gives weight to 
between country differences common across industries. A similar decomposition of the between-group 
variation can be derived in which the last term reflects the importance of an industry fixed effect. Also 
note that the above variance decomposition illustrates the orthogonality of country, industry and time 
fixed effects.
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Table VI
Job Flow Rates by Industry for Belgian and French Manufacturing (in %)
Belgium France
Job Job Net Job Job Job Net Job
Industry Creation Destruction Change Reallocation Creation Destruction Change Reallocation
Food (15) 4.74 5.03 -0.29 9.77 5.73 4.38 1.35 10.11
Tobacco (16) 2.72 6.61 -3.89 9.32 0.00 4.77 -4.76 4.77
Textiles (17) 4.62 5.79 -1.17 10.41 4.05 5.78 -1.73 9.84
Apparel (18) 3.22 8.57 -5.35 11.79 4.75 5.66 -0.90 10.41
Leather (19) 2.06 7.14 -5.08 9.20 2.98 5.13 -2.14 8.11
Wood (20) 5.33 5.46 -0.14 10.79 6.03 3.83 2.19 9.86
Paper (21) 3.57 4.78 -1.21 8.36 5.14 4.34 0.79 9.48
Publishing (22) 4.89 4.84 0.06 9.73 5.24 4.44 0.80 9.69
Petroleum (23) 1.04 4.48 -3.43 5.52 2.17 7.50 -5.33 9.68
Chemicals (24) 2.94 3.21 -0.26 6.15 4.75 3.74 1.02 8.49
Rubber (25) 5.03 4.06 0.97 9.09 4.79 3.43 1.36 8.22
Other non-metals (26) 3.45 4.27 -0.82 7.73 3.25 4.66 -1.40 7.91
Basic metals (27) 1.46 4.80 -3.35 6.26 2.44 4.03 -1.60 6.47
Fabricated metals (28) 5.72 5.19 0.53 10.91 5.13 4.52 0.61 9.65
Machinery (29) 3.78 5.60 -1.82 9.37 4.07 4.49 -0.42 8.55
Office machinery (30) 8.02 5.86 2.16 13.87 4.25 8.14 -3.89 12.39
Elec. machinery (31) 3.14 4.55 -1.40 7.69 4.38 4.67 -0.29 9.05
Communication (32) 2.02 6.89 -4.88 8.91 7.47 4.55 2.92 12.02
Precision (33) 4.87 5.84 -0.97 10.71 5.31 7.94 -2.63 13.25
Vehicles (34) 3.14 4.75 -1.61 7.89 8.55 5.64 2.91 14.18
Other transport (35) 3.46 5.94 -2.47 9.40 1.91 7.39 -5.48 9.30
Furniture (36) 4.30 6.24 -1.95 10.54 5.11 4.73 0.38 9.84
Recycling (37) 6.96 6.28 0.68 13.24 7.01 3.87 3.14 10.87
Notes: Industry numbers in brackets refer to 2-digit NACE Rev.l classifications.
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Table VI (cont.)
Job Flow Rates by Industry for Italian and UK Manufacturing (in %)
Job
Italy
Job Net Job Job
United Kingdom 
Job Net Job
Industry Creation Destruction Change Reallocation Creation Destruction Change Realloci
Food (15) 8.83 6.48 2.35 15.32 5.81 7.00 -1.19 12.81
Tobacco (16) 10.12 24.74 -14.62 34.87 0.33 5.50 -5.16 5.83
Textiles (17) 7.02 4.30 2.72 11.32 4.89 8.28 -3.39 13.17
Apparel (18) 6.93 10.61 -3.68 17.55 5.26 7.72 -2.46 12.98
Leather (19) 8.93 4.69 4.24 13.62 5.21 8.77 -3.56 13.98
Wood (20) 7.70 3.91 3.79 11.61 6.35 6.79 -0.45 13.14
Paper (21) 7.52 3.01 4.51 10.53 5.20 7.40 -2.19 12.60
Publishing (22) 7.44 12.45 -5.01 19.89 6.72 8.14 -1.42 14.87
Petroleum (23) 11.73 7.62 4.11 19.35 6.51 23.52 -17.01 30.03
Chemicals (24) 11.40 4.79 6.61 16.20 3.95 9.94 -5.99 13.89
Rubber (25) 9.36 3.71 5.65 13.07 6.43 6.36 0.07 12.80
Other non-metals (26) 7.45 5.16 2.30 12.61 4.46 10.34 -5.88 14.79
Basic metals (27) 8.45 8.09 0.36 16.53 3.53 8.91 -5.39 12.44
Fabricated metals (28) 8.22 9.52 -1.30 17.74 5.18 8.84 -3.66 14.02
Machinery (29) 9.30 6.13 3.16 15.43 4.69 8.47 -3.77 13.16
Office machinery (30) 7.11 14.53 -7.41 21.64 5.44 9.54 -4.10 14.99
Elec. machinery (31) 9.82 7.28 2.54 17.10 4.22 11.42 -7.20 15.64
Communication (32) 8.87 5.65 3.22 14.52 6.59 11.94 -5.35 18.53
Precision (33) 9.50 4.20 5.30 13.71 4.51 5.83 -1.32 10.34
Vehicles (34) 6.44 7.26 -0.83 13.70 3.31 8.26 -4.95 11.58
Other transport (35) 11.74 7.54 4.21 19.28 4.11 10.11 -5.99 14.22
Furniture (36) 7.27 6.67 0.61 13.94 6.23 6.76 -0.53 12.99
Recycling (37) 14.59 22.21 -7.62 36.80 7.84 6.88 0.95 14.72
Notes: Industry numbers in brackets refer to 2-digit NACE Rev.I classifications.
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Figure IV
Time Averaged Job Creation and Destruction Rates by Country (in %)
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Figure IV (cont)
Time Averaged Job Creation and Job Destruction Rates by Country (in %)
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Notes: Plotted numbers refer to 2-digit NACE Rev.l classifications. See Table 2. Job creation and 
destruction rates fo r Italy and the UK are censored at 15%, dropping from the plot industries 16 and 
37for Italy and 23 fo r the UK.
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Table VH
Fixed Effects in Gross Job Flows, 1992-1999
Dependent variable
Controls
POS NEG SUM NET
Belgium -0.016** -0.015** -0.032** -0.002
France -0.011** -0.018** -0.030** 0.008
Italy 0.033** 0.013* 0.046** 0.020**
UK -0.005* 0.020** 0.015** -0.026**
Food (15) 0.007 -0.012 -0.006 0.019
Tobacco (16) -0.023** 0.032* 0.008 -0.055**
Textiles (17) -0.004 -0.009 -0.013 0.005
Apparel (18) -0.006 0.011 0.006 -0.017
Leather (19) -0.008 -0.005 -0.013 -0.003
Wood (20) 0.008 -0.019 -0.011 0.027
Paper(21) -0.003 -0.020 -0.023 0.018
Publishing (22) 0.005 0.004 0.009 0.001
Petroleum (23) -0.003 0.040** 0.037* -0.042
Chemicals (24) 0.001 -0.015 -0.014 0.016
Rubber (25) 0.008 -0.025* -0.017 0.034*
Other non-metals (26) -0.009 -0.008 -0.017 -0.001
Basic metals (27) -0.017* -0.005 -0.022 -0.011
Fabricated metals (28) 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.005
Machinery (29) -0.002 -0.008 -0.009 0.006
Office machinery (30) 0.007 0.024* 0.031* -0.017
Elec. machinery (31) -0.003 0.000 -0.002 -0.003
Communication (32) 0.006 0.004 0.010 0.002
Precision (33) 0.004 -0.010 -0.006 0.015
Vehicles (34) -0.003 -0.005 -0.008 0.002
Other transport (35) -0.003 0.008 0.004 -0.011
Furniture (36) 0.001 -0.008 -0.007 0.010
Recycling (37) 0.034** 0.026* 0.061** 0.008
1992 -0.003 -0.010 -0.012 0.007
1993 -0.012** -0.003 -0.016 -0.009
1994 -0.001 -0.013 -0.014 0.012
1995 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 0.006
1996 0.005 0.016 0.021* -0.011
1997 -0.005 0.010 0.006 -0.015
1998 0.005 -0.005 0.001 0.010
1999 0.008* 0.008 0.017 -0.001
grand mean 0.056** 0.070** 0.126** -0.013**
R-squared 0.25 0.09 0.17 0.08
R-squared =0, yt =0 0.18 0.03 0.11 0.02
F-value fii =O,yt=0 55.63 10.31 32.36 7.61
R-squared a c = 0, yt =0 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04
F-value a c =0, yt =0 1.96 1.32 1.50 1.41
Notes: ** indicates significance at 1% level * indicates significance at 5% level. Industry numbers 
refer to 2-digit NACE Rev.l classification. Reported F-values are F-test statistics for the joint 
significance of included attributes. The number of observations is 782.
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particular, this result suggests about one fifth of the variance in job creation is 
captured by persistent country specific differences.
Turning to the significance of point estimates, the existence of country specific 
differences requires the significance of the country dummy coefficients in (7). Table 
VII shows that point estimates for the job creation rate are all statistically significant 
and the estimated grand mean is 5.56%. The predicted time-averaged job creation 
rates are 3.96% (Belgium), 4.46% (France), 8.86% (Italy) and 5.06% (United 
Kingdom). Point estimates for the job destruction rate are all highly statistically 
significant. The predicted grand mean for the job destruction rate is 7% and the 
predicted time-averaged job destruction rates are 5.5% (Belgium), 5.2% (France), 
8.3% (Italy) and 9% (United Kingdom). The predicted job reallocation rates are 9.5% 
(Belgium), 9.6% (France), 17.2% (Italy) and 14.1% (United Kingdom). Net growth 
rates deviate significantly from the estimated grand mean (-1.3%) in Italy (2%) and 
the UK (-2.6%). Finally, Table VII also reports F-values being F-test statistics for the 
joint significance of attributes included in the regressions. Country dummies are 
jointly statistically significant at the 1% level for all measures of job flows.
The estimates therefore reflect the presence of a country fixed effect. But this 
effect is partially driven by above average job creation in Italy and job destruction in 
the UK. To assess the importance of these outliers, the periods 1991-1995 for Italy 
and 1996-1999 for the UK can be excluded from the regression analysis. For the job 
creation rate, discarding observations in the first half of the sampling period for Italy 
and in the second half for the UK does not change point estimates. For the job 
destruction rate, the coefficient for Italy is 0.032 and becomes statistically significant
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at the 1% level whereas the coefficient for the UK becomes insignificant. Using the 
job reallocation rate as the dependent variable leaves the coefficient for the UK 
insignificant. Finally, the country dummy coefficients are all individually statistically 
insignificant when net growth rates are used as the dependent variable. Therefore, 
similarities in net employment growth rates mask country specific differences in job 
creation and destruction. Relative to the UK, Italy has experienced higher and 
Belgium and France have experienced lower job creation and destruction on average.
Explaining country specific variation in employment dynamics requires 
attributes that differ between countries and are correlated with job creation and 
destruction rates such as differences in labor market regulation. The usual suspects are 
income taxes, unemployment benefits and employment protection such as firing taxes. 
Empirically however, these policy variables are likely to be correlated. For example, 
Boeri et al. (2001) show unemployment benefits and firing taxes are negatively 
correlated. Besides omitted variable bias, some covariates may suffer from 
simultaneity bias as well. For example, Ichino et al. (2001) argue employment 
protection legislation can be influenced by aggregate labor market conditions like 
unemployment. Consequently, this chapter does not attempt to detect causal 
relationships between policy variables and employment flows but suggests further 
research on the importance of labor market institutions in Continental European 
countries would be welcome.
IV.B Industry fixed effects
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Industry dummies capture industry specific variation that is common across 
countries. Considering (7) and setting a c and yt equal to 0, the R-squared measures
the importance of between industry variations common across countries. The R- 
squareds are 5.09% (job creation rate), 4.21% (job destruction rate), 4.57% (job 
reallocation rate) and 4.24% (net growth rate). These numbers already question the 
existence of a dominant industry fixed effect in employment flows.
Alternatively, the significance of the industry dummy coefficients in (7) 
informs about the presence of an industry fixed effect. Point estimates are given in 
Table VII. OLS estimates for the job creation rate are not statistically significant 
except for tobacco, basic metals and recycling industries with only the latter showing 
higher than average job creation across countries. Point estimates for the job 
destruction rate are not statistically significant except for 5 out of 23 industries. 
Particular is higher job destruction in tobacco, petroleum and recycling industries. 
Using the job reallocation rate as the dependent variable an industry fixed effect is 
observed for petroleum and recycling industries, driven by a strong process of job 
destruction and creation respectively. The last column of Table VII reads that on 
average some industries grew and others contracted but differences are not 
statistically significant. The reported F-values in Table VR are smaller and reflect the 
joint significance of industry dummies only for the job creation rate as the dependent 
variable. Controlling for possible sampling error yields similar results. These results 
do not allow to conclude that persistent industry specific differences are important.
The absence of an industry fixed effect does not support earlier findings by 
Baldwin, Dunne and Haltiwanger (1998) who use comparable data for US and
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Canadian manufacturing covering the period 1973-1993. They conclude that common 
technologies as well as other common elements dominate the long-run structural 
relationship between industries. Accordingly, they argue, it is difficult to distinguish 
between both countries in terms of the industrial structure of gross job-flow rates. 
However, the analysis here learns that this result cannot be generalised to all 
industrialised economies.
IV. C Time fixed effects and interaction effects
A time fixed effect captures part of the within-group variation in employment 
flows. The insignificance of year dummy coefficients in Table VII reflects that 
productivity or demand shocks are not common across countries and industries or do 
not affect employment dynamics similarly in different country-industry cells.
The modelling of interaction effects between time and country or industry 
dummies enables to capture time-variation within country-industry cells that is 
country or industry specific. Estimating equations take the following form:
3  7  2 1
(8) xtct=fi + Y da c * countryc *yeart + '^K ct * country cXyeart +eict
C=l /= ]  ct= 1
or
2 2  7  1 5 4
(9) xtct=^i + ^ p {* industryt + * yeart + £  A„ * industrytXyeart +
<=i r=i u=i
where countrycXyeart and industryXyeart are column vectors of dummy variables, 
one for each country-year or industry-year couple respectively.
Applying OLS to (8) while dropping Belgium and 1992, the joint significance 
of the interaction coefficients involving each country informs about a country-year
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Table VIII
Interactions of Country and Time Effects in Gross Job Flows
Dependent variable
POS NEG SUM NET
country-year
specific effect for
France 0.844 0.880 0.845 0.897
Italy 0.032 0.116 0.111 0.078
UK 0.513 0.272 0.520 0.188
Adjusted R-squared of estimating
equation including
country dummies 0.173 0.030 0.106 0.019
country and time dummies
and interaction effects 0.190 0.044 0.127 0.028
Notes: The numbers are marginal significance levels of tests for the joint significance of all 
interactions containing the dummy in the first row of the table.
specific effect. The numbers in the top panel of Table VIII are marginal significance 
levels of such tests. The reported p-values indicate that country-year specific 
variation in employment flows is statistically insignificant. Relatively low p-values 
for Italy can be explained by above average job creation in 1996 and below average 
job creation in 1997 and above average job destruction in the period 1995-1997. 
Therefore, aggregate shocks that are country specific do not seem to fit the variation 
in employment flows very well. Moreover, Table VIII illustrates point estimates are 
relatively small in absolute value. This result follows from the similarity between 
adjusted R-squareds using (7) and (8) while setting /?, and yt equal to zero: fixed time
effects and interaction effects only add little to the explained variation in the 
dependent variable.
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Table IX
Interactions of Industry and Time Effects in Gross Job Flows
Dependent variable
POS NEG SUM NET
Industry-year 
specific effect for
Tobacco (16) 0.871 0.038 0.173 0.050
Textiles (17) 0.982 0.999 0.999 0.999
Apparel (18) 0.999 0.996 0.999 0.994
Leather (19) 0.982 0.997 0.997 0.993
Wood (20) 0.943 0.999 0.997 0.997
Paper (21) 0.998 0.999 0.999 0.999
Publishing (22) 0.968 0.944 0.971 0.924
Petroleum (23) 0.321 0.095 0.387 0.036
Chemicals (24) 0.934 0.999 0.998 0.995
Rubber (25) 0.999 0.999 0.998 0.999
Other non-metals (26) 0.999 0.994 0.996 0.998
Basic metals (27) 0.999 0.992 0.996 0.996
Fabricated metals (28) 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
Machinery (29) 0.999 0.998 0.998 0.999
Office machinery (30) 0.745 0.829 0.784 0.836
Elec. machinery (31) 0.994 0.999 0.999 0.997
Communication (32) 0.992 0.996 0.989 0.998
Precision (33) 0.922 0.992 0.972 0.992
Vehicles (34) 0.332 0.923 0.622 0.943
Other transport (35) 0.576 0.925 0.957 0.731
Furniture (36) 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.998
Recycling (37) 0.846 0.003 0.032 0.006
Adjusted R-squared of estimating 
equation including
industry dummies 0.022 0.013 0.016 0.013
industry and time dummies
and interaction effects -0.060 -0.015 -0.044 -0.007
Notes: The numbers are marginal significance levels of tests for the joint significance o f all 
interactions containing the dummy in the first row of the table. Industry numbers refer to 2-digit NACE 
Rev.l classification.
Equation (9) allows for the presence of industry-year specific effects. Marginal 
significance levels of interactions effects by industry are given in Table IX. The 
relative low p-value for the tobacco industry can be explained by larger job
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destruction in 1996 across countries. Also, significant above average job destruction 
in recycling in 1995 is reflected in the presence of an industry-year specific effect. All 
in all, evidence for a prevalent industry-year specific effect is not very strong. 
Comparison of the R-squareds excluding and including time dummies and interaction 
effects from the estimating equation learns that including time dummies and 
interaction terms decreases the model’s adjusted R-squared: fixed time effects and 
interaction effects add nothing to the explained variation in the dependent variable.
To conclude, estimates do not reveal the presence of a country-year or 
industry-year specific effect in employment dynamics. This implies the cyclicality of 
employment flows is neither country nor industry specific. Therefore, besides an 
overall country fixed effect, country-industry specific or “residual” variation in 
employment flows best explains job creation and destruction.
V. CONCLUSIONS
One paper allowing for a consistent comparison of gross flows of jobs 
between countries is Baldwin, Dunne and Haltiwanger (1998) using harmonised data 
for manufacturing industries in Canada and the US. They find that job destruction is 
more cyclically volatile than job creation in both countries but more so in the US and 
that industries with high (low) gross job flows in Canada are characterized by high 
(low) gross job flows in the US. Accordingly, this result suggests that country specific 
differences are not important and that the process of job reallocation in both countries 
is best explained by an industry fixed effect.
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This chapter uses information on manufacturing establishments during the 
1990s in four European countries: Belgium, France, Italy and the UK. The strength of 
the analysis comes from the fact that the data are comparable across countries and 
manufacturing industries: the sampling criteria, the time frame and the sector 
composition are uniformly defined. Furthermore, the data cover the majority of 
manufacturing employment in all four countries. The results suggest 1) job 
destruction is more cyclically volatile only in the UK and 2) a country fixed effect 
dominates the between-variation in employment flows.
As shown theoretically by Garibaldi (1998), symmetric behavior of job 
creation and destruction over the business cycle can arise as an outcome in which it is 
time consuming for firms to lay-off workers due to firing frictions. Besides the 
potential impact of labor market regulation on the cyclicality of employment flows, 
different labor market institutions in Continental European countries could also 
explain an important part of the country specific differences in employment dynamics.
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
Every day, the continuous mutations of our labor markets affect the income and job 
prospects of many workers. In this respect, the past thirty years have been no exception. 
Wage inequality has increased considerably and an ever higher educated workforce is 
increasingly employed in both low-paid and high-paid service jobs. These are the 
changes that this thesis aimed to explain.
First, it would be natural to assume that the increase in wage inequality together with 
the relative increase in high-paid service jobs could be explained by an increase in the 
relative demand for skilled labor or skill-biased technological change (SBTC). But the 
SBTC hypothesis is only a partial truth since it seems best able to explain what is 
happening in the top half of the wage distribution but is uninformative about the 
increasing employment shares of workers in low-wage service jobs. There, the more 
nuanced view about the impact of technology recently proposed by Autor, Levy and 
Mumane [2003] (ALM) seems more appropriate and it seems plausible that the relative 
demand for routine middling jobs has fallen. This thesis has provided UK evidence of 
increased job polarization between 1975 and 1999 that is consistent with the ALM 
hypothesis. Moreover, it has argued that an important part of the increase in wage 
inequality both at the top and the bottom of the wage distribution can be explained by job 
polarization. However, the finding that during the 1980s the wages in the lowest paid jobs 
are falling relative to those in the middling jobs presents something of a puzzle for the 
ALM hypothesis. But more recent studies (Autor, Katz and Kearney [2004] and Goos and 
Manning [2005]) have argued that the ALM hypothesis seems consistent with the 
deceleration of growth in lower tail inequality since the late 1990s. More precisely, it is
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argued that earnings as well as employment of workers in low-paid jobs (relative to the 
middling jobs) increased during the late 1990s. Since it seems crucial for the ALM 
hypothesis to see what has happened to the relative wages of workers in jobs intense in 
non-routine manual tasks, I therefore think one idea worth pursuing would be to look 
deeper into the measurement of task premiums and their changes over time.
Crudely, the continuing investment by the UK government in making higher 
education ever more accessible seems at odds with the documented increase in the 
relative demand for workers in low-wage jobs. Not only are college workers more likely 
to be paid a high school wage due to job polarization, the continuous expansion of higher 
education also reduces the college premium through an increase in the relative supply of 
college workers. More precisely, this thesis has argued that fluctuations in the rate of 
growth of the relative supply of college workers can explain an important part of the 
changes in earnings dispersion. To this end, it was shown that the fall in educational 
attainment growth rates for cohorts bom between 1955 and 1970 could explain an 
important part of the rise in the average college premium and therefore wage inequality 
after 1980. Consequently, as cohorts bom after 1970 will come of age, the college 
premium and wage inequality are expected to fall relative to the impact of any increase in 
the relative demand for low-paid and high-paid service jobs following the recent 
expansion of Britain’s higher education system.
The relative importance of low-wage service jobs is also expected to increase in 
Continental European countries due to increased product market competition. This could 
happen indirectly through the increasing trend towards outsourcing of mainly routine 
middling jobs but also directly through product market deregulation. For example,
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following the deregulation of shop closing hours in the US and the UK, policy makers in 
most Continental European countries are under increasing pressure to allow shops to 
open on Sunday. This thesis has argued that one important effect of such deregulation 
would be an increase in retail employment in deregulating industries but only if 
consumers have a sufficiently strong “taste” for Sunday shopping. Whether this is the 
case probably differs between countries. But even in those countries where consumers do 
not value their common leisure greatly, this thesis has shown that equally important in 
any debate about the employment impact of extending opening hours are retailing costs, 
pricing behavior, the competitive nature of retail markets and wage policies. Moreover, it 
was argued that the optimal policy maker would also account for the predicted fall in 
product demand and therefore retail employment in non-deregulating industries or 
countries.
Finally, this thesis has shown that also more persuasive regulation seems to affect 
employment in Continental European countries. In contrast to Anglo-Saxon countries 
where job destruction is more cyclically volatile than job creation and gross job flows are 
best captured by industry fixed effects, it was shown that job destruction is as cyclically 
volatile as job creation and that a country fixed effect dominates the between-country 
variation in gross job flows. For example, this can arise as an outcome in which it is time 
consuming for firms to lay-off workers due to firing frictions.
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